and thoroughly done than the rescue of a large class of intelligent and educated people-physicians, scientists, and others, readers of Spencer and Huxley and Tyndall and Darwinfrom a crude and crass materialism which saturates all their thought and, in some instances, degrades their lives. Nor do we know of any man better equipped for this task than Professor Bowne. But it is perfectly clear that he will win no disciples for the truth from this class of readers; first, because he does not take the smallest pains to propitiate and attract them; and, secondly, because not one in a thousand of them. could understand him if he did. We do not know where a neater, more decisive refutation of the ambitious Spencerian philosophy, as it wrecks itself on the problem of error, so beautifully solved by our author, is to be found than in Professor Bowne's treatise.* We find an analysis of it, made on the margin of the old edition when we read it a second time, more than eight years ago, and it came upon us with freshness and resistless force in the new. But the "ghost of Leibnitz," which Professor Bowne discovers lurking behind the ponderous phrases of Spencerianism, would frighten the average scientific reader out of his wits, and for protection he would but cling the more closely to his beloved and intelligible Spencer. We know the partly cogent answer to all this would be that the ends sought are purely scholastic and professional. But life is too short and the world too wide for a man like Professor Bowne to afford to be scholastic and professional; besides, it is not clear that these very laudable, if narrow, ends are incompatible with the broader ones we have indicated. Most surely some one must be found to do the work of redeeming our current science from the dreary and bitter bondage of materialism; and that work must be wisely and kindly done, with tender condescension, if need be, to the materialist's standpoint and methods.

Without losing sight of this desideratum we turn from manner to matter. That the ground of the world-process is objective, spiritual, personal, and that apart from minds phenomena could have no existence, are elements alike of sound Lotzean and of sound Berkeleyan doctrine. Professor Bowne * Old edition, pp. 389-399; new edition, pp. 321-330.

at times emphasizes his dissent from Bishop Berkeley-more, we think, in the old edition than the new; but to our way of thinking Berkeley and Lotze reach essentially the same objective idealism by different routes. They approach the same object and land at the same destination from opposite directions. Berkeley, by analysis of the process of perception, reveals the subjective sensation of objective origin--its manifestation permeated by law of which there is no subjective control-which by rational construction becomes knowledge; Lotze and Bowne, by solution of the problem of the causality involved in change and the universal connection of things according to law, reduce matter to phenomenal reality and find its existence in the energizing of the Infinite and its locus in human consciousness. Berkeley's doctrine is psychological: Lotze's and Bowne's metaphysical. But they are essentially complementary, not contradictory. One starts from minds and the other from things, but both alike reach the phenomenality of matter and the true ontological reality of spirit. The Lotzean doctrine naturally emphasizes the ceaseless energizing of the Infinite according to law, while the Berkeleyan doctrine just as naturally emphasizes conscious percipiency of the phenomena thus projected within the sphere of intelligence; but both alike and in perfect harmony deny the existence of phenomenal reality apart from mind. Berkeley is thus subjective and psychological, while Lotze is objective and ontological; but united they afford the broadest and deepest basis for idealistic realism. It is doubtless true that Berkeley has not put the emphasis as decidedly upon the universal and unchanging elements of experience as has Lotze; certainly he has not done it with the vigor and vividness with which Professor Bowne performs this task in his Theory of Thought and Knowledge. But, even if this truth is relatively obscure in Berkeley, his subjective view-point is sufficiently explanatory of it, and Lotze's objective view-point supplies most naturally the exact correction which it needs.

This is perhaps not far from Professor Bowne's conception of the relation of the two philosophers. But, as we see it, it is high time for philosophy to enter upon its constructive and universalizing stage. Instead of emphasizing insignificant

differences-especially when their source is sufficiently evident -it is the business of modern philosophy to search for essential identities, and to rejoice over them as over great spoil. We do not question the rigidly scientific accuracy of Professor Bowne's method in constantly finding the ultimate explanation of phenomena in their metaphysical causes, in passing from the inductive to the productive plane and from phenomenal reality to ontological reality as its only sufficient ground. He was writing a treatise on metaphysics. But, as our author more than once acknowledges, these purely metaphysical arguments are dreary stretches for even the well-equipped reader -hardly less fatiguing, indeed, to the conscientious student than to the able and laborious professor whose persistent pen nobly accomplished the self-imposed task of first putting these profound reasonings upon paper. But what are they for the unprofessional reader, and how can the average scientific gentleman be induced to read them? We do not hesitate to say that, taken in their metaphysical nakedness, without an empirical shred to clothe their shivering forms, they are often, to such a reader, not only unconvincing but unintelligible.

