Hooker's left at this time faced east, his left and right centre east and south, his right south, slightly turning at the extreme right toward the west, and resting in the air. The line has been compared to the letters C and V, the apex being just beyond the Chancellor House.

During the afternoon Sickles's command arrived, having been ordered up from Sedgwick, and went into position at the left of Howard and the right of Slocum. At midnight Hooker sent to Reynolds to send his men to Chancellorsville. Sedgwick was accordingly left alone

below Fredericksburg.

In the enemy's line, active preparations and earnest deliberations were taking place for the morrow. Fitzhugh Lee gives such an interesting account of the conversation between Lee and Jackson, and the movement of the latter, that I am tempted to quote liberally from his address. He says:

"The problem presented to General Lee on the night of May Ist was to decide how best to attack Hooker's camp on the morning of May 2d; time was an important element, for near Fredericksburg, in his rear, was Sedgwick, largely outnumbering the Confederate force in his front under Early. During the afternoon, General Lee wished to attack from his right, and cut Hooker off from the United States Ford, preventing his communication with Sedgwick, and rode down himself and examined the lands all the way to the river, but found no place where he could do so. Returning at night, he found Jackson, and asked him if he knew of any place to attack. Jackson said, 'No.' Lee said, 'Then we must get around to the Federal right.' Jackson said he had been inquiring about roads, and Stewart came up then and said he would go down and see what he could learn about roads; he soon returned with the Rev. Dr. B. T. Lacey, who said a circuit could be made around by the Wilderness Tavern, and a young man living in the county, and then in the cavalry, was sent for to act as guide. Ah, what an earnest talk Lee and Jackson had on the night of May 1st! At sunset, they took their seats on a log to the right, or north, side of the Plank Road, and a little

distant from the wood. Jackson spoke to Lee about what he had seen and heard during the advance, and commented upon the promptness with which the enemy had appeared to abandon his movements toward Fredericksburg, and the ease with which he had been driven back to Chancellorsville, and concluded by expressing an opinion very decidedly, repeating it more than once, that the enemy would recross the Rappahannock before morning. After telling Jackson that he hoped that his opinion might prove to be correct, Lee added, 'But, General, we must get ready to attack the enemy if we should find him here tomorrow, and you must make all arrangements to move around his right flank.' General Lee then took up the map and pointed out to Jackson the general direction of his route to the Furnace and the Brock Roads. Some conversation took place as to the importance of endeavoring to conceal the movements from the enemy, and as to the existence of roads farther to the enemy's right, by which General Jackson might pass so as not to be exposed to observation and attack. The general line of Jackson's route was pointed out, and the necessity of celerity and secrecy was enjoined upon him. The conversation was a lengthy one, and at the conclusion of it Lee said to Jackson that before he moved in the morning, if he should have any doubt as to whether the enemy was still in position, he could send a couple of guns to a spot near by and open fire upon the enemy's position, which would speedily settle the question."

Captain Smith, of General Jackson's staff, whom I met at Fredericksburg a few weeks since, said that he and the rest of the staff had bivouacked in the woods, and about the middle of the night he awoke and saw Lee and Jackson seated and bending over a camp-fire which had almost died out; they were then planning for the flank attack; at daybreak, the column was on the march.

At sunrise, Hooker rode along the lines, receiving hearty cheers from the men. A few changes were made in the disposition of the troops. As early as eight o'clock in the morning, Birney reported to Sickles that a continuous column of infantry trains and ambulances was passing his front to the right. The woods concealed this

command, except at one opening, and a section of Clark's battery was brought up, shelling the column, and compelling it to seek another road. Sickles said the column was observed for three hours, and indicated either a retreat or an attack upon the right flank. The report of this movement was at once sent to Hooker and Howard, and the former issued the following order to Generals Slocum and Howard, at 9.30 A. M.:

"The disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy; if he should throw himself upon your flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the position you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency; the right of your line does not appear to be strong enough; no artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the General's opinion, as well posted as might be. We have good reasons to suppose the enemy is moving to our right; please advance your pickets, for the purpose of observation, as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach."

