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It was an action of trover for scrip certificates. It appeared that one Tyrrell, being allottee of certain shares, sold to the defendant, who sold them to one Hull. The jury, however, found that Hull was acting for the plaintiff. Hull paid the deposit, and obtained the certificates, which he handed to the defendant, and upon his refusal to give them to the plaintiff, his action was brought. It was contended that, as the scrip certificates were not in existence at the time of the contract of sale to the plaintiff through Hull, trover could not be maintained, but that the action should have been upon the contract for non-delivery. Rule nisi.

DOE dem. GROVES v. GROVES.
Limitation Act-Estoppel.
Welsby moved, pursuant to leave, to enter a non-
suit, the Court to draw inferences as a jury.

It appeared that one William Hart died in 1798,
leaving his son, John Hart, then fifteen years of age,
heir to the premises in question. In December, 1798,
the widow, who was dowable, but never had dowry as-
signed to her, married the defendant, and after taking
out administration, occupied the premises. The son,
John Hart, lived there until 1805, when he came of
age, and up to 1841. The defendant's name was
painted upon the door, and the shop license was in
his name.
He also paid chief rent, and was rated to
the poor's rates. In 1842, the defendant applied to
the lessee of the plaintiff for 150l. as a loan, and then,
by the advice of an attorney, John Hart executed the
mortgage, under which the lessor of the plaintiff now
claimed, but the defendant was no party to the deed.
Under these circumstances there was no title in the
lessor of the plaintiff. The defendant's title was per-
fect by the effect of the Limitation Act. (Doe dem.
Jukes v. Somers, 14 M. & W. 39; Scott v. Dixon, 3
Drur. & Warren.) There was no estoppel. (Lyon v.
Reed, 13 M. & W.; Co. Litt. 352; Pickard v. Sears,
6 A. & E. 469.)

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Rule nisi.

REG. v. JONES.
Poor-rates-Exemptions_under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36-
Religious Tract Society.

No society can be exempted from rates under 6 & 7
Vict. c. 36, unless its laws expressly and in terms
prohibit any dividend, gift, division, or bonus in
money among any of its members.
Semble, that societies established for religious pur-
poses (as the Tract Society) are not within the mean-
ing of the Act.

This was an appeal under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36, against the certificate given by Mr. Tidd Pratt, to exempt the Religious Tract Society's premises in Paternosterrow from poor-rates. The Sessions quashed the certificate, subject to the opinion of the Court.

tribution, and shew that it would be directly against
the objects of the society, and a breach of trust
and duty so to apply the funds. The Court of
Chancery would interfere just the same whether there
was a written law against it or not. [WIGHTMAN,
J.-You say that the affirmative laws as to the dis-
position of the funds are equivalent to an express pro-
hibition.] Yes. Nor is there in fact any breach of
the proviso; the rules pointed out do not authorise
a division or bonus of money. They only give a spe-
cies of commission. But as this can be remedied by
the society passing an express law, the more im-
portant question is, whether the Religious Tract So-
ciety is within the statute. Is it to be said that re-
ligion, the highest source of poetry and all literature,
and the subject of all that is most permanent and
great in literature, is to exclude the society from the
benefit of the statute? The publication of the society
in almost every spoken tongue,-the circulation of
such works as "Pilgrim's Progress," "Butler," &c. is
in every way conducive to literature; and the higher
object they have in view is not to put them beneath
the societies aiming at more inferior and limited ends.
Could it be denied that a society instituted for the
cultivation of taste, which should seek this end solely
by selling cheap models and copies of works of art,
would be within the words "for the purposes of the
fine arts?" It is a monstrous thing to exclude reli-
gious literature from the character of literature.
Would not a writer of these tracts be entitled to the
benefits of the Literary Fund? Lord Bacon terms
religion the greatest of all sciences.

Lord DENMAN, C. J.-It appears to me that there
is no doubt that this does not comply with the terms
of the statute. That expressly requires that the so-
ciety shall not, and, by its rules, may not, make any
dividend, &c. It is not enough that the rules do not
permit any such division, but they must distinctly
prohibit it. We are asked as to the other point, and
although we give no decision upon it, yet I must say
that I entertain very great doubts upon it. It is a
forced construction of the words to say that it is a
literary purpose, because religion, which it seeks
to spread, is the highest of all species of literature. It
may seem strange that such bodies should not be
exempted, but it is still more odd that, if this argu-
ment be the correct one, literature should be put
after science in the statute.

PATTESON, J.-I think the first objection is fatal.
The words are express and distinct, and a prohibi-
tory law is essential. As to the other question, as
at present advised, I cannot think that the Religious
Tract Society can be called instituted for literary
purposes exclusively. Throughout its publications the
object is to spread religious knowledge.
WILLIAMS, J. and WIGHTMAN, J. concurred.
Order of Sessions confirmed.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK.
Thursday, April 16.

ROBINSON U. WARD.-Rule nisi for setting aside verdict
for plaintiff, and entering it for the defendant, on the ground
that proof of a tender of 71. "for rent" proved a tender of
71. parcel of the moneys mentioned in a declaration, which
contained counts for use and ocupation, work and labour,
money lent, money paid, and on an account stated.-Bram-
well.

JONES v. LITTLEWOOD.

Cur, adv. vult.

R. v. GREGORY.-Motion for judgment on the defendant,
who stands convicted of a libel on the Duke of Brunswick.
Postponed on the ground that judgment had not been signed.
Talfourd, S.

Robinson, in support of the order of Sessions.This society is not within 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36, s. 2. The words of that section exempt "premises belonging to any society instituted for purposes of science, literature, or the fine arts exclusively," provided such society shall not, and by its rules may not, make any dividend, gift, division, or bonus in money unto or among any of its members." To comply with this statute, it is not sufficient that the rules do not direct a division, but they must expressly forbid and prohibit it. The rules of the Religious Tract Society do not do this. In fact some division of the profits is made, for the 4th rule allows subscribers to purchase at reduced prices, and clergymen collecting for the society receive half the amount of the collection in books. These are supposed to be for distribution, but they may be sold if the parties think proper. But even if the rules here are sufficient, yet the Religious Tract Society is not within any of the classes mentioned. It must come under the head "literary," or none at all. Can it be said, looking at its rules and avowed objects, as shewn by all its reports, to be for literary purposes exclusively? Its object is to teach Christianity, to make men religious, to give them knowledge only in such a form as shall conduce to their salvation hereafter. Incidentally, literature may be encouraged, because this must be done through books; but this is an accidental means only, not the purpose for which it is instituted exclusively. They do not teach theology generally, but only limited sectarian notions, excluding the largest portion of literature, all ancient, and a great part of modern. Influencing set aside the verdict for the plaintiff upon a stamp objection. Postponed for the production of the deed. the mind to a particular course is their object, not Monday, April 20. instruction generally. Even their books containing WHITMORE AND OTHERS, Assignees of GREEN, v. LAKE. scientific knowledge are professedly written with reli--Talfourd, Serjt. moved to set aside the verdict for the degious views, and in a religious strain. The Anti- defendant, as against evidence. Corn-Law League, if it confined its exertions to GREEN. WINCOT.-Prendergast moved to set aside the printing and circulating publications, might claim verdict for the plaintiff, on certain issues, as against evidence. Cur. ado. vult, exemption with equal right. On both these grounds, LEWIS v. SAMUEL.-M. Chambers, Q. C. moved to rethe exemption cannot be allowed. duce damages, or to enter the verdict for the defendant, or for new trial.

Talfourd, Serjt.-The words "shall not" or "may not" cannot have the construction contended for, or the statute will be a dead letter. It must be taken with reference to the circumstances when it was passed. Its title and preamble shew that it was intended to exempt literary and scientific societies, yet no society of this kind contains such a rule in express terms. It would be an insult to insert such a rule, as much as saying the trustees shall not steal the funds. Take the Literary Fund for example. It suffices, if the rules do not authorise any such dis

PAGE V. HATCHETT.-Sir John Bayley moved to discharge the rule obtained by the defendants, the plaintiff agreeing to abandon so much of the second count as related to certain of the goods therein mentioned. The Court, in giving judge ment upon an application for a new trial in this case, had said that there was to be no rule if the plaintiff would abandon the count in trover within 14 days. Upon that count there had been a demurrer to the replication, and the plaintiff had obtained judgment upon that demurrer, so that by abandoning that count altogether they would give up the costs of the demurrer, which was not, he supposed, the intention of the Court. They were willing to abandon the whole of the second count, except that part to which the demurrer applied.

