to reject Mr. Hughes's plea for Compulsory Service. The "No" majority was not large-under 100,000 on a vote of over 2,000,000-but it cannot be denied that both here and in Australia the result was unexpected, and has caused disappointment and concern. We are indebted to the Sydney correspondent of The Times for what is probably an accurate view of the true situation. "Of the loyalty of Australia to the Empire and the Allies," he says, "there is no question," and we have never doubted it for an instant. What appears to have happened is that the majority of Australian electors allowed themselves to be stampeded into the belief that there was no need for compulsion. Many sections of the community, of course, voted "anti" on principle or for political reasons-the Irish, the Germanborn, and the women voters, for example -but all these sectional influences would have failed of their purpose. if there had not been a very general misunderstanding of the urgent need for men. Australia is very far from the war, and there is, says The Times correspondent,

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a general feeling that it is all a thrilling cinema film or a nightmare from which the world may wake at any moment." It is a thousand pities that such a tragic delusion should be allowed to exist, and we look to both the Home and Dominion Governments to correct this impression with all the energy at their disposal without delay. In the meantime there has been a return to the voluntary system of recruiting, but the whole position is far from satisfactory, and the prestige of Mr. Hughes has received an unfortunate blow. Though both Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Islington remain at the India Office, yet the reconstruction of Government has not left India entirely unaffected. The new Ministry does not include Mr. Charles Roberts, who was a great friend of India,

India and Governmental Changes.

and who, we heard, had been replaced by Lord Islington at the time the Coalition Government came into power because it was deemed necessary to have a peer other than Lord Curzon to act as India's spokesman in the Upper House. Indians are, however, happy that Dr. Fisher is in the Government. He is known to be deeply interested in Indian progress, and to be very sympathetic with Indian aspirations. He served on the Indian Public Services Commission, and his wife is the daughter of Sir Courtenay Ilbert, who, as a member of the late Lord Ripon's Government, fought valiantly, though unsuccessfully, against the Indian bureaucracy. Mr. Chamberlain's nomination of Lord Ronaldshay is not liked by the Bengalis. Anyone appointed to succeed so sympathetic a Governor as Lord Carmichael would have found it difficult to step into his shoes, but it is thought that Lord Ronaldshay belongs to the Curzonian school, and is antipathetic towards Indian aspirations.

A Notable South African.

President Steyn-for as President he will always be remembered— who passed away in the last days of November, was the most conspicuous civilian during the Boer War. Although he took no part in the direction of the campaign, he shared all the hardships of the struggle, and contributed probably more than any single man to nerve the heart and keep up the spirit of the Boers. Of him, as was said of Cromwell long ago, it was true that "hope shone in him as a pillar of fire after it had gone out in other men." He went into the war in splendid physical health. He came out of it a shattered wreck, paralysed, and nearly blind. Although he made a wonderful recovery, his health never permitted him to take any active part in politics after, but his personality ever made itself felt, and he will be mourned by many in South Africa.

Greece.

The Greek situation, considering it as it has appeared for the past year or more, is one that no man outside the councils of diplomatists can pretend to understand. Its apparent facts are that a monarch, obviously hostile to the Allies, and to what extent we know not acting in favour of the Germanic Powers, has been permitted by the Allies to retain his place and a certain portion of his power, and, beyond doubt, to work in a manner hostile to Allied interests in the Balkans. One must look even farther back than his defection from the Serbo-Greek treaty for his first piece of double-dealing, back to the first bombardment of the Dardanelles forts by the warships of the Allies; then comes his despicable "scrap of paper" view of the Serbian appeal for his aid, at the time of the Bulgarian and Austro-German sweep past Belgrade fifteen months ago. The Allied occupation of Salonika restrained his German sympathies, and gave him cause for more double-dealing, which he has kept up throughout the months that preceded the Allied ultimatum of December 14th, in which it was definitely stated that the Greek army was 66 a menace to the peace and security of the Allied armies in Macedonia." The terms of this ultimatum, accepted perforce by King Constantine and his pro-German clique, were such as to put an end to the danger of a stab in the back from which the Salonika force suffered so long. In this country a certain group of would-be wire-pullers alleged that the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey was responsible for the Allied hesitancy in dealing with the Greek king, but such an allegation overlooks the fact that not only Britain, but France, Russia, and Italy have each a share in the Balkan campaign, and are equally involved in the dangers arising out of Greek double

dealing. Why such double-dealing has been so long permitted has not been revealed, but doubtless the end of the war will show reasons for such a policy as has been pursued. It is significant that M. Venizelos, the one great man of Greece whom the Allies can trust, has never counselled repudiation of Constantine; his influence has modified the situation enormously in favour of the Allies, by giving a lead to the pro-Ally section of the Greek people, but never once has he given countenance to proposals for breaking off relations with his nominal king. In this is evidence that some reason exists for the apparently futile policy pursued by the Allies up to the time that their ultimatum was issued with a view to safeguarding the expedition based on Salonika, and putting an end to a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. A clearance, such as the ultimatum demands, of all possibly hostile military forces from north Greece, will ensure the rear of the Salonika force from any attack, and will, as far as can be seen, put a definite end to pro-German machinations in this theatre of war.

