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error must be laid at the door of our interpretation of the sense data. In the case of most of the great philosophical systems that the world has outgrown, the failure can be traced to an incomplete analysis of the act of cognition. That the importance of such an analysis should have beeen so long overlooked is explained by the fact that the cognitive process is spontaneous and subconscious; but that the analysis must be exhaustive and basal the fate of many an ambitious world-theory proves. Even some present-day theories are lamentably weak at this point. In particular is this true of current monisms of the materialistic variety. The sense product in its completed form of perception is treated as an ultimate datum in which the senses alone are active. This leads to a minimizing of the mental element till it seems almost a vanishing quantity. The mental life is reduced to a kind of mechanism, the distinction between physical and mental processes is blurred, and then it is easy to make out a case for that unthinkable somewhat neither mental nor material yet the source of both.

Such an analysis brings to light some interesting facts. In general it reveals the complexity of the process, even in the acquisition of the simplest knowledge of objective things. This process is the starting point for the two great branches of philosophy, a theory of reality or metaphysics, and a theory knowledge or epistemology. Even more distinct and irreducible seem to the student the two elements of knowledge-the impressions from without and the strictly mental activity of fixing, relating, and objectifying these impressions. Immediately we see that, though thought in its conscious product is objective and seems merely to reflect the things perceived, it is as a process entirely mental. Whatever may be our theory to explain the fact we see that the world about us, apparently so independent of all thought, is strangely related to our own thinking, and that without such thought-activity on our part the world would not exist for us. The materialist, of course, is greatly disturbed by such an analysis, and hence is inclined to decry it as unnecessary or meaningless. He insists that we must take the world just as we find it, without speculative admixture. We should be empirical in our methods, hold fast to the facts as they report themselves, and not lose our way in



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vain and confusing studies about what lies back of the observed data. This is good general advice, but when we become entangled in our effort to understand our data and insist on having all the facts, the necessity of the analysis becomes evident. Materialism seerns forever doomed to oscillate between the horns of the fatal dilemma which its defective theory of cognition involves, or it must move in a vicious circle when trying to understand itself. This is true even of the refined materialism which has repudiated the name.

But when the analysis is complete the work of philosophy has just began. It has come into possession of its empirical data ; all depends on the way it handles them. The questions immediately pre

. sent themselves, How are we to understand those general concepts, such as substance, quality, relation, cause, identity, change, time, space, which make a knowledge of nature possible? What is the final test of knowledge? What of the fundamental power manifesting itself in nature ? And thus one after another the distinctive problems of philosophy unfold themselves to the student.

In the prosecution of such a study a few suggestions are in place. We must be willing to trust reason, that is, must assume that nature is knowable. Infinite patience and a hardheaded insistence upon clearness of meaning are indispensable. We must have the courage to follow where reason leads, though it be “into the dark depths of a wild and tangled forest.” Nor should we be content to remain in this hopeless confusion. There is another side" to the forest which we may reach, if we persist. The contradictions must be overcome. Our failure at this point argues either that the preliminary work has not been thorough or that the principle of explanation which will resolve the puzzles has not yet been discovered. The first shortcoming is evident, for instance, in Professor Huxley's brilliant attempts at philosophizing which resulted in agnosticism. He had scarcely gotten beyond the Humian theory of perception. His was not an "ignoramus," but an "ignorabimus." The second difficulty is illustrated in that excellent work by Professor Bradley on Appearance and Reality. In this work the reader is presented with an array of contradictions that is quite overwhelming. All meaning drops out of our fundamental concepts, and one is almost ready to doubt if perhaps his own judgment be not also mere appearance. Nothing intelligible is left of the categories or of the still more fundamental distinction of the self and not-self. Everything resolves away under the touch of the skilled dialectician, “und wir sehen dass wir nichts wissen können." In all this he has proved that the concepts when treated apart from intelligence and compared one with another cannot be understood. The first fact to be recognized in the study of these elements of knowledge is the mind which thinks them. For example, change and identity are in hopeless conflict, and we can make nothing of them while we treat them as objective and both having validity; but the difficulty vanishes when they are viewed as activities of an intelligence trying to understand reality. In the interest of knowledge the mind reads into its perceptions an abiding content; the identity of the object perceived is therefore mental or “logical.” But the mind also must take account of change. We can discover no real identity anywhere except in intelligence.