Rule nisi.

R. v. PELHAM.-Argument concluded. Cur, adv. vult.
Friday, April 17.
FOLLETT . ANDREW.
Cur, adv, vult.
DOE dem. BENNETT, v. HARRY.-V. Williams, moved to

Cur, adv. vult.

Rule refused as to the reduction of damages; as to
the other points, Cur.adv. vult.

DOE dem. DYKE v. DYKE.-Allen, Serjt. moved to set
aside the nonsuit in this case. Before his opening, the Lord
Chief Baron had nonsuited the plaintiff, considering that his
construction of the will could not be supported. It turned
upon the description of the premises.

Rule nisi.

the verdict for the plaintiff, on the ground of surprise, and
the improper admission of an agreement, or to reduce the
Rule refused.

PENDREY V. JONES.-Watson, Q. C. moved to set aside

damages.

REG. v. PARKER. REG v. LEWIS.-Points to be taken

when defendants brought up for judgment. In the former case Pearson subsequently applied to the Court to order the affidavits to be filed at once; but Shee, Serjt. objected, the course was not usual; and upon his undertaking that no others but those already sworn should be used, the Court re fused the order.

MOUNTAIN ..—Baines, Q. C. moved for a rule sis for setting aside verdict, and entering a nonsuit, for trespass, for taking sheep. The plaintiff derived his title to the sheep by having purchased them on a given day from a person, to whom the defendant had agreed to sell them on the next day, at a price certain, if that person should then be willing to take them at this price; and that, 1st, the contract between the defendant and that third person was void by the Statute of Frauds. 2nd, the defendant had the whole of the day following that of the sale to the plaintiff to avoid his con tract with the plaintiff's vendor; and, 3rd, that the bargain could only be transferred by the consent of all three parties,

Rule nisi.

PENROSE. EVANS. PENROSE v. EVANS.-Chilton, Q.C. moved for rules in each of these cases, which tarned upon the same deed, of a very peculiar character. Rules refused, HANCOCK ..—Chilton, Q. C. moved for a rule nisi, to enter nonsuit. Rule refused.

SMITH U. ARCHER.-Shee, Serjt. moved for a rule sisi to
set aside the verdict for the defendant, as against the evi-
dence. It was a question of fact as to the identity of a rail.
way proposed, and a railway executed. Rule refused.
moved for a rule nisi to reduce the damages. The question
DE FOINVILLE . DE BOINVILLE.-Dowling, Serjt.
was whether certain furniture were included in an assignment
of stock in trade.
Rule nisi, not to go into the new trial paper.
Cox v. BINGHAM.-Pigott moved for a rule misi to reduce
the damages.
Rule refused,
Wednesday, April 22.
REG. U. LORD MAYOR OF LONDON.-M. D. Hill, Q. C.
(with whom was Pulling) was heard in support of the right
of Mr. Ashurst to be admitted in the Lord Mayor's Court,
under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73.
Cur, ade, vuit.

Saturday, April 18.
HUMFREYS U. MARSH.
Cur, adv. vult.
damages, or for a new trial. Verdict for the plaintiff, dam
EVERSHED. BROWN.-Pigott moved to reduce the

ages 180/.

Rule nisi, unless the plaintiff would consent to reduce the damages to 1007.

Humfrey, Q.C. for the plaintiff, consented to the reduc

tion.

CHRISTIE v. PICKFORD.
VINCENT . DORE.

Cur, adv. culi.

Cur. ade, vult.

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(A note of this case next week.) DOE dem. HAYWARD U. TINSLEY.-Ejectment by mort gagee. The question was, whether the legal estate passed under a mortgage deed. Crompton moved for a rule to set aside the verdict, but the Court suggested a special ease. Rule nisi, unless a special case agreed upon. DOE dem. ANGEL v. ANGEL. Rule refused(This case will be reported next week.) LAURIE U. DAVIS. Cur. adr. vult. MORTIMER v. Moore. Leave to amend refused. BLUCK V. SIDERWAY.-Assumpsit for money had and received, to recover a sum of money handed to the defendant as treasurer of a club. The defence was that the son of the plaintiff was the subscriber to the club; that the money had

received from him; and that the defendant was liable to him. The case was tried before the Undersheriff of Staf

fordshire, who left to the jury the question whether the mo
ney was the money of the plaintiff. Petersdorf moved for
a new trial, on the ground of misdirection. The proper
question for the jury was, whether the son had deposited the
money as agent for his father.
Rule nisi.

Wedesday, April 22.

to give a bond to Mr. Mourilyan under the Municipal Cor REG. v. SANDWICH.-Demurrer to a return to mandamus, porations Act. The question turned upon the right of the corporation to traverse certain points, which had been admitted upon a return to a former mandamus, on behalf of Mr. Mourilyan. Whitehurst, Q.C. (with whom was Wood), in support of demurrer. Peacock, contrà.

Judgment for the Crown, aud peremptory mandamus ordered. Judgment in the following cases will be delivered on Mon day, the 27th inst.:

SOLOMON U. LAWSON.

GRIFFITHS v. LEWIS.
REG. v. DOUGLAS.
ALFRED v. FARLOW.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,

Tuesday, April 21, 1846. TOUCH v. STRAWBRIDGE. A contracted with B, for the support of A's illegitimate child. At the time of the contract, it was contemplated that it should continue for more than a year. It was, however, agreed that B should keep the child as long as A pleased, and should be paid monthly. Held that this was not a contract within the meaning of the phrase, "not to be performed within the space of one year, ," in the 4th section of the Statute of

Frauds.

Semble-The statute relates only to actions brought to recover damages for the non-performance of executory contracts, and not to actions, brought to recover payment of a debt due in respect of an executed consideration.

This was an action of indebitatus assumpsit, for

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the lodging and maintenance of, and for goods supplied to, a certain child, at the request of the defendant.

Plea, non assumpsit.

At the trial before Erle J. at the last summer assizes at Bristol, it appeared that the child was an illegitimate child of the defendant, which had been supported by the plaintiff under a parol agreement. The agreement was for the payment of a guinea a month by the defendant. At the time of entering upon the agreement, when the child was only a few months old, it was proposed that the plaintiff should take charge of it for a year certain, and it was then objected by the defendant, that as the child was so young, the proposed rate of payment would be more advantageous to the plaintiff during the first, than during any subsequent year, and that it would not be fair, unless the plaintiff would continue to keep the child upon the same terms after the expiration of the year. The plaintiff then agreed to keep the child as long as the defendant pleased.

Under these circumstances, it was objected that the contract was one "not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof," and therefore by 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4, required a note in writing. Erle, J., upon this, nonsuited the plaintiff, reserving leave to move to enter a verdict for 151. A rule having accordingly been obtained for that purpose, cause was now shewn by

sequent proceedings, for irregularity. He mentioned R. G E. T. 2 Will, 4, and Harrison v. Tait (4 Bing. N. C. 443.) Rule to shew cause. Monday, April 20.

DOE dem. GAISFORD and OTHERS v. STONE.