If such a book as we have described above is to be written as a breakwater against the flood of materialism that is inundating the modern scientific world, it must make the approach from the more obvious but equally true psychological side, as well as from the profounder metaphysical side; and the distinct effort must be deliberately put forth to dissipate the ordinary scientific prejudices and superstitions, and to make connections with the average scientific ways of looking at things. Now, such a historian of philosophy as Albert Weber has recognized the analysis of Berkeley as the only antidote that can be successfully opposed to materialism, and such a scientist as Huxley has conceded the impregnability of Berkeley's position. But Berkeley and Lotze in their different ways reach scarcely distinguishable conclusions, and it thus becomes pedigogically expedient-or, as we should say in theology, apologetically expedient-to unite rather than divide them; to treat Berkeley as the psychological complement of Lotze, and Lotze as the metaphysical complement of Berkeley, and thus build on the broadest and deepest foundations the wall

that shall withstand the oncoming assault of a deadly materialism, fatal alike to knowledge, to morals, and to religion. The psychological analysis of the process of perception is much more simple and more immediately convincing than the metaphysical proof of the merely phenomenal reality of things. If the materialist is to be convinced and converted we believe this is the natural avenue of approach, as it certainly is the natural, if not necessary, introduction to the metaphysical argument. But, psychology and metaphysics united, the harmonized conclusions of Berkeley and Lotze are invincible; and thus are the weapons formed to our hand for the achievement of a victory for which the whole modern world "groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now."

Professor Bowne is perfectly definite and clear on the merely phenomenal reality of things and on the ontological existence of the Infinite; we are not sure but that he leaves the human spirit at some impossible halfway place. Of the finite, two conceptions are allowed to be possible. It may be either a form of energizing on the part of the Infinite, or it may be a real creation. In the first case its existence is phenomenal; in the second, it would seem, ontological. In neither case can the finite be identified with the Infinite, and pantheism is excluded. The decision between the two views is reached on the basis of the facts of experience. If any finite being exists capable of. acting from itself and for itself, it has in that fact the certain test and mark of reality as distinguished from phenomenality. This mark occurs only in human spirits or persons. If it be asked why the Infinite may not "posit" or create impersonal as well as personal agents, the answer is that identity and causality are found only in the personal, while analysis reveals that the impersonal has not even subjectivity and is simply the phenomenal process of an energy not its own. Hence, while things are but the energizing of the Infinite, persons are created, posited-not made out of some preexisting material, but caused to be. This distinction, on the general basis of Lotzean metaphysics, seems clear and satisfactory. Persons possess "ontological otherness to the Infinite." They seem to be lifted out of the order of inductive into that of productive causality, out of the category of phenomenal conditions of results into that

of real causes. So Professor Bowne's chapter on "Soul and Body" begins with the declaration that the soul abides, acts, and is acted upon, and hence possesses the essential marks of ontological reality. There are also passages in which Professor Bowne seriously objects to the view of nature as a closed system, and insists that man by his free and real agency projects results into the natural series which nature could never have reached independently. This free causality of man in nature which produces its results, not by the disruption of law and continuity, but by the knowledge of law and obedience to it, is used as a help to a proper understanding of the like free and causal relation of the Creator to the world.

But, when the problem of the interaction of soul and body is reached, the soul is forthwith reduced to the same level of phenomenality with the body itself. The causality between them is said to work both ways. Causality here evidently means, not productive, but inductive causality; a volition secures a "concomitant variation" of the body with a state of the soul, while a sensation secures a "concomitant variation" of the soul with a state of the body. Without this concomitant variation, which is all the interaction there is, there would ensue hopeless confusion of both knowledge and action, for the same stimulus might produce different sensations and the same volitions result in different actions. Thus the interaction between the" ontologically real" personal spirit and the phenomenal body is precisely like, and belongs to the same order with the interaction between two impersonal and merely phenomenal things.

We are not unaware of the nature of the necessary, and possibly satisfying, correction of all this, namely, that the soul has free causal control of its own states and thus, though the mental series runs along independently of the physical series, its parallelism is not maintained solely by concomitant variation with the bodily state, but its own independent initiative interpolates personal and volitional members in the mental series, with which the body must in turn preserve its parallelism by responding with the appropriate concomitant variation. This explanation, though it results from the general principles of Lotzeanism, is nowhere formally stated, so far as we now re

15-FIFTH SERIES, VOL. XV.