miles. The United States and others have also made it clear that their vital interests require that agreement on a 12-mile territorial sea be coupled with agreement on free transit of straits used for international navigation and these remain basic elements of our national policy which we will not sacrifice. We have, however, made clear that we are prepared to accommodate coastal State concerns regarding pollution and navigational safety in straits and have made proposals to that effect in Subcommittee II." "The views of my delegation on resource issues have also been stated on a number of occasions. Unfortunately, some delegations appear to have the impression that maritime countries in general, and the United States in particular, can be expected to sacrifice in these negotiations basic elements of their national policy on resources. This is not true. The reality is that every nation represented here has basic interests in both resource and nonresource uses that require accommodation." "Accordingly, we believe it is important to dispel any possible misconceptions that my government would agree to a monopoly by an international operating agency over deep seabed exploitation or to any type of economic zone that does not accommodate basic United States interests with respect to resources as well as navigation." In another excerpt regarding the deep seabeds we stated: "An effective and equitable regime must protect not only the interests of the developing countries but also those of the developed countries by establishing reasonable and secure investment conditions for their nationals who will invest their capital and technology in the deep seabeds. In order to provide the necessary protections for all nations with important interests in the area, it is also necessary to establish a system of decision making which takes this into account and provides for compulsory settlement of disputes. We do not regard these objectives as inconsistent with the desire of other countries for equitable participation in deep seabed exploitation and its benefits." For some time our experts have been engaged in a study of the economic implications of deep seabed mining legislation such as last session's H.R. 13904 and the current session's H.R. 9. They are examining issues of resource management and development, as well as questions of political economy such as the design of arrangements to ensure efficient exploitation of ocean resources. Implications for tax, customs and development finance policies are also under review. The technology of ocean bed mining is likely to develop rapidly, and new information continually challenges old hypotheses. It is therefore impossible to be definitive. Nevertheless, at this time we are prepared to give you a comprehensive but as yet still incomplete report of the Administration's views on certain technical aspects of H.R. 9, particularly those related to resource management and development. In reporting to you that the Administration is opposed to the enactment of H.R. 9, we want to make clear that this does not mean we are unalterably opposed to legislation of any sort, or that we intend to disregard the problem of interim mining. Any of a number of events could occur that would lead us to conclude that legislation was necessary, and we intend to prepare as quickly as possible for that contingency. Moreover, we wish to repeat that we continue to adhere to the President's statement that it is neither necessary nor desirable to try to halt exploration and exploitation of the seabeds beyond a depth of 200 meters during the negotiating process, provided that such activities are subject to the international regime to be agreed upon, which should include due protection of the integrity of investment made in the interim period. Our opposition to H.R. 9 in no way alters this. We are deeply conscious of the fact that no decision we could have reached on this issue at this time could have been universally popular. Some who support the moratorium may not agree with the policy we have set forth. Some who support the approach in H.R. 9 may be equally disappointed. For the present, we think the middle course we have outlined is best. We hope the Committee will agree. However, we fully understand that the Committee, like the Administration, may wish to pay close and continuing attention to developments that could alter this assessment. We pledge our full cooperation with the Committee in those efforts. The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report. Sincerely, CHARLES N. BROWER, Acting Legal Adviser and Acting Chairman, Mr. DOWNING. The chairman of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, in the last session of Congress, requested an administration position on this proposed legislation on February 18, 1972. The committee was concerned that important "interim policy" aspects of President Nixon's oceans policy statement of May 23, 1970, were being ignored by the executive branch to the injury of the domestic interest in efficient and timely development of important seabeds metal resources and associated marine technologies. Repeated requests for an administration position throughout 1972 met with delays but, in hearings before this committee on September 26, 1972, Mr. Stevenson, the then legal advisor of the Department of State, advised us that a position on the bill would be forthcoming after the November-December 1972 meetings of the U.N. General Assembly. I am aware that the leadership of