The object of the statute was to prevent fraudulent practices, which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury, which may be instanced by an imputed promise to serve for twenty years, or to enter into a partnership for life. Rule to shew cause. Matters of this last kind, not strictly to be performed GAMBLE V. KURTZ.-Talfourd, Serjt. (with him Webster) within a year, are protected by the solemnity of moved for a cross rule to that obtained by Channell, Serjt. writing. The case now before the Court was suffi- nonsuit should not be entered, or why the verdict should on April 16, calling upon the plaintiff to shew cause why a ciently supported by the ordinary evidence of an exe-not be entered for the defendant upon the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd cuted consideration. In the next place, if an action issuss, or why there should not be a new trial upon the on an executed consideration could ever be brought ground that the verdict was against evidence. within the statute, this is not within its terms. The words "not to be performed within the space of one year," point out a contract not capable of being performed within a year. The rule to be extracted from Boydell v. Drummond is, that a case is within the statute where it is the understanding of the parties that it is not to be performed within the year. I see nothing in these terms necessarily to extend the agreement beyond the year. If a contract be made-Argument concluded (part heard Jan. 28). to serve for two years, that is within the statute; but PRICE and UXOR v. JAMES.-Channell, Serjt. shewed a contract to serve without the limitation of any cer-cause. Talfourd, Serjt. (with him Phinn) supported the tain time is not within it. rule. Rule absolute for a new trial. Tuesday, April 21. ZULUETA and OTHERS v. MILLER and OTHERS.-Sir T. Wilde, Serjt. shewed cause. Channell, Serjt. in support of the rule. Cur, adv. vult. KEYS and OTHERS, Executors, v. IRVINE.-Byles, Serjt. in support of the rule. No one shewing cause, Rule absolute. BARTLEY. CARVER and OTHERS.- Channell, Serjt.

COLTMAN, J.-I think that this case is not within the statute. It is a contract to sustain the child for successive months, and is subject to be defeated by the defendant. It therefore comes within the rule as to a contingency laid down in Peter v. Compton, and never yet impugned. The other point it is not necessary for us to determine, or I might have had some difficulty; as even in the case of an executory consideration, it might be necessary to refer to the contract to make out the case.

Rule to shew cause. TEMPEST. KILNER.-Byles, Serjt. moved for a rule to enter a nonsuit, or to reduce the damages to 251. Rule to shew cause. GIBBONS U. ALISON.-Shee, Serjt. (with him Petersdorff) moved for a new trial upon the ground of misdirection, and that the verdict was against evidence. Rule to shew cause. HOLDEN U. LIVERPOOL NEW GAS AND COKE COMPANY. Cur, adv. vult.

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shewed cause. Sir T. Wilde, Serjt. in support of the rule.

Cur, adv. vult. Doe dem. ATKINSON v. FAWCETT.-Sir T. Wilde, Serjt. commenced his argument against the rule.

CRESSWELL, J.-I also am of opinion that this
rule must be made absolute. I think that the evi-
dence shews that the contract was never within the
meaning of the words "not to be performed within COCK, will be reported next week.
a year," in the 4th section. The contract was really
a contract from month to month, so long as both
parties pleased.

Argument adjourned.
COULTAS v. Bowes.
Rule to shew cause.
The cases of BENTLEY . CARVER, and WHITE v. Han-

ERLE, J.-Upon consideration, I think the verdict
should be entered for the plaintiff. We must not
allow the treaty which preceded the contract to ope-
rate against the contract. The contract ultimately
was, that the arrangement should continue as long
as the defendant should think proper. If so, it is
clear that there is a contingency, and the statute
does not apply.
Rule absolute.

Manning, Serjt.-This is a case within the latter part of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds. It is similar to the cases in which it has been held, that a comtract of service or apprenticeship to commence at a subsequent day, is within the clause, and must be in writing. (Snelling v. Lord Huntingfield, 1 Cr. M. & R. 20; Bracegirdle v. Heald, 1 B. & A. 722). There the agreement might have been determined by the death of the servant or apprentice, yet the law looked to the fact that the parties contemplated a service of more than a year. In this case the evidence shews that more than a year's duration was contemplated, because the objection is taken that the limit of one year would be disadvantageous to the defendant. Even where it is competent for the parties to put an end to the contract upon certain terms within the year, yet if by the whole tenour of the agreement the parties have in view some more distant period, the rule applies. (Birch v. Earl of Liverpool, 9 B. & C. 392; Boydell v. Drummond, 11 Fast, 142: Peter v. Compton, Skin. 353; Wells v. Horton, 4 Bing. 40.) If the defendant had pleased that the child should be kept until it was twenty-one years of age, and then a claim had been made for payment, all the mischief would have been done which the statute was designed to prevent. [TINDAL, C.J.-This action is brought on an executed contract; an indebitatus assumpsit for work and labour, not a contract executory for which the statute was provided.] That difficulty does not press. For there is no implied contract, the child being illegitimate, and the statute excludes parol eviRule to shew cause. dence of an actual contract where the agreement is ELSTON . GASCOYNE.-Channell, Serjt. moved for a not to be performed within the year. If I give a pa- new trial, upon the ground that the damages awarded were rol guarantee and goods are supplied and the contract executed, I am not liable. [CRESSWELL, J.Saturday, April 18. There is not in that case a primary liability. There FOSTELL V. JOHNSTONE.-Channell, Serjt. (with him would be if you ordered goods to be delivered fifteen Crompton) moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdimonths hence, and accepted them when they were de-rection. livered.]

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BUSINESS OF THE WEEK.
Friday, April 17.

Serjt. (with him Ogle), moved to set aside the verdict for the DOE dem. BAYLEY AND OTHERS v. FOSTER.-Byles, plaintiff, and enter a nonsuit, or a verdict for the defendant. 59 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 17; 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 2; and Doe dem. Lyster v. Goldwin (2 Q.B. 143), were referred to.

Rule to shew cause.

PIGGOTT v. EASTERN COUNTIES RAILWAY COMPANY. the ground of the improper reception of evidence, and that -Shee, Serjt. (with him James), moved for a new trial, upon the verdict was against the evidence.

excessive.

ELTON U. GASCOYNE.

Cur. adv. vult.

Rule to shew cause.

Rule to shew cause.

Cur, adv. vult.

GALLY U. ROUND.-Byles, Sertj. moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection. He cited Bessey v. Wyndham (14 L.J. N. S. 7 Q.B.); Goss v. Quinton (3 Man. & G. 825.) Rule to shew cause. COULTAS v. Bowes.-Sir Thomas Wilde, Serjt. (with him Byles, Serjt), moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence. SIGGARS . PAINTER AND ANOTHER.-Talfourd, Serjt. moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence. SKELTON v. ALCOCK.-Byles, Serjt. moved for a new trial, upon the ground that the verdict was against evidence, and that evidence was improperly admitted. Smith v. Kelly

Rule to skew cause.

Rule to shew cause.

CAPES V. JONES-Dowling, Serjt. moved to enter a suggestion on the roll under 23 Geo. 2, c. 30, ss. 5, 7.

Wilde, Sir T., Serjt. in support of the rule.-This is an executed contract under ordinary circumstances. The plaintiff has done all on his part; the defendant has acquiesced and has had the benefit. Indebitatus assumpsit will therefore lie. It is just the same case as if he had put his horse out to livery at a given sum per month. Would it in that case be contended that if the horse were kept for more than a year, the stable-keeper could not recover for its keep upon a quantum meruit? Further, even were this contract executory, it is not within the statute. The pay-(4 Esp. 249) was quoted. ments were made monthly, and there was nothing to hinder either party from dissolving it within a year. It has been held that part performance does not take a case out of the statute, but here there was a perfectly good performance every month. So a contingency is not within the statute, which does not extend to cases where the thing may be performed within the year. (Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 143.) Not only was there the contingency of either party dissolving the contract, but even the child's life was but a contingency. TINDAL, C.J.-This rule must be made absolute. In the first place, this is not an action within the scope of the Act at all. It is founded upon a by-gone consideration, viz. the nourishment and care afforded to

Rule to shew cause.

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the child by the plaintiff at the request of the defen-served, for a new trial, unless the plaintiff would consent that dant. There was evidence enough for the jury that the defendant assented that the child should be taken care of, and had made partial payments. I think, therefore, that he was entitled to recover in the action in the common form. The words of the statute are

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Wednesday, April 22. GORDON V. ELLIS. Judgment for the plaintiffs. POWLES, Public Officer, v. PAGE. Cur. adv. vult. NEVILLE U. TIPPLE.-Byles, Serjt. moved to set aside the judgment signed in this case, for irregularity. (Reg. Gen. E. T. 2 Wm. 4; 1 Jervis's Rules, 93.) Rule to shew cause.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.

Wednesday, April 15. HINCKER V. JAMES. Where in an action against a party for not delivering certain sacks of flour to arrive by a ship at a certain port, it appaered, from the terms of the contract, that a specific thing was contracted for. Held, that it was not enough for the plaintiff to shew that the ship arrived with an equal quantity of flour on board to that contracted to be delivered, but that he must shew that the specific flour contracted for arrived in that ship.

