except the existence and power of God, can be proved without having recourse far more to the researches and experiments of others than to the phenomena which we have actually observed? Natural religion is, in this respect, much on the same footing as revealed; but, in the second place, the miracles which support divine revelation are still, in some instances, as much the objects of immediate observation as any appearance whatever in the natural world. The present state of the Jews, minutely foretold three thousand years ago, proves, not only that the prophet was divine who predicted it, but that there is a miraculous interposition of the power and agency of God actually presented to our view in the preservation of this wonderful people. Here all who will look to the prediction, and to the fact in which it is fulfilled, have the evidence of their senses for the existence of miraculous interposition. "We do not think it is going too far to say, that the process of induction in the case of Christianity is much simpler, and much less liable to mistake, and much better fitted for issuing in unequivocal results, than the process of induction which must be gone through in the case of natural religion. The general foundation of our reasoning is the same. We have testimony and observation for the miraculous facts which are adduced in favour of Christianity; and we have testimony and observation for the ordinary facts on which natural religion is built. But miracles, from their very nature, carry a much readier, and clearer, and more irresistible conviction to the mind than ordinary facts can possibly do. In the latter case the argument is much more abstruse than it needs to be in the former. And when we have once established the truth of the Christian record, we have at the same time, and by necessary consequence, established the truth of every particular doctrine which it contains; whereas, there is not a single point in the religion of nature which does not require a train of reasoning peculiar to itself, for its discovery, or for its confirmation. It is probably owing to these circumstances, that, in point of fact, incomparably more have been convinced by the evidence for Christianity, of its being the workmanship of God, than were ever convinced or made religious by the mere study of creation, and the mere light of nature.' With respect to Hume's objection to miracles,-that we have no experience for them,-and that all our experience is against them, we shall consider it very fully in the following Book. NO VALID OBJECTION CHAPTER VII. CAN BE FORMED AGAINST A DIVINE REVELATION FROM ITS CONTAINING 1. On the subject of this chapter the reader is referred to the observations of Butler,† and to the profound remarks of President Edwards. Difficulties and mysteries may be expected in a divine revelation, because, in the first place, they are to be found in the established order of nature, and in the second place, they seem to be closely connected with, and involved in, the subject-matters of such revelation. 2. First, Difficulties and things apparently liable to objection are to be found in the established order of nature. This is obvious to every one, and universally admitted. We meet with difficulties innumerable in the natural world, the possible existence of which, in our a priori reasonings on the subject, we should have denied. “Were the instruction which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and to mankind by these, together with reason, matter of probable proof, and not of *Thomson's Sermons on Infidelity, p. 34. + Analogy, p. ii. chap. iii. + Edwards' Works, vol. viii. p. 223. certain observation, it would be objected as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon account of the means by which this instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and circumstances of it. For instance: Would it not have been thought highly improbable, that men should have been so much more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions of the heavenly bodies,-than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many other things in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in astronomy? How capricious and irregular a way of information, would it be said, is that of invention, by means of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in many things, upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend. So likewise the imperfections attending the only method by which nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to each other, are innumerable. Language is in its very nature inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence; and so liable to it from design, that every man can deceive and betray by it. In like manner, that brutes, without reason, should act, in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those respects, would be thought impossible." 3. We might thus go on and specify the difficulties that continually present themselves in the established constitution of things. Beforehand, it would have appeared to us impossible that evil could exist under the government of a Being of infinite goodness and almighty power;-that the gifts of knowledge, eloquence, and influence should be conferred on persons without virtue or prudence ;—that during many ages mankind should have been liable to diseases and suffering from them, and have been all the while left ignorant of those remedies which exist in nature, and which God has provided;-and that even after these remedies, or some of them, have been discovered, so very few of the human race should derive advantage from them. 4. Now, our argument is this:-As the constitution of nature and a divine revelation must proceed from the same author, and as there are many difficulties and things apparently liable to be objected to in the one, so there probably will be many difficulties and things apparently liable to be objected to in the other. But as we do not deny that nature is the work of God on account of those things in it which are opposed to our a priori reasonings, ―neither are we entitled to maintain that a book professing to be a divine revelation is not from God, because it contains mysteries, and things which are contrary to our natural anticipations. On the other hand, the existence of some things in such a book different from what we should have anticipated, and above and beyond our reason, is a confirmation of its claims to a divine original. 5. By these remarks, however, I am not to be understood as affirming, that the contents of a professed divine revelation may not furnish indubitable proofs of its being an imposture. If it contained and inculcated palpable immoralities, and asserted contradictions, we could not receive it as the production of the Fountain of purity and truth. But the case is far otherwise when our only objections to its divine authority arise from its containing things difficult and mysterious. Such things meet us continually in the ordinary administration of the government of God in regard to this world; thus showing how incompetent we are to sit in judgment on the wisdom of our Maker. But if we are incompetent to judge of the wisdom of his ordinary administration:-if in regard to that we are taught the limited nature of our faculties,is it not highly supposable that there will be felt a still greater incompetency to judge of his extraordinary administration? If in every department of the former we are taught the shortness of our powers, much more supposable is it that their narrowness and limited extent will be shown us by the difficulties and mysteries connected with the latter. 6. If, therefore, the divine authority of a book which claims to be a revelation from God be established by ample and appropriate evidence,—evidence, the variety of which is suited to the great designs which such revelation is intended to answer,-evidence adapted to all the circumstances of the human race, and to the diversities of human character,—then the reception which it demands, and to which it is entitled, is unqualified and absolute, though it should contain things hard to be understood, or even incomprehensible by us. 7. Secondly, Difficulties and mysteries, or things incomprehensible to us, are closely connected with and involved in that which we might suppose would furnish the subject matter of a revelation from God. What, might we suppose, would form the subjects of such revelation? These would be the declarations of God concerning his own nature,-his counsels and purposes with respect to his creatures,-the occasion of the sinfulness and fall of man,—the provisions made for their recovery, -the invisible world to which men are related, and to which they shall hereafter belong. These are some of the themes of a revelation from God. And is there not in each of them something that is difficult of comprehension to us? If it be asked, Is it not the design of a revelation to make known what was formerly unknown, or, if known, imperfectly understood? Why, then, insert in such revelation mysteries and things difficult of comprehension ? Our answer is this: Many things concerning the nature of what is revealed may be clear, though many other things concerning their nature may be hid. God requires us to understand no more than is intelligibly revealed. That which is not distinctly revealed, we are not required distinctly to understand. It may be necessary to know a thing in part, and yet not necessary for us to know it |