this Nation's Law of the Sea Delegation to the U.N. Seabeds Committee and of the Interagency Policy Making Task Force guiding that delegation has been changed at this critical time, but I hope that the new leadership recognizes and has assumed this obligation to be responsive. Since the committee first addressed itself to this interim legislation, the international negotiations, which have so long dominated administration policy on marine resources, have seemingly receded even farther into the future. Little was accomplished in 1972 negotiations except the production of a conference agenda of doubtful content and a few items of proposed treaty "language" of somewhat dubious utility. The nature of these items, and particularly the last minute timing of their production, may easily lead one to believe that their accomplishment is more cosmetic than substantive in intent and effect. The 1973 Conference on Law of the Sea has now become the 1974– 75 Conference to be preceded by a short organizational exercise in late 1973. The Seabed Committee, sitting for 2 years as a conference preparatory committee, after a previous 3 years of general debate, has not produced even a minimum amount of proposed treaty language upon which to structure negotiation in the Conference. It only has some 65 scheduled days in 1973 to do so. If it cannot, and I believe that it cannot, the November-December 1973 United Nations General Assembly has the authority and responsibility to delay Conference plans for another year or more. In the face of continual delay and disruption at the U.N., domestic interests continue to suffer disadvantage and administration neglect. Coastal fishermen are under increasing economic pressure from 31-659-74—2 foreign factory fishing fleets having little regard for fishery stocks off our once highly productive coasts. Our distant water fisheries fleets, are subjected to arbitrary interference hundreds of miles off the coast of Latin America. Our merchant marine operators and oil companies face increasing littoral State interference in international straits which once were free passage areas of the high seas. Our ocean miners are frustrated in their plans to develop highly desirable alternate metal sources because investment capital is difficult to secure in a politically emotional legal atmosphere. The administration has handled the law of the sea question until now as primarily a foreign policy issue. The lead policymaking agency has been the State Department, which is responsible for negotiation of the international treaty in coordination with other executive departments. As all public non-State Department agency positions and opinions. must be filtered through State, this Congress has had little opportunity to judge for itself the relative importance of domestic policy considerations as compared with foreign policy considerations. Do the objectives of the State Department in international negotiation justify the continuing harm being done to domestic interests by continued delay in ministering to the needs of these interests? Has the dedication of the United States to internationalization of the Continental Shelf and margins been beneficial when 102 nations, including China, India and the U.S.S.R., recently approved a General Assembly resolution asserting absolute coastal State control over all living and nonliving resources of their "patrimonial seas"? I note here that in spite of a stated administration policy of fundamental opposition to the U.N. moratorium resolution and increasing evidence of the international acceptance of broad coastal State jurisdiction over resources, the Department of Interior still has not yet nominated offshore petroleum deposits on our Continental Shelf beyond 200 meters for resource leasing, even in the face of the Nation's present energy crisis. The record of these negotiations reveals that, under the one-nation one-vote principle, the seabed resource sector of law of the sea discussions is being used by the developing country majority as a bargaining counter to secure concessions from the maritime (and mineral importing) countries minority. The leadership of the developing countries has been captured by the very Latin American countries which have been "plucking the Yankee eagle" in its offshore fisheries and onshore copper mining activities. This Latin American leadership has not been exercised in the best interests of the world community. It has consistently exercised its leadership to inflame developing country opinion to the detriment of compromise and consensus. It has proposed repressive controls over marine mineral production which are designed to restrict or prevent ocean production to the benefit of its national or regional minerals industries. This Nation needs these strategic materials. It needs them on an economic basis and it requires their availability under arrangements which are not subject to arbitrary or discriminatory limitations to access exercised by nations which are indifferent or hostile to U.S. national needs. The efforts of U.S. ocean miners long predated U.N. seabed ambitions, and will survive them should the negotiations follow their current unproductive pattern. Our ocean mining industry leads the world in the engineering and metallurgical development necessary to convert these nodules into marketable metals. These miners are now ready to make substantial investments leading to actual mining operations. This investment must not be inhibited by the irresponsible