This was an action against the defendant for not delivering certain flour. The declaration was on a special agreement, setting out that the defendant had sold to the plaintiff certain, to wit, 200 sacks of flour, at 378. per sack, to be delivered to him when the ship Wanderer arrived at Newport, and there were allegetions that the Wanderer arrived at Newport in Au gust, 1845, with 200 sacks of flour on board, but that, although the plaintiff was ready and willing to receive and pay for the said flour, and requested the defendant to deliver the same, yet the defendant wholly neglected it, and refused so to do, to the damage of the plaintiff.

The defendant pleaded several pleas, one of which was, that although the said ship did arrive, yet she did not arrive with the said goods on board. At the trial the bought and sold note was put in, and was in form as follows:-"Sold 150 to 200 sacks of fresh flour, at 37s. per sack, to be delivered ex Wanderer, on her arrival at Newport." Evidence was also given of the arrival of the Wanderer at Newport, with 200 sacks of flour on board. For the defence it was shewn that the flour was not consigned to the defendant, and that he had no control over it. Upon this, a verdict was directed to be entered for the defendant, with liberty to the plaintiff to enter a verdict for 70l. which

was the difference between the value of the flour at the time the ship arrived and the time when the contract was made, flour having risen in price.

Whateley.-Q. C. now moved accordingly, and contended that as the defendant had undertaken to deliver the flour when the ship arrived, he did so at his own peril, and the fact of the flour which actually came by the Wanderer being consigned to another person and not the defendant could not affect the question.

PARKE B.-The fact of the sold note mentioning the quantity as 150 to 200 sacks, shews that the parties contracted with respect to some specific thing. Now, how do you make it appear that the 200 sacks of flour which did arrive by the Wanderer at Newport was the subject matter of the contract?

the Wanderer arrives, and was therefore bound to do

Whateley.That, it is submitted, does not matter. The defendant undertakes to deliver the flour when

so on that arrival taking place; then it is clear that he could have compelled the plaintiff to take the flour.

By the COURT.-It is clear, by the words of the said

note, that the parties were contracting for some specific thing, and it was for the plaintiff to shew that the specific thing so contracted for did arrive; that he has not done. You may have a nonsuit instead of a verdict, so that on another trial you may have an opportunity of supplying this, which may be only a deficiency of evidence.

Whateley assenting to this course, Talford, Serjt. (who had appeared for the defendants at the trial), consented, on behalf of his clients, to this Rule absolute for a nonsuit.

course.

OLROYD V. CHADWICK and ANOTHER.

New trial.

the communications were privileged.

This was an action to recover back the sum of 6501. which had been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, as a deposit on the sale of an estate which had not been completed; the breach alleged being, that the defendant had neglected to make out a good title. The defendant had had a verdict on two pleas: 1st, that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to accept and pay the residue of the money; and 2ndly, that the defendant had not had a reasonable time allowed him by the plaintiff to make out his bill; and leave was reserved for the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for 6501. non obstante veredicto, on the count for money had and received, if the Court should be of opinion that he was entitled to do so, on all the facts of the case.

:

Watson, Q.C. now moved accordingly, citing Jacob v. Lee (2 M. & R. 33) Morris v. Horser (lb. 392); and Rogers v. Custance (Ib. 179). This was on a point relative to a notice to produce. There was also a point as to the admission of evidence. It appeared that the defendant Owens was an attorney, and at the time the negotiation relative to the sale of the estate took place, he was in partnership with a gentleman named Grice; but this partnership had since (and prior to this action) been dissolved. It also appeared that the defendant had asked him to attend to this negotiation with regard to the sale of the estate. At the trial it was proposed to call him, on the part of the plaintiff, to prove certain statements made to him by the defendant, which went to shew that he could not make out his bill, but it was objected that those statements were privileged, and his evidence was held inadmissible by Mr. Baron Platt, who tried the cause. It was now contended that the relation of client and attorney did not exist between them, and that the evidence was admissible.

This was an action brought to try the validity of a warrant of distress which had been issued by the defendants, who were justices, to collect poor rates. The assessment was made under the 43 Eliz. c. 2, which, before it could be enforced, must be allowed by two justices, and notice published in the church, under 17 Geo. 2, c. 3, since the 7 Wm. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 45. This notice is not to be given in the church, but to be reduced into writing, and to be affixed on or near to the doors of the churches or chapels in the parish. In this case it seemed that prior to 1832 there had been an old chapel in the parish, where divine service was performed, which fell into ruin, and a new chapel was built, under 59 Geo. 3, c. 102, s. 40, which was duly consecrated, and the galleries, pewing, sacramentary vessels, and parish chest, which had been in the old chapel, were removed to the new. The windows of the old chapel were then blocked up, but it was used for burials and occasionally christenings; divine service, however, was never performed there. The ground on which the parties brought this action against the justices was, that they had illegally issued the distress, the rate being bad for want of sufficient notice. They contended that as it was neces- By the COURT.-If the partner asked the witness sary to give notice on the doors of all the churches to conduct this business, why should not the relation and chapels in the parish where it was made before it of client and attorney exist? If for any reason Owens could be enforced, notice should have been affixed to devolved the task of conducting the business with rethe door of the old chapel as well as the new, which gard to this estate on his partner, it is clear the relahad not been done. At the trial a verdict was taken tion would exist; and as it is clear that the statefor the plaintiff, with leave to the defendants to movements were confidential, they ought to have been exfor a nonsuit. cluded; on the other points there will be a rule nisi. Rule nisi.

Martin, Q.C. now moved accordingly, and contended that it was only necessary to give notice on the Loors of those churches and chapels in which divine service was performed; and he cited R. v. Marr (12 A & C. 779), and R. v. Whip (4 Q.B. 141); he also stated that these were points arising on the face of the warrant of distress. Rule nisi.

Thursday, April 16.

TORK v. DARBY. New trial.

This was an action for an illegal distress for rent, and it appeared that the plaintiff had held a farm, for the rent of which the distress was made, of one Mountain-Mountain being tenant to Darby. In October 1843, the three parties met, and it was agreed between them that Mountain should cease to be tenant to Darby in June 1844, and that Tork should be his tenant instead. In March 1844, however, Darby represented to Tork that he had the freehold of the farm, and agreed to sell it to him, but was afterwards unable to make a title to the feehold (having only a term of 1,000 years, and was unable to get in the freehold). In August 1845, Darby put in a distress for rent due from June 1844 to June, 1845. At the trial, a verdict was taken for the defendant, with liberty for the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict, damages, 221. 6s. 6d.

Humfrey, Q.C. now moved accordingly, and contended that this distress could not be put in, as Tork was never tenant to Darby, the agreement to sell having been made by Darby before the time when Tork was to come in as his tenant. Rule nisi.

HILLS v. CROSSLAND. New trial.

This was an action for a malicious prosecution. Verdict for the plaintiff, damages, 501. It appeared that the action arose out of a prosecution which had been instituted against the plaintiff for an alleged as. sault committed at a vestry meeting, and of which he had been acquitted.

M. Chambers, Q.C. now moved for a nonsuit, on the ground that it had been proved at the trial that the plaintiff had at the vestry done what amounted to an assault in law; and that therefore, although he had been acquitted, it could not be said that there was an absence of reasonable and probable cause for the defendant's preferring the indictment, which was essential to enable him to maintain this action. Rule nisi.

BEAMISH v. Owens. New trial.

Semble-A, who was an attorney, being engaged in negotiations for the sale of an estate of his own, devolved the conduct of the business with regard to it on his partner; and then made certain statements to him, which went to shew that he could not make out his title. Held, in an action brought against A to recover back the deposit money, that the relation of attorney and client existed between them, and that

ENGLEHART v. MOORE. Attorney's bill. This was an action on an attorney's bill; the only plea was that no signed bill had been delivered, the plaintiff had a verdict, damages 271. 15s. 2d. Humfrey, Q.C. now moved to set this verdict aside and enter a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that no sufficient bill had been delivered, no Court was anywhere mentioned in the bill as to where the business was done, but it was headed "Yourself at the suit of Percy;" this, it was submitted, was insufficient. (Lewis v. Primrose, 13 L.J. Q B. 269.) Rule nisi.

