in Germany and France. It is entirely probable that Cuba being left without any means of defense, these governments on behalf of their citizens would demand and endeavor to enforce their assumption. Cuba's only guarantee against this will be the fact that any nation attempting to compel it to pay this indebtedness will understand that it has the United States to deal with. Between revolutionists and Spaniards and Cubans who were loyal to Spain, there is little love. With no army to repress disorder, it is certainly within the limit of reasonable probability that the revolutionary and turbulent party may attempt the destruction or confiscation of Spanish and Cuban property which the new government would be utterly powerless to prevent. We most certainly owe a duty to our own citizens in Cuba that they shall be protected in the enjoyment of their property and kept free from the dangers which attend revolutionary uprisings. Indeed, any one who knows public sentiment in Cuba is aware that it is expected by Cuban people that if difficulty, either foreign or domestic, shall arise, the United States will be called upon to meet it. Even those who insist that nothing should be put into the constitution recognizing our right to do so, say that the United States will do it as a matter of course. Their strange attitude is that they will have a right to call the United States to their defense, but will not agree in advance that we may assert that right.

The United States needs this mutual arrangement because, for its own defense, it cannot permit any foreign power to dominate, control or obtain a foothold in this hemisphere

gress for intervention in Cuba, our government in some way pledged itself to make no requirement or suggestion respecting the establishment of a government by the people of Cuba. Such persons by some strange misapprehension also insist that the clause which has come to be known as the "Teller resolution," estopped the United States from having anything to say as to the relations which should exist between us and the new government; that although for three-quarters of a century conditions in Cuba had at various times imperilled our peace, and had always been an object of deepest solicitude, we deliberately pledged our honor that from the time we should drive out Spain we would surrender any right to say what the future government of Cuba should be, and committed all the vast interests of the United States in that island to the people of Cuba alone. The folly of such action on our part ought to be a sufficient answer to those who insist on such a construction.

To show, however, the utter fallacy of such a contention, it is necessary only to inquire what the so-called "Teller resolution" really is, and to consider for a moment the circumstances under which it was adopted. The fourth clause of the resolution of intervention is as follows:

"That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

It should be remembered that we were then

in the second clause of the resolution

"that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters."

The justice, fairness and wisdom of the conditions thus proposed do not seem to be questioned by any. A few persons only assert that in the joint resolution passed by Con

That our motive for the war upon which we were entering should not be misunderstood, either by Cuba or the nations of the world, we thought it proper and necessary to declare that we had no intention of acquiring the island of Cuba. It was an assertion merely that we would not exercise the right of a conqueror and reduce the island to our possession; that our motives were disinterested, and that the war was a war for humanity,

undertaken to put an end to abhorrent conditions near our shores, and not a war of conquest. No other construction can be justly placed upon the clause quoted. Our intervention was the assumption of a right, even at the cost of war, to put an end to intolerable government in Cuba; it was as clearly the assumption of a right to provide for a tolerable government there in the future. That we should assert in the same sentence our right and duty to put an end to abhorrent conditions in the island of Cuba, and also abandon our right to insist upon stability and peace thereafter, is inconceiveable.

We did agree that when "pacification should be accomplished we would leave the government and control of the island to its people, but it requires a great stretch of imagination to say that "pacification" meant only peace with Spain, and that we were to withdraw from the island as soon as that was accomplished. If that narrow meaning is the correct one, we should have evacuated Cuba at the same time Spain did. If we rightfully remained there to secure the establishment of a government by the people of Cuba, we certainly have a right to insist that that government shall be one which will result in permanent pacification. A clear light is thrown upon the meaning of the word the word "pacification" when we recall the fact that the resolution of intervention was the result of a message to Congress by the President of the United States on the 11th of April, 1898, in which he said:

"I ask Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes."

No one who reads the clause and considers the circumstances under which it was adopted, can for a moment with reason claim that its "pacification" meant only turning Spain out of the Island. If so, we should have left the government of the island then to the insurgents, a step which every right-minded person will say would have been a palpable violation of duty and honor. Manifestly pacification

meant the securing of conditions in the island which would assure not only temporary but permanent peace under a stable government by the people. By every consideration, then, of our own interests, our own peace, as well as our responsibility to the people of Cuba and the nations of the world, we have the right to insist that, in the establishment of a government there, conditions shall be assented to, which will, so far as possible, secure a government which we can indorse, and, if necessary, defend.

Will it be contended for a moment that, if the Cuban convention should adopt a constitution which provided for a limited monarchy, we should be under obligations to turn over the island to such a government? And if it be admitted that we should not, does it not necessarily follow that we may exercise our own judgment as to the circumstances and conditions under which we will leave the island to the control of the people of Cuba?

The whole question may be summarized in a sentence. The United States of right may, and must, insist that before it will withdraw from the military occupation of Cuba there shall be a friendly government established there which will in case of necessity assist in the discharge of all international obligations and in protecting the life, liberty and property of all its inhabitants. To require less would be national folly and result in national disgrace.

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that any one should suppose that in requiring the relations between the two countries to be thus defined, we are in some sense interferring with the independence of Cuba. Assent to the propositions set forth can in no sense detract from or impair Cuban independence. An independent government is none the less independent because it enters into agreements by way of treaty, or by way of an ordinance attached to its constitution, with another government. We make treaties with many nations in which we assume obligations and concede rights, but we are none the less independent, and Cuba will not be less, but more surely independent than it could otherwise be, when it shall assent to terms by which its independence will be firmly secured. Selfgovernment without the benefits naturally resulting therefrom, would be of little value. Cuba needs a real not a paper independence, and this the United States alone can assure her.