actions of materials-exporting countries using the U.N. as a mechanism to prevent the United States from developing alternative sources of copper and other critical metals. It is time for the United States to protect its national interest and to reaffirm strongly its commitment to the principle that deep ocean resources should remain available to all nations and should not become the monopolized resource of any one entity-private, public, or international. A method is suggested by President Nixon's ocean policy statement of May 23, 1970-a domestic interim policy which encourages the development of ocean mineral resources and provides due protection for the integrity of investments made during the lengthy negotiation of an increasingly complex ocean treaty. Such an interim policy should, according to the President, include changes in domestic law and regulations to protect public and private interests, and dedication of part of the revenues produced as assistance to developing countries. Frankly, it is my belief that the various interested departments of the executive have been remiss in not implementing this policy. They have had almost 3 years to do so but have failed to act. It is now time for Congress to consider filling this vacuum in the protection of U.S. interests. Legislation has now been proposed in Congress to accomplish this goal and the administration has promised, after interminable delay, really unjustified by any objective analysis of the pace of the U.N., to comment upon it. Mr. Brower, it is my hope that your comments today will not consist of requests for further delay in action on the proposed legislation. Instead, constructive criticism or alternative solutions should be offered in the spirit of the President's ocean policy statement of May 1970. Similarly, the subordination of positions by the Interior, Commerce, Defense, and Treasury Departments to that of a State Department, whose diplomatic goals may dominate the whole fabric of the debate, should be avoided. This legislation has a potentially beneficial effect on domestic revenue, balance of payments, materials availabilities, ocean technology, and many other facets which may very well outweigh considerations related to our international relationships. All the executive departments must be allowed to address their areas of authority and responsibility, so that the Congress may evaluate the true balance between domestic and foreign policy impacts of deep ocean mining. As you know, the jurisdiction of this committee is the merchant marine and marine resources. I can appreciate your desire to address yourself to the foreign aspects of this legislation. Your Department has done this adequately in the past. Today, now, I ask that you and your associates address yourselves to the domestic aspects of this legislation such as mineral policy and problems, balance of payments, national security, fiscal policy, et cetera. Of course, it will be necessary for you to discuss the foreign aspects, but this should be limited. In addition, I would like for you to describe to the committee in detail the contributions on domestic policy considerations that have been made by the Treasury, Defense, and Commerce departments. I suggest to you that this committee feels it is time for the Congress to assert a leading role in this area. Ocean mining may be the right answer at the right time to the problem of our increasingly grim metals supply posture. Let us assume our responsibilities and proceed vigorously with the careful consideration of this legislation. Gentlemen, this is longer than I usually like to take on an introductory statement, but I hope you gather from the tenure of the remarks that I am just a little bit tired of waiting for, I suppose, the State Department primarily to come up with some answer to this question. In view of the statement made by President Nixon-he wanted an ocean policy; he wanted to develop the seabeds particularly in view of your own U.S. draft treaty which has provisions which are contained in H.R. 9, we would sincerely like to know your position. Mr. MOSHER. Mr. Chairman, can I make a comment? Mr. DOWNING. Yes, indeed. Mr. MOSHER. The statement you just made is an extremely strong statement, and ordinarily I like strong statements, and I also have tremendous respect for the chairman's judgment in these and other matters. However, I must say that I am a little bit surprised at the extreme tone or the slant of his opening statement. It seems to contain a tone of cynicism and impatience and even chauvinism to which I cannot quite ascribe, adjectives like doubtful and dubious and cosmetic and interminable. I certainly share a degree of the feeling you have expressed, but I do not believe we should give the impression that the whole committee is prejudging this situation to the extent that would be true in this statement. I think I have to assert for myself a position of reserved judgment, a willingness to listen to the administration's point of view, and a degree of patience that is not quite evident in my friend's statement. Mr. DOWNING. I think you have made a fair statement. Perhaps I am too impatient, and I do not want to prejudge the administration or any of its agencies. I know we are all trying to do the best possible job. Mr. MOSHER. I do think, Mr. Chairman, that foreign policy and you have agreed, foreign policy considerations are extremely important. Mr. DOWNING. They are. Gentlemen, if my point comes through, so be it. |