Saturday, April 18.

POTT and OTHERS v. CLEGG.

New trial.

In this action various issues had been found for the plaintiff, and one for the defendant, who had also leave to move to enter a verdict on one of the issues found for the plaintiff on a question of set-off, the question being whether the defendant could avail himself of a declared balance in his favour in a banker's book as a set-off, the balance being declared more than six years before action brought, or whether it was barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Chilton, Q.C. now moved accordingly. Rule nisi.

FENWICK V. BOYD and ANOTHER, and THE SAME

V. THE SAME.

These were actions by and against the same parties on a charter-party. Verdicts for the plaintiff in the first action, damages 6357. 13s. with leave for the defendant to move for a new trial; in the second, 1,8851. 168. 6d. with leave to move for a new trial or a nonsuit.

Jervis, Q.C. now moved accordingly, and stated that as the facts were the same in both cases, he thought it best to move them together in the first action. The grounds on which he moved for the new trial were, that the facts of the case did not bring it within the terms of the second part of the charterparty so as to let in the question of time and right, and also in arrest of judgment that the contract was not properly set out.

The same points arose in the second case, with the addition of this, that the action was, it was contended, brought too soon, as the goods were warehoused under 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 57, s. 47; and as that Act enacts that the cargo, when so warehoused, shall be considered to be in the ship, this was an action for freight with the cargo in the ship.

on a warranty of champagne, which the plaintif in his declaration alleged was sold by sample, and to be delivered equal in quality to a bottle which had been produced. The plea was, that the sale was not a sale by sample. A verdict having passed for the plaintiff,

Whateley, Q.C. now moved to enter a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the invoice which was sent to the plaintiff at the time the wine was delivered contained no such stipulation; and as he had received the wine under such invoice, it, in fact, formed the contract, as the goods were there described, and the terms of credit mentioned.

By the COURT.-The jury have found the fact that there was a sale by sample; the contract was made quite independent of the invoice, which was merely sent to inform the party what he had to pay. It is nothing more than a memorandum of what the goods sent are, and of what the plaintiff was to pay, and need not include the conditions of the sale, which could not bind him in any way. Rule refused.

WOOLLEY U. DAVISSON. New trial.

This was an action for the value of shares in the Leeds and Thirsk Railway Company, bargained and sold. The defence was, that the defendant was only an agent in the sale, and was not liable as principal. A verdict was directed for the defendant, with leave to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict, if the Court should be of opinion that the plaintiff, on all the facts, was so entitled.

Baines, Q.C. now moved accordingly, citing OWER v. Gooch (2 Esp. 567); Story on Agency, 267 & 288; Thompson v. Davenport (9 B. & C. 78); 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 223; Paley's Principal and Agent, 372. Rule nisi.

Wednesday, April 22.

WALSTAB v. SPOTTISWOODE. Liability of a provisional committee-man at suit of an allottee of shares in a railway scheme which is not carried out.

In this case Martin, Q. C. moved for a rule to shew cause why a nonsuit should not be entered pursuant to leave reserved-the first count of the declaration being special, and the second for money had and received, and a verdict having been found for the plaintiff on each of these counts, with 781. 15s. damages. It appeared that the plaintiff had applied for 30 shares in the Direct Birmingham, Oxford. Reading, and Brighton Railway, and the letter of application contained the usual promise to accept the shares, to pay the deposit of 21. 12s. 6d. upon each share, and to sign the parliamentary contract and subscribers' agreement. The letter of allotment contained direc. tions for payment of the deposit money to certain bankers therein mentioned, and for obtaining the scrip on production of the banker's receipt.

The motion for a nonsuit was made on two grounds -1st. That from the agreement contained in the above letters, no promise could be raised for the delivery of scrip by the defendant to the plaintiff, who had paid his deposit money on the 30 shares; and, secondly, that money had and received would not lie in this case.

On the first point, Martin contended that a provisional committee-man has authority to do those acts only which are prescribed by the Joint Stock Companies' Act, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, in which he referred particularly to ss. 2, 23, 25; and that this Act gives no power to issue scrip before complete registration. He likewise insisted that the agreement (if any) established by the letters of application and allotment was respecting shares and not scrip, and that the first count of the declaration was consequently not supported by the evidence. On the second point he argued that, although money had and received would lie where there had been a total failure of consideration, yet in this case the committee had no power to dissolve the company, and therefore there had been no such total failure; but even if there had been, the contract being illegal, the money paid by the plaintiff could not be recovered back. On both grounds the Court granted a Rule to shew cause.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK. Wednesday, April 15. MIDDLETON v. LESTER.-Humfrey, Q.C. moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against evidence. Cur, adv. vult. DEW v. BURGESS.-M. Chambers, Q.C. moved to set Rule refused. aside the nonsuit herein. Thursday, April 16. BEYNON U. DAVIS.-Gray shewed cause. V. Williams in support of his rule. Cur, adv. vult. MUMMERY . PAUL.-Petersdorff shewed cause against a rule which had been obtained to stay the proceedings herein, on the ground that the course of action had been described in a previous action. The Court said that that action had not been disposed of on the merits, and that the rule must be discharged with costs. Rule discharged. BRUNN v. CHUCK.-Jervis, Q.C. moved to set aside the first judgment herein, on the ground of irregularity.

Rule nisi.

Rule nisi in both cases. SWINTON V. THOMPSON. In an action on a warranty of goods alleged to have been sold by sample, Held, that an invoice which was delivered with the goods, formed no part of the contract, but was merely a memorandum of the goods so delivered, and the sum to be paid. This was an action brought against the defendant trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence.

NASH V. BROWNE and OTHERS.-Whateley, Q.C. moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against evidence. Cur. adr vult. WITLEY U. BONEVILL.-Whateley, Q.C. moved for a new Cur, adv, vuit.

Friday, April 17. JOETT U. SPENCER.-Jervis, Q.C. moved for a rule to shew cause why the judgment in this case should not be arrested. Rule to shew cause.

CHAMBERLAIN . THE CHESTER AND BIRKENHEAD RAILWAY COMPANY.-In this case, which was tried before Williams, J. at the last Chester Assizes, Crompton, on behalf of the defendants, moved for a rule to shew cause why a nonsuit or verdict for the defendants should not be entered on the plea of not guilty, and why the judgment should not be arrested. He also moved for a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, on the ground of the improper reception of evidence. He cited Pim v. Curall (6 M.

& W. 234).

Rule to shew cause. SCOTT v. RICHARDS.-Talfourd, Serjt. moved, on behalf of the plaintiffs in this cause, which was tried at Reading before the Lord Chief Baron, for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence. Rule refused. BICKLEY V. BOYDELL.-Whateley, Q.C. moved for a rule to shew cause why the verdict on certain of the issues joined between the parties in the above cause, which was tried at Stafford before the Lord Chief Baron, should not be entered

for the plaintiff, with damages agreed on. He cited Pinero v. Judson (6 Bing. 206); Pearce v. Cheslyn (4 A. & E. 225); Doe dem. Pearson v. Ries (8 Bing. 178); Staniforth v. For (7 Bing. 590); Doe dem. Phillip v. Benjamin (9 A. & E. 644); and Poole v. Bentley (12 East, 168); to shew that an instrument may operate as a present demise, even where a future lease is contemplated and agreed upon by the parties. On other points he referred to Holford v. Dunnett (7 M. & W, 348) Watherell v. Howells (1 Camp. 227; Bac. Abr. Waste, C. 4; 2 Wms. Saunds. 259); Johnson v. Carr (1 Leving, 152); Davies v. Stacey (12 A. & E. 506).

Rule to shew cause. WOOTON v. FRUCTUOSO.-In this case Humfrey, QC. moved for a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, and that the verdict was against evidence. He cited Freestone v. Butcher (9 C. & P. 343); 2 Smith Lead. Cas. 250; Smout v. Ilbery (10 M. & W. 1); Dysart v. Dysart (1 Robertson Ecc. R. 106).