At noon, Sickles was ordered to advance cautiously toward the road followed by the enemy, and harass the movement as much as possible.

With the exception of the capture of about three hundred prisoners, and an interchange of shots between the artillery, nothing was accomplished. The final orders to attack came too late, for at that time Jackson's column had passed out of sight.

At army headquarters, it was thought that Jackson was retreating; and as late as ten minutes past 4 P. M. a despatch was sent to Butterfield that the enemy was fleeing, trying to save his trains, and two of Sickles's divisions were among them.

With the exception of the movement on the part of

Sickles, the army remained quiet throughout the day. Why nothing was done, no one seemed to know.

General Devens, commanding a division on the extreme right of the army, only two regiments of which were to the right of the Turnpike Road, reported a large column moving rapidly toward the right; he did not know whether it was in retreat, or marching for a flank attack. After this, scouts came in and reported the same fact. Cavalry reconnoissances were made, but pushed out no farther than to find the cavalry pickets of the enemy, when they retired, and reported, a quarter of an hour before the attack was made, that no enemy at all were in front. Carl Schurz, commanding the division to the left of Devens, says: "Our right wing stood completely in the air, with nothing to lean upon, not even a strong echelon, and with no reliable cavalry to make reconnoissances,— and that, too, in a forest thick enough not to permit any view of the front, flank, or rear, but not thick enough to prevent the approach of the enemy's troops. Our right was at the mercy of the enemy, who was at perfect liberty to walk around us through a large gap between von Gilsa's right and the cavalry forces on the Rapidan. General McLean, whose brigade was to the left of the extreme right brigade, faced south; while Jackson's attack came from the west." In his report, he says: "The sketch of our position will show how little we expected an attack upon our flank or rear;" and he adds, "All was quiet during the day until about six o'clock." No satisfactory theory can be found for the negligence and the culpable - almost criminal carelessness allowed on the right, except upon the belief that the enemy was in retreat; and this will not excuse it, for a vigorous attack by Sickles, or a good look-out in advance on the Turnpike Road, would have discovered the true situation.

In the centre and on our left, Lee kept up considerable firing, for the purpose of diverting Hooker, and preventing him from interfering with Jackson, and an advance at any

time during the day by our superior forces upon the lines. under Lee could not but have been successful.

While the right of the army was in fancied security, Jackson was rapidly pushing on.

Fitzhugh Lee gives this graphic description of the view which Jackson and he had of the Federal army:

"Upon reaching the Plank Road, some five miles west of Chancellorsville, my command was halted, and, while waiting for Jackson to come up, I made a personal reconnoissance to locate the right for Jackson's attack. With one staff officer, I rode across and beyond the Plank Road, in the direction of the old Turnpike, pursuing a path through the woods, momentarily expecting to find evidence of the enemy's presence.

'Seeing a wooded hill in the distance, I determined, if possible, to get upon its top, as it promised a view of the adjacent country; cautiously I ascended its side, reaching a point upon its summit without molestation. What a sight presented itself to me! Below, and but a few hundred yards distant, ran the Federal line of battle. I was in rear of Howard's right. They were in line of defence, with abatis in front, and long lines of stacked arms in rear. Two cannon were visible in a part of the line. The soldiers were in groups in the rear, laughing, chatting, smoking, probably engaged here and there in games of cards and other amusements, indulged in while feeling safe and comfortable, awaiting orders. In rear of them were other parties, driving up and slaughtering beeves. The remembrance of the scene is as clear as it was sixteen years ago.

"So impressed was I with my discovery that I rode rapidly back to the point on the Plank Road where I had left my cavalry, and back down the road Jackson was moving, when I met Stonewall himself. 'General,' said I, 'if you will ride with me, halting your column here out of sight, I will show you the enemy's right, and you will perceive the great advantage of attacking down the old Turnpike, instead of down the Plank Road, the enemy's line being taken in reverse. Bring only one courier, as you will be in view from the top of the hill.' Jackson assented, and I rapidly conducted him to the point of observation. There had been no change in the picture. I watched him closely, as he gazed upon Howard's troops. It