Roumania.

Though, for a time, there were not wanting those who saw in the RussoRoumanian retirement a likeness to the Franco-British retirement to the Marne, and to the great Russian retreat of eighteen months ago, such a view of the operations has now been dispelled. The retirement to the Marne, and the Russian retreat in less measure, were retreats of forces that gained strength as they fell back toward their bases-in each case the lines, by rolling back on their sources of strength, automatically gained strength, while the enemy by lengthening his lines of communication correspondingly lost strength. In the advance through Roumania, on the other hand, the enemy has gained

strength by the shortening of the line he has to hold and consequent concentration of his forces. The Russo-Roumanian retreat is consequent on a breakdown, and is a serious set-back to the Allied eause, though it does not, when regarded as a part of the whole campaign, afford any ground for pessimism.

Enemy Captures,

The main loss to Roumania is in men; probably, from the time that the retreat from the Vulkan Pass was begun, the Roumanian army has lost heavily. The losses of guns have also been considerable, but these can be replaced, while the men cannot. In the matter of supplies captured, the enemy reports have treated us to such phrases as "large quantities,' and the booty is immeasurable," but no attempt has been made to state what quantities of grain and foodstuffs have actually fallen into enemy hands, probably because these quantities have fallen far below expectations. Much was made of the fact that a certain amount of grain which had been purchased by the British Government had been captured, but whether the quantity was one sack or a thousand tons is left to the reader of the reports to determine. It is certain that the Roumanians destroyed some of their stores, and removed still more; it is certain, too, that after expecting an alleviation of the food scarcity in Germany from the occupation of Roumania, the German papers are now wailing more loudly than ever over dearth of foodstuffs, which looks very much as if great hopes had been built on augmentation of supplies from Roumania, hopes which had failed to materialise. We may take it that the invading armies have been able to live on the country, and that a certain amount of grain has been captured by the enemy, but that the amount captured is not only insufficient for German needs, but grievously smaller than the enemy expected to find.

has been evacuated; the retreat farther north has been continued beyond Ploesti and has uncovered Buzeu, which gives the enemy full control of the line of rail from Constanza through Fetesti and Buzeu to the Roumanian northwestern frontier and to Hungary-all the southern railway systems of Roumania are now in enemy hands; the whole of Wallachia has fallen fallen to the enemy, practically, and that without any very heavy fighting. Meanwhile a theory has

been advanced for this breakdown and persistent retreat, that theory being based on the fact that the evacuation of Bucharest had been considered as a possibility before the Roumanian declaration of war. It is to the effect that Roumania, in declaring war, merely anticipated by a few days an inevitable German declaration of war. Germany's intense need of foodstuffs, which Roumania declined to give, had caused the German general staff to set the machinery in motion for Falkenhayn's advance before August 29th, and it was considered better to anticipate the enemy attack, rather than wait for it at the frontier-and hence the initial invasion of Transylvania, while Falkenhayn's force was still on the way. This version is given merely as a theory, but it is strongly supported by the turn of

the enemy has to face. The enemy offensive in Roumania is a bigger business than the Salonika offensive on our part, for the Salonika force has brought to combat it not less than eight and almost certainly not more than ten enemy divisions, while for the Roumanian thrust the enemy has employed twenty-two divisions, Bulgarian, German, and one Turkish. Meanwhile the five months of fighting on the Somme, from the beginning of July to the end of November, involved on the enemy the use of not less than a hundred divisions, and almost certainly the number used is over a hundred. On that short sector of front the enemy has had to employ five times as many men as he has used in the advance through Roumania, and his losses, at a moderate computation, are are not short of the whole number of troops used in the Roumanian campaign, while it is a certainty that he lost as many men in the series of attacks on the positions covering Verdun as he has used in the Roumanian campaign. Further, considering the casualties incurred by the Russo-Roumanian forces in relation to the whole of the eastern front, they do not as yet amount to a fourth of the casualties incurred in the course of the great Russian retreat of last year, and they do not by any means reduce the Allied strength on the eastern front as a whole to what it was before Roumania entered on the war, while, in spite of the enemy successes, the eastern front that Germany and Austria and Bulgaria.must hold is still longer by about three hundred miles

than it was before Roumania joined up with the Allies. In spite of her successes, Germany has not restored the balance in the east, and she is far less able now than she was six months ago even to maintain that balance, for neither the march through Wallachia nor any other extension of the territory she holds can solve the growing problem of inadequate man-power, while, evidently,

the Wallachian campaign has not solved the problem of food supplies.