Rule to shew cause. LINDSAY U. ALCOCK.-Watson, Q. C. moved for a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence.

Rule to shew cause. JONES v. FOSTER.-Martin, Q. C. moved for a rule to shew cause why the verdict in this case tried before Williams J. at Carnarvon, should not be entered for the defendant on the 1st and several other issues, and also for a new trial. He cited Henniker v. Turner (4 B. & C. 157), and on the first breach in the declaration, the Court granted a Rule to shew cause. JONES V. CARTER.-Jervis, Q. C. moved for a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, the verdict having been entered for the plaintiff by direction of the learned judge (Williams), the facts being the same as in the preceding case. Rule to shew cause. ABRAHAMS » DOORSTE Orawak moved for a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence.

Rule to shew cause. BLUNDELL U. YATES.-Charnock moved for a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, 1st, on the ground of misdirection, and that evidence was improperly admitted; 2ndly, that the verdict was against evidence. On both points the Court granted a Rule to shew cause. HUGHES v. HUGHES.-Jervis, Q. C. moved for a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, 1st, on the ground of improper rejection of evidence, as to which he cited Cornish. Searel! (8 B. & C. 471); 2ndly, because there was no direct proof of permission, under the plea of leave and license. Rule to shew cause on both grounds. Saturday, April 18.

BALL U. BETTS.-Crowder, Q.C. moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence. Rule nisi, unless the defendant will consent to a verdict for the plaintiff on the first count. MASON V. JENKINS.-Talfourd, Serjt. moved for a new trial. Rule nisi. CROMER v. CHUCK.-Rule discharged with costs. Will be fully reported next week.

HOLFORD V. KERSEY.-Alexander moved for a new trial. This case, also, will be reported next week. Rule nisi. Reports of the following cases are omitted for want of room. They will appear next week:HUNTINGDON v. GRAND JUNCTION RAILWAY COMPANY. Rule nisi for new trial. MAYOR OF POOLE, v. WITT. Rule nisi for new trial. MITCHELL v. NEWARK. Rule refused. TILK V. BUXTON.-M. Chambers, Q. C. moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence.

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Rule refused. Rule nisi. Rule nisi. Cur, adv. vult. Rule nisi. Rule nisi. Rule nisi. Rule refused. Cur. adv. vult.

trial in this case, on the ground of misdirection; citing Sykes v. Dixon (9 H. & E. 693); Young v. Timmins (1 Cr. & J. 331); 6 T. R. 221. Rule to shew cause. REID U. TATE.-Knowles, Q.C. moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, of surprise, and that the verdict was against evidence. Rule refused. FLETCHER . MARSHALL.-Watson, Q. C. moved for a nonsuit and in arrest of judgment. On the first point, the Court granted a Rule to shew cause. MARSDEN U. NEWMARCH.-Watson, Q. C. moved for a rule to shew cause why the verdict in this case, which had been found for the plaintiff, should not be entered for the defendant; he likewise moved, in arrest of judgment, and for a new trial. On all points, the Court granted a HAHN V. DALTON.-Baines, Q. C. moved for a rule to shew cause why the verdict which had been found for the defendant should not be entered for the plaintiff. He cited Stevens v. De Medina (4 Q. B. 422); Poole v. Hill (6 M. & W. 835; Wilks v. Smith (10 M. & W. 355). Rule to shew cause. Rule to shew cause. BATSON v. RICHARDS.-Watson, Q.C. moved for a rule to

shew cause why the verdict in this case should not be set aside, and a new trial had on the ground of misdirection.

Rule refused.

GEACH v. INGOLL.-In this case, which will be found reported 14 M. & W. 95, Humfrey, Q.C. moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, and that the verdict was against evidence.

Rule to shew cause.

ASHBY . BATES.-Humfrey, Q C. moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, that the verdict was against evidence, and that the learned judge (Coltman) had ruled that the wrong party was entitled to begin.

Rule to shew cause. Wednesday, April 22. DOE dem. STACE v. WHEELER.-Peacock moved, in this

case, to enter a nonsuit; he likewise moved to stay proceed ings on payment of costs by defendant, pursuant to stat. 7 Geo. 2, c. 20. As to the rule for a nonsuit he cited Doe dem. Poole v. Errington, (3 Nev. & Man. 646), and in support of his motion to stay proceedings, and for a reconveyance of the premises, he referred to the above mentioned statute. On each point the Court granted A rule to shew cause. NAYLOR v. SCORAH.-Martin, Q.C. moved for a rule to shew cause why the verdict in this case should not be set aside and a new trial had on the ground of misdirection.

Rule to shew cause.

JACKSON U. SMITHSON.-Shee, Serjt. moved for a new trial in this case on the ground of misdirection, and that the verdict was against evidence. He likewise moved in arrest of judgment. On the two last-mentioned grounds, the Court granted a Rule to shew cause.

SMITH U. JEFFRIES.-Shee, Serjt. moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection; he also moved to enter a nonsuit pursuant to leave reserved. Rule to shew cause. SMITH V. RANSOM.-Bramwell moved for a new trial, on affidavits, and on the ground of the improper rejection of evidence. Rule refused. PRICE . RICHARDSON.-E. V. Williame moved to enter a nonsuit. Rule to shew cause. OWEN U. MANN.-Yardley moved for a nonsuit, or to enter the verdict for the defendants, or for a new trial. On all the points the Court granted a Rule to shew cause. THOMSON V. GREGORY.-Jervis, Q.C. moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence. Rule refused.

WILDES V. STEVENS.-Petersdorf moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence. He cited Hicks v. Duke of Beaufort (4 Bing. 229).

Rule refused. BOOTH . MILLNS.-Pashley moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection. Rule to shew cause.

LEE V. DREW.-Piggott moved to enter a nonsuit, or for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection respecting the sufficiency of notice of dishonour of a bill of exchange; and on this point the Court granted a Rule to shew cause. COLEGRAVE U. SUMMERTON,-Huddleston moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence, and of misdirection.

Rule to shew cause.

FARRY . NEWMAN. -Byles, Serjt. moved to enter the verdict for the defendant, on points reserved. He cited stats. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29; 18 Geo. 3, c. 19, and 3 Geo. 4, c. 23, s. 22; Reg. v. Willcock 14 L. J. N. S. Magistrates' Cases, Rule to shew cause. HARWOOD v. FIFE.-Bovill moved for a rule to shew cause why a nonsuit should not be entered, and for a new trial, on the ground of the improper reception of evidence. He cited Doe v. Hillen (2 Dowl. P.C. N.S. 694). Rule refused.

104.

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T. W. Saunders moved for a rule to dispauper the plaintiff, and for the costs of the day for not proceed. ing to trial pursuant to notice. It appeared that issue having been joined herein, and notice of trial given, the plaintiff obtained an order to sue in formâ pauperis; that he subsequently countermanded this notice, and afterwards gave a fresh notice for the HUTCHINSON V. EAST LANCASHIRE RAILWAY COMPANY. Sittings in last Hilary Term, but that immediately

GOLDICUT v. BINNIOR.

FINLAYSON v. PILBROW.

HOGGINS AND ANOTHER V. FIELD.

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Cur, adv. vult. Rule nisi. Rule nisi. Rule nisi. Rule nisi. Rule nisi.

Tuesday, April 21. BARNETT V. HARRIES.-Channell, Serjt. moved for a rule to shew cause why the nonsuit entered in this case should not be set aside, on the ground of the improper rejection of evidence, and on affidavits. He cited Wilks v. Hopkins (14 L. J. N. S. C. P. 225). On both points a

Rule to shew cause. GRANT U. MADDOX.-Martin, Q. C. moved to set aside the verdict for the defendant and for a new trial, on the ground of the improper admission of evidence and misdirection. Rule to shew cause. PILKINGTON v. SCOTT.-Knowles, Q.C. moved for a new

before the trial be withdrew the record, but has since given a fresh notice of trial for the first sitting in the present Term. (Doe dem. Leppingwell v. Trussell, 6 East, 505; Pratt v. Delarue, 10 M. & W. 512; Facer v. French and Another, 5 Dowl. 554.)

Rule nisi.