In conclusion, then, we would say that science can never be a complete substitute for philosophy. Philosophical problems demand a special method of treatment. A study of the history of thought, although valuable and even necessary to a full and satisfactory grasp of world problems, should not be undertaken as introductory to a systematic treatment of the snbject. The student should recognize as his special task such an adjustment of the spontaneous and uncritical views of nature as will eliminate contradictions and give a harmonious concept of the world as a whole. For this he needs a stead

a fast confidence in the power of thought to grasp reality. Let him do his critical work exhaustively, try all things, and hold fast to the truth when found. If persistent he will surely attain such a rational insight into nature as will be its own exceeding great reward.

beo. A. Wilson




THERE are two general classes of Biblical critics ; one explains the Holy Scriptures and the other explains them away.

The recent remarkable proclamation of Frank W. Rollins, Governor of New Hampshire, appointing April 13th as Fast Day, contains these wise words :

No matter what our belief may be in religious matters, every good citizen knows that when the restraining influences of religion are withdrawn from a community its decay, moral, mental, and financial, is swift and sure. To me this is one of the strongest evidences of the fundamental truth of Christianity.

THE INNER LIFE OF THE PREACHER. In very many respects the inner life of the preacher is exactly the same as that of other Christian men and women. In the main he has the same temptations to be resisted, the same virtues to be cultivated, the same helps to growth in grace. But in some particulars the preacher's inner life deserves a separate treatment, both on account of its special importance and on account of the peculiarities, favorable and unfavorable, pertaining to it. There are certain hindrances to the minister's spiritual progress which do not in the same way, or to the same degree, affect the spiritual growth of other people, and which call therefore for particular attention. Four of these hindrances may be specified :

1. Officialism. To have to do with sacred things is his business, that whereby he earns his bread and supports his family. Hence the temptation to look upon his work chiefly from a business point of view is by no means small. He is apt to read the Bible with his congregation in mind rather than the needs of his own soul, hunting for texts to preach from instead of truths to live by, or investigating the higher criticism instead of the higher ranges of Christian experience. He has so much pray. ing to do in public that it is natural for him to think he may be excused from praying much in private. In personal work for the people around him professional motives are liable to intrude their ugly heads and stain the purity of his purpose. When he urges the careless or lukewarm to come to church he is well aware that an enlarged congregation is an important item in his success and has a pretty close connection with his salary. And even when he pleads with men to come to Christ and labors hard to promote a genuine revival of religion Satan whispers that if there are many converts under his ministry he will be sought for by larger churches. And so it is in every direction. His private religious life is so mixed up with his public work that a dangerous complication ensues. It is peculiarly easy for him to substitute multiplied ecclesiastical activities for vigorous wrestling with his individual infirmities and the insistence on a close personal walk with God. It is, of course, not necessary that he yield to this temptation, but it is there and makes itself felt every hour of the day.

2. The Strain of Nonfraternal Competition. The minister's intimate relation to his brother ministers brings him peculiar trials as well as peculiar joys. While he has in their society very much of comfort, of stimulation, and of help, there is no denying that he needs to watch closely against certain evil feelings which have a tendency to arise as he contemplates their superior prosperity, or what appears to him to be such. He sees those that he thinks are no better and no abler than himself preferred be. fore him. He imagines-it is all imagination—that faithfulness has not so much to do with promotion as favoritism. He observes how readily the populace are imposed upon by a few shining and shallow traits and tricks, while more solid but less showy excellence that has not the knack to push itself into prominence is carelessly and continuously passed by. He is considerably stumbled by these things. It is hard for him to be reconciled to the injustice with which he thinks he has been treated, at the failure of the authorities to properly appreciate his worth. The schemes of those less scrupulous, or the qualities of those less conscientious but more brilliant, have prevailed over his more modest or less attractive gifts. It is difficult for him to be perfectly contented. Jealousy and envy lurk beside his door and endeavor to slip in as he opens it to look out upon the curious conglomeration that comes within his vision. If he


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