Evidence of what Ger

Peace Efforts, many hoped, and of how far her hopes tally with actual accomplishment, is available in the open move toward peace instigated by Berlin. It was hoped that some real advantage would come of the Roumanian campaign, and when all that could be accomplished in the way of benefit to the Central Powers had been achieved, the offer of peace was madeit was made when the Central Powers felt themselves best able to offer terms, because they had reached their maximum of bargaining power. Obviously, if they had gained sufficient supplies from Roumania to carry them over the winter, and if they saw sufficient reserves of men in hand to carry on the war to a successful conclusion, they would not have made such an offer-for the blasphemous references to God and humanity contained in the offer, as it was stated by the German Chancellor, may be passed over as unworthy of notice, since they emanate from the source that systematically planned the Belgian outrages, the rape of Poland, the Serbian horrors, and seamurders that are yet fresh in men's minds. Germany's end in this offer was material advantage, and, knowing themselves beaten, the German leaders offered peace while as yet they possessed a semblance of power to continue the struggle. If they had anticipated decisive success in Roumania, or on any other front, they would have withheld this offer until such success had been gained, for it would have been been so much more bargaining capacity. Since the offer was made with no such decisive advantage to back it, the obvious conclusion is that Germany -for only Germany counts in things like this fears the immediate future, thus justifying those estimates of her strength which placed the exhaustion of her reserves as bound to happen within the

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next six months. For a decrease in the extent of territory held, and a consequent decrease in the power to make terms of peace, will come before the final exhaustion of enemy reserves, and not simultaneously with it. It is elementary military knowledge that a defensive front, which the enemy front as a whole has now become in spite of such a local blow as that at Roumania, must be shortened while a reserve of strength exists in addition to the force necessary to hold the front; otherwise, the very effort to shorten the front is equivalent to disaster. This fact is as elementary from the military point of view as Germany's offer is transparently simple-and contemptible-from the diplomatic point of

view.

The Western Front.

Two events, at the time of writing, have occurred which emphasise the German need for peace: one is the French success at Verdun on December 15th-16th, and the other is the British forward movement toward Baghdad. Of these two the former is by far the more important, for various reasons; in the first place, it is a victory at a point that Germany, as a matter of honour-if such a thing as a matter of honour has anything to do with Germany -counted a point of necessity for German victory; in the second place, it has been achieved at a point where the whole world can see and judge of the importance of the victory, the influence that it must exercise on German moral and on the whole campaign, and the relative power of the French offensive and the German defensive at this part of the line, more or less representative of the relative strengths of the opponents along the whole western front; in the third place, it is a definite reply, in the sight of the whole world, to the German assertions that, since the fighting forces are exhausted and nothing more can be done, it is time for peace;

it is an assertion of the strength of France, whom Germany considered most exhausted of the powers arrayed against her, and thus is indirectly an assertion of the strength of all the Allies, and of the fact that the world will not tolerate a German peace. For, save for the United States, one may express the "world" of to-day as two groups of belligerents; the weaker of these two groups is proposing peace; the stronger group-the world that counts-is steadily coming to a point at which it will be the only “world' capable of backing its will by the force that makes will effective. The neutrals have paltered too long, and are out of the reckoning.

Three days of artillery Verdun-the preparation preceded the Revanche. latest attack at Verdun, which began at 10 a.m.

on December 16th, as far as the infantry advance was concerned. A front of ten kilometres was set as the limit of width attacked, and in one day this front was carried to a depth of three kilometres. On the right bank of the Meuse, the historic positions that cost the Germans over a quarter of a million lives were taken back: the villages of Vacherauville, Louvemont, les Chambrettes, and the Hardaumont and Bezonvaux works, together with the whole of the famous "Pepper" Hill, passed to French hands, and, by the end of the day of December 17th, there had been counted over 9,000 German prisoners, including 250 officers, while about a week of the output of Essen, over 80 guns of all calibres, had been either captured or destroyed. A later report shows that the total of prisoners is over 11,000, and of guns 115, with 151 mine-throwers and machine guns. The French communiqué, in recording the event, states: "the success is complete, and the troops are giving evidence of very lively enthusiasm. Our losses are slight.' Such enthusiasm is in every way justifi