E. James moved to set aside the Master's award or certificate herein. This cause was referred at Nisi Prius to the Master, a verdict having been taken for 371. the order of reference directing the Master to decide upon all matters in difference, and to direct by whom, to whom, and in what manner the costs should be paid. The Master found that the plaintiff had sustained damages to the amount of 371. (the amount of the verdict) besides his costs of suit. The present rule was moved on the four following grounds :-1st. That the Master had not awarded as to the costs of the reference. 2nd. That the finding as to the costs is ambiguous and uncertain. 3rd. That he has not determined upon all the issues, which were five in number. 4th. That the Master has stated in his award that he had considered the evidence of the parties, but not stated that he had examined any witnesses (this point was afterwards abandoned.) (Morgan v. Smith, 1 Dowl. N. S. 617.)

COLERIDGE, J.-I think there is nothing in the first objection. The Master has proceeded correctly; he has considered this as a certificate, and not as an award. Now a certificate is totally distinct from an award, for an award is addressed to the parties, whereas a certificate is addressed to the officer of the court, and is resorted to under certain circumstances, and with the view to saving expense. Mr. James relies here upon certain particular terms in the instrument, but I think that makes no difference; you must look at the broad distinction in the case, and it appears to me that this is merely a certificate of the Master; it follows, therefore, that there is also nothing in the second objection. I will look at the third.

Rule refused on the two first points. Cur, adv. vult. on the third.

Monday, April 20.

(Before Mr. Justice COLERIDGE.)
EVANS v. JONES.

Distringas to compel an appearance, where the excuse
is that the defendant is ill in bed.
Corrie moved for a distringas to compel an appear-
ance under the following circumstances. The usual
I calls and appointments had been made, but on each
occasion the defendant had been denied, the servant
saying that he was ill in bed, and could not be seen.
Distringas granted.

Tuesday, April 21.

(Before Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN.) REG. V. THE JUSTICES OF ANGLESEA. Where the six months during which a party may apply for a certiorari have elapsed, the Court will not (except with the consent of all parties) permit the writ to issue, notwithstanding application was in due time made at chambers for the writ, and was not then obtained, in consequence of the absence of the judge. Peacock moved for a certiorari to bring up an order of sessions, subject to a special case. The order in question was made on the 14th of October, now more than six months since, and beyond the time, therefore, which, by the 13 Geo. 2, c. 18, s. 5, is allowed for moving for the writ. Application had been made to a judge at chambers on the 11th instant (within the six months), for the writ, but no judge attended chambers that day, nor until the 15th, in consequence of the Easter holidays. Application had subsequently been made to Mr. Justice Coleridge, who referred the applicants to the Court. Under these circumstances it was sought to have the writ issued nunc pro tunc.

WIGHTMAN, J.-Have you any authority for such an application, when you are out of time?

Peacock.-There is no express authority, but the chairman of the sessions consents to the application. WIGHTMAN, J.-That will not do; you should have the consent of the other side. The only authority upon which this writ issues in such a case is by statute, and you have not complied with it.

Rule refused. Wednesday, April 22. REG. v. THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN, AND BURGESSES OF BATH.

Certiorari to remove an order of a Town Council in order to quash same for defects apparent on its face.

T. W. Saunders moved for a certiorari to bring up an order of the town council of Bath, made on the 25th of January, 1836, for the purpose of quashing the same for defects apparent on its face. The order in question was made under the provisions of the 87th section of the 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76 (an Act to provide for the regulation of Municipal Corporations in England and Wales) which enacts "that it shall be lawful for the council of any borough in any part of which there is a local act for the lighting thereof, to make an order that any part of such borough not being within the provisions of any local act for the lighting LEWIS v. CURLEWIS. thereof, shall, from and after a certain day to be When a cause is referred at Nisi Prius to the Master, named in such order, be taken to be within the proin order that he may determine the matters in dif- visions of such local act or acts for lighting any part ference, and direct by whom, to whom, and in what of such borough as the common council shall specify manner the costs are to be paid, and he decides ac-in such order; and after such day the part named in cordingly, his decision is in the nature of a certificate, and not an award, and is not bad for not providing for the costs of the reference.

Saturday, April 18.

such order shall be within the provisions of the act or acts so specified, so far as relates to lighting, or to any rates authorized to be levied for the purpose of

lighting," &c. The order itself was in these words: "It is ordered that such parts of the parish of Lyncombe and Widcombe mentioned in the report of the watch committee as necessary and proper to be lighted, shall, after the 1st day of February next, be taken to be within the provisions of an Act for better paving, cleansing, lighting, watching, regulating, and improving the city of Bath, and the liberties and precincts thereof,' so far as relates to lighting the same." It was now contended that inasmuch as this order does not shew upon its face what are the parts of the parish to be lighted under it, it does not comply with the terms of the foregoing section, and is therefore bad. Rule absolute.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK.

Friday, April 17. HARRIS . KIMBERLEY.-Allen, Serjt. moved to set

aside the nonsuit herein, the plaintiff having been nonsuited at the last Gloucester assizes in his absence, which was occasioned by a mistake as to the time of the sitting of the Court. Rule nisi for a new trial on payment of costs. STOCKER V. DORAN.-Bovill moved, on the part of the plaintiff in this cause, which was tried before the undersheriff of Middlesex, for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection. Rule nisi, on payment of costs. Re ROBERT SWANN.-Joyce moved for a rule, calling upon an attorney to pay 77. the amount of taxed costs, pursuant to his undertaking. Rule nisi. Ex parte-Burney moved for a rule, calling upon an attorney to answer the matters of an affidavit.

Rule nisi. Saturday, April 18. LAZARUS v. HOPKINS.-Wordsworth moved for a rule for a new trial herein, on the ground of its having been taken out of its turn as an undefended cause, in the defendant's Rule nisi. REG. v. CLARK.-Whateley, Q.C. moved to enlarge the rule herein. Application granted, TOLSON . SANDERSON.-Pashley moved to enlarge the peremptory undertaking herein. Rule nisi.

absence.

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Re FORD, Gent. one, &c.-The Attorney-General applied
for liberty to read an affidavit on the discussion of this rule, Railway, &c. Deposits
Commons' Inclosure.
Rule nisi; to come on with the other rule.

notwithstanding the said affidavit had not been filed in due

time.

REG V. THE INHABITANTS OF LUGGERSHALL.-O'Malley moved to make absolute a rule for imposing a fine of 2001. on the above inhabitants for the non-repair of a highway. Rule absolute. Ea parte PEPPER.-The Attorney-General moved to enlarge the fiat for the admission of the applicant as an attorney. Rule nisi, to be admitted the last day of this Term. Thursday, April 23.

SMITH V. RAYSON.-Temple moved to set aside the verdict herein, and for a new trial. The cause was tried before the under-sheriff for Westmoreland, when a verdict was returned for the defendant. Rule refused. Ex parte PHILLIPS.-H. Hill moved that the articles of clerkship of this gentleman might be enrolled nunc pro tunc. Application granted. JONES v. WILLIAMS. DOUDNEY V. HUMBER.-T. W. Saunders moved to make absolute these rules, no cause being shewn. Rules absolute. POOLE. SPILLER.-Whigham moved for a distringas to proceed to outlawry herein.

Monday, April 20.

Rule grunted.

ADAM V. ROWE.-Payne moved to set aside an award, on the ground that the arbitrator had not disposed of all the issues. (Kilburn v. Kilburn, 13 M. & W. 671; Morgan v. Thomas, 9 Jur. 92.) Rule nisi.

BOWEN v. WILLIAMS.-Crouch moved, on the part of the defendant, for a new trial in this case, which was tried before the under-sheriff for Middlesex, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, on the grounds of misdirection, and the verdict being against evidence.

Rule nisi.

REG. v. WELSMAN.-W. H. Cole moved for an attach

ment against the above party, for not complying with an undertaking given by him to produce certain documents. Rule nisi.

