THE BLOCKADING SERVICE.

BY HORATIO L. WAIT.

[Read October 7, 1885.]

WHEN the Rebellion against the Government of the United States began, in 1861, a novel and perplexing question arose, as to whether it would be better for the government to declare all the Southern ports of entry closed, or to proclaim a blockade. The decision in this matter necessarily determined the policy of foreign nations in their relations with us, and fixed the course to be pursued by our government toward the insurgents. Many facts that have been made public since the war clearly indicate that this was the chief question that affected the European nations in their attitude toward us during our great struggle, and it certainly influenced the character of the struggle in our own country.

The urgency of the case caused President Lincoln to act promptly. He issued a proclamation on April 19, 1861, six days after the surrender of Fort Sumter, declaring a blockade of the entire coast of the Confederacy, from South Carolina to Texas, and, on April 27, extended it to cover Virginia and North Carolina, making a coastline of over three thousand miles, greater in extent than the Atlantic coast of Europe, to be blockaded, -- an undertaking without precedent in history.

During our last war with Great Britain, when that nation had over seven hundred naval vessels in commission, not a single port of the United States was thoroughly closed. When Mr. Lincoln issued his proclamation, we had but forty-two ships in commission in our navy; most of these

were absent on foreign stations, and but one efficient war-ship, the "Brooklyn," was available for immediate service. The days of "paper blockades" had long since passed away. The universally recognized rule of international law on this subject was that "Blockades to be binding must be effectual. There must be a squadron lying off the harbor to be blockaded, and it must be strong enough to constitute an actual blockade of the port. The neutral must have had due notice of its existence; and to affect a neutral vessel, she must have been guilty of an act of violation, by passing or attempting to pass in or out of the port with a cargo laden after the commencement of the blockade. The neutral must be ready to prove himself that which he professes to be; therefore he is subject to the right of visitation and search."

A more serious difficulty now presented itself. How was it possible to undertake such a blockade as this, along such a vast extent of coast, when so few ships of any kind were available, without its being open to the charge of being a mere "paper blockade"? In the early part of the century, such blockades had been attempted by European powers; but the same nations were now the first to make merry over the subject of our "paper blockade." Some of the most prominent European statesmen publicly declared it a "material impossibility to enforce it." To avoid any chance of technical complications with these critical foreign powers, a special notice was given by our vessels at the entrance of each port actually closed by them, in addition to the general diplomatic notice, so that, for a time, one warning was allowed every ship touching at a blockaded port before she was liable to capture; and thus each port was brought under the full operation of the proclamation only when it was actually blockaded by one or more armed vessels. By degrees, as the blockading force was increased, the blockade became more extended and stringent; it was, therefore, assumed that the general notice rendered the special notice unnecessary. It was

finally discontinued entirely, and capture took place without warning.

The magnitude of this task of establishing and maintaining the blockade was but little appreciated by the people generally. Public attention was absorbed by the raising of many large armies from the various States; and the anxious solicitude which kept the sympathetic minds of the people on the alert as the defeats and victories of our troops on the land followed one another until the end of the war, prevented them from fully realizing what was needed, and what was accomplished, by the national forces on the ocean. On land, the reporter and the special artist were omnipresent; while from the ocean came little else besides brief official despatches, — for correspondents were looked upon with disfavor in the sea service. At the beginning of the war, very few outside of the naval circles had adequate ideas of what we had undertaken to do. The novelty of the complications surrounding the first attempts to establish the blockade made it a matter of great perplexity even to those who were supposed to be authorities on the subject. When the Secretary of the Navy asked the principal shippingmerchants and shipowners of New York to aid him in procuring vessels to begin the blockade, it is related that their committees decided that thirty sailing ships would be needed. As it took over six hundred ships, mostly steamers, to do the work, it is manifest that they had a very faint conception of what was to be done. There were twenty-eight old ships of war lying dismantled at the various navy-yards. Those that were worth repairing were fitted for sea as rapidly as possible. All the available merchant vessels that could be made to carry armaments, including tugs and old New York ferry-boats, were purchased, and converted into fighting ships as hastily as the limited facilities of the Northern ports would permit. The scanty resources of the navy-yards were inadequate, and all the private shipyards were

crowded with work. There were not enough skilled workmen to meet this sudden demand, and the naval officers found it necessary personally to direct the unskilled artisans, or assist with their own hands in fitting these nondescript vessels for the mounting and working of heavy guns. As fast as the vessels could be purchased, altered, and equipped, they were stationed along the coast or sent to sea, many such vessels, by the tact and skill of the officers in charge of them, being made to do good service. One of the most important prizes captured the steamer" Circassian" was taken near the harbor of Havana by one of these old Fulton ferryboats.

At the beginning of the war the lack of men was as great an embarrassment as the want of vessels. Three hundred and twenty-two of the officers of the regular navy resigned, or joined the insurgent forces. Many of these had already distinguished themselves by their services or talents. One of them, Commander Brooke, rendered very important services to the Southerners by converting the ten-inch Columbiads captured by them into rifled guns. They proved to be very effective pieces, and were said to be the best converted guns ever made. He also aided in devising the simplest and best of the many kinds of torpedoes and fuses used by the Confederates, as well as in designing the ram

"Merrimac."

The total number of seamen at all the Northern naval stations available for immediate detail amounted to but two hundred and seven; and it must be remembered that it was as important that they should be trained to handle heavy guns at sea as that they should be good seamen. The true sailor will soon make himself efficient on board any ship, as far as the handling of the vessel is. concerned; but in the effective use of the battery, only the trained man-of-war's man can safely be relied upon. There are also many other minor matters - such as the