Tuesday, April 21. MARCHANT U. LLOYD.-Pigott moved, on the part of the defendant, to enter a nonsuit herein. The action was tried before the under-sheriff of Middlesex, when a verdiet was returned for the plaintiff. (Roberts v. Elsworth, 2 Dowl. N.S. 426; Douglas v. Home, 12 Add. & Ell. 641; Curtis v. Rickards, 1 Man. & Gr. 46.) Cur, adv. vult. BORDIER V. BARNETT.-Bovill moved to discharge a rule for a commission to examine witnesses abroad. Rule nisi. AUSTER V. HOLLAND.-Gray moved to set aside the writ of summons and all subsequent proceedings, on the ground that the action had been commenced without any authority from the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff's attorneys should pay the costs. Rule nisi.

Ex parte DEPHLIDGE.-Corrie moved for a certiorari to remove into this court the depositions taken by the coroner in a case of manslaughter, and that the applicant may be admitted to bail in the county. Application granted.

CLARK V. HUGHES.-Macaulay moved for a rule to set aside the verdict herein, and for a new trial, on the grounds 1, of the rejection of evidence; 2, of misdirection; and 3, of the verdict being against evidence. The action was brought by a surveyor against one of the provisional committee of the Sheffleld, Nottingham, and London Direct Railway, and was tried before the under-sheriff of Nottinghamshire, when a verdict was returned for the plaintiff. Rule nisi.

Wednesday, April 22. TAGG U. SIMONS.-Dowdesweli moved for a rule to strike out the defendant's pleas, or that the plaintiff should be at liberty to sign judgment on thirteen of such pleas, and the defendant to pay the costs.

Rule nisi.

ROWBOTHAM v. BALL, Clerk.-Butt, Q. C. moved for a rule to strike out the demurrer as frivolous. Rule nisi. REG. V. THE RECORDER OF NEW SARUM.-Slade moved for a rule for the costs of the mandamus herein.

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Lough Swilley and Lough Foyle Drainage.

BILLS READ A SECOND TIME.

Friday, April 23.

Dublin Wide Streets
Lincoln Waterworks
Wakefield Waterworks
Lancashire Waterworks

Edinburgh and Glasgow Union Canal
Rothesay Municipal and Police
Ardrossan Municipal Police and Improvement

Forth and Clyde, and Monkland Navigation Junction.
Forth and Clyde Navigation, and Bowling Bay Improvement
Pow of Inchaffray Drainage
Airdrie and Coatbridge Waterworks
Worcester Gas
Queensferry Passage
Sion College Estate
Sheffield General Cemetery.
Belfast Consumers' Gas
Belfast Improvement
Gravesend and Milton Waterworks
Liverpool Water,
Liverpool Paving
Newport Waterworks
Wolverhampton Stipendiary Justice
Wath-upon-Dearne Improvement
Wednesday, April 22.
Legal Quays, London
Tunbridge Wells Improvement

BILLS READ A THIRD TIME AND PASSED,

Friday, April 17.

Boston Waterworks
Rochester Bridge
Witham Navigation
Tuesday, April 21.
Liverpool Docks
Royal Asylum of St. Anne's Society
Upwell-cum-Welney Rectory
Dundee New Gas
Glasgow Waterworks.

SESSIONAL PRINTED PAPERS. Bills-Commons Inclosure

Bankruptcy and Insolvency

missioners

General Terminus and Glasgow Harbour Railway, &c. Bills— Minutes of Evidence

Scarcity Commission-Further Return

Prisons of Ireland-Twenty-fourth Report of Inspectors
General

Criminal Offenders, Ireland-Tables
British Museum-Paper
Railway Deposits-Returns
Sugar-Return

Gauge Commission-Minutes of Evidence.

PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

POPULATION AND POOR-RATES.-An interesting return connected with the population and poorrates of England and Wales (obtained by Mr. Wode. printed. The hon. member moved, on the 9th inst. house, the member for East Norfolk) has been for "a return showing the population, the amount of money levied for poor-rates, and the ratio which the amount levied for poor-rates bore to the population in each of the counties in England and Wales during each of the years ended Lady-day, 1813, 1824, and 1844; also a return of the amount levied for poor. rates in England and Wales (exclusive of the counties of Kent, Middlesex, and Surrey) for each of the years ended Lady-day 1826 and 1841, distinguishing the amount levied on landed property, dwellinghouses, and all other kinds of property, with the proportion per cent. which the amount levied on each description of property bears to the total amount levied." He also moved for "an account of the expenses of medical relief in each union and parish of England and Wales under the regulations of the Poor Law Commissioners ending Lady-day 1843, 1844, and 1845, together with the total cost of relief to the poor in each union." By the first branch of the returns it seems, that in 1811 the total population of England and Wales was 10,150,615; the total money levied for poor-rate, county-rate, &c. for the year ended Lady-day, 1813, was 8,646,8411. and the rate per head on the population was as much as " 17s." The population in 1821 was 11,978,875; the poor-rates, &c. in 1824 amounted to 6,833,6301. and the rate per head on the population was then 11s. 5d. In 1831 the population was 13,897,187; the poor-rates, &c. 8,338,0797. and the rate per head on the population 12s. In 1841 the population was 15,906,741; the poor-rates, &c. 6,847,2051. and the rate per head on the population, vs. 7d. The ratio which the amount levied for pour rates bore to the population varied very much. In 1813 the highest ratio was in Sussex, where it was as much as 36s. 11d.; and the lowest in Cumberland where it was only 10s. 1d. In 1844 it was the highest in Wilts, where it was 12s. 11d.; and the lowest in Cumberland, where it was only 5s. 1d. In the second part of the return a statement is made shewing the amount levied for poor-rates in England and Wales (exclusive of Kent, Middlesex, and Surrey), at certain periods→ namely, 1826 and 1841. In 1826 it was 5,740,4361. and in 1841, 5,154,3521. The aggregate totals of Kent, Middlesex, and Surrey, not included in the above totals, were 1,255,7201. in 1826, and 1,197,476%. in 1841. The third and last branch of the return has reference to the amount of money expended for medical relief, under the regulations of the Poor-law commissioners. In 1845, there were 591 unions in England and Wales. In 1843 the amount expended for medical relief was 147,2631. in which year the total cost of relief to the poor, including medical relief, was 4,626,356. In 1844 the amount expended for medical relief was 152,2291. when the total relief to the poor, including medical relief, was 4,455,0171.; and in 1845, the amount expended for medical relief was 157,4091. in which year the total cost of relief to the poor, including medical relief, was 4,474,2751.

EXPIRING LAWS.-(SESSIONAL PAPER, 128.)The report of the committee appointed to inquire what temporary laws of a public and general nature are now in force, and which laws of a like nature have expired since the date of the last report, or are about to expire. The following list comprises such temporary Acts as are to determine on fixed dates, unless expiry.

Highland Roads and Bridges-Thirty-second Report of Com-renewed by the Legielature, with the period of their
Shannon Navigation-Seventh Report of Commissioners
Bridlington Piers and Harbour-Account
District Asylums-Supplemental Return
Education, Ireland-Paper
Sugar-An Account of Session 1841 reprinted

National Debt-Account

Bills in Progress.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORS.-A draft of a Bill

Railways and Canals Amalgamation-First Report from for regulating the times of payment of rates and taxes

Committee

Civil Contingencies-Account and Estimate
Cotton Twist and Yarn-Account
Archbishops and Bishops-Returns
Greek Loan-Correspondence
Oregon Territory-Correspondence
Joint Stock Companies-Report of the Registrar
Public General Acts-Caps. 5 to 12
Mint-Returns
Marriages-Returns

by Parliamentary electors, and for abolishing the stamp duty on the admission of freemen. This Bill is brought in by Sir De Lacy Evans and Mr. Hawes, and consists of only one clause, by which it is intended to provide that, after the passing of this Act, no person whose name is or shall be upon the register for the time being, as entitled to vote in the election of a member or members to serve in Parliament for

Railway Department, Board of Trade-Report, with Appen- any city, town, or borough in England, shall be re

dices 1 and 2

Cows and Bullocks-Papers

Public Income and Expenditure, Balance Sheet-Account
Poor Law-Return
Postage, East India-Return
Scarcity Commission-Weekly Reports

quired, in order to entitle him to have his name inserted in any list of such voters for that city, town, or borough for the following year, to have paid any poor rates or assessed taxes, except such as shall have become payable from him previously to the 11th day

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