It is not easy to understand the reasoning of those who assert that we propose to limit or detract from the independence of Cuba, nor is it easy to understand the sensitiveness which seems to prevail among some of the members of the constitutional convention on this subject. The overtures of the United States are friendly overtures. President McKinley in his recent inaugural message, with his rare faculty for expressing a whole argument in a single sentence, accurately stated the situation: "With our neighbors we must remain close friends."

It is sad to reflect that sometimes peoples as well as men are inclined to turn their backs upon their best and truest friends. We have shown our friendship for Cuba in a most generous way. The lives of our brave young men have been freely sacrificed, an immense amount of treasure has been expended; we have relieved the starving reconcentrados; we have paid three millions of money to the

Cuban soldiers; we have assumed the payment of all damages which our citizens sustained during the revolution, and we ask nothing in return but that there shall be an independent government established and permanently maintained in Cuba, a government which shall insure the continued pacification. of that island. Surely we may ask the Cuban people if this generous exhibition of our friendship is not a guarantee that we desire to be their friends in the future.

What the immediate action of the Cubans will be is at the time that this is written uncertain, but it is scarcely conceivable that in the end the people of Cuba will reject the liberal and friendly proposals of the United States. We can wait. We shall wait, as we have done, in a spirit of friendship, in full confidence that eventually the better sentiment of the island will assert itself, and the world will see not only a free Cuba, but a peaceful and prosperous Cuba.

A

PANIC was threatened in Wall Street on December 18, 1899. The Secretary of the Treasury saw, about three o'clock in the afternoon, that matters had reached a crisis. He had not been in communication with Wall Street, nor had Wall Street appealed to him. But he had heard from some of the largest manufacturers that they were crowded with orders, and were unable to get money to tide over the interval between production and collections. The stringency in the money market was caused by the annual demand for currency to move the crops, aggravated by the action of the banks during the preceding twelve months in overloaning upon industrial securities.

The Secretary telephoned from Washington to New York to men in whom he had confi

dence and inquired as to the situation. The answer was that the situation was panicky. He was also informed that the clearing-house committee had about decided to issue certificates to supply currency.

The Secretary realized better than the bankers in New York that a panic would follow such an action. He went to see the President. He told him that he could avert disaster by a single move which would cost the government nothing. He proposed to announce next morning that internal revenue collections might all be deposited in the designated banks throughout the country instead of being sent directly to Washington. These deposits would amount to at least $30,000,000 in a very few days.

The President gave his consent and support. The Secretary called together the newspaper

correspondents, and the next morning every paper in the land made the announcement. The effects justified Mr. Gage's predictions. The New York clearing house found it unnecessary to issue certificates. More than three hundred banks in thirty-seven states received greatly increased deposits. What might have been a repetition of the panic of 1893 was thus avoided by the cool head and good judgment of the Secretary. Mr. Gage believes that panics can be almost indefinitely deferred by proper financial legislation.

Secretary Gage is the originator of the movement for civic reform which started in Chicago under his inspiration and is now a national influence. He wrote the platform of the Economic Conferences, a unique feature of Chicago's social organization, where Republican and Democrat, rich and poor, Conservative and Anarchist, meet for debate and exchange facts and theories. It is told of the first meeting of this kind organized by Mr. Gage that Tom Morgan, a labor agitator, was one of the principal speakers. After Mr. Gage had delivered a speech, Morgan arose and said: "Mr. Gage has spoken. He is six feet tall, a banker, well clothed and well fed. You will now hear from little Tommy Morgan, a runt, poorly clothed, and a factory hand since he was seven years old." It is said that Mr. Gage never so thoroughly enjoyed these meetings as when he succeeded in getting the real representatives of all classes of people upon their feet, perhaps even to antagonize his plans.

There is one thing which must always be borne in mind in estimating a Secretary of the Treasury. The position is necessarily one of comparative obscurity. His department never comes into the public eye unless it has done something to disturb conditions. One of the most satisfactory features of his administration to the Secretary himself is the fact that not once during that time has his department been instrumental in exciting the market of which Mr. Gage, though not a speculator, is a close student and a safe guide as to immediate future influences.

THE SECRETARY'S PLANS

The firmer establishment of the gold standard, a readjustment of the nation's debt upon a basis of lower interest rates, and an

He

increased flexibility of the currency are the ambitions of the Secretary. He would have sound money made more sound by requiring the Treasury to give gold on demand for all silver money presented for exchange. would make the silver dollar a metallic greenback differing from the paper article only in its intrinsic material value. He would provide further for the final retirement of all silver from circulation except for subsidiary coins. The Secretary takes a modest pride in refunding a large part of the national debt at a lower rate of interest. Through his efforts $446,000,000 in three, four, and five per cent bonds were converted into bonds bearing a lower rate of interest. The net saving to the government in interest alone upon this transaction was $11,000,000. To increase the flexibility of the currency he would retire government notes from circulation and expand the power of banks of issue. In the present system of loans and credits, he sees practically all that is necessary; but his desire now is to increase the possibilities of securing small cash loans. His theory is that the man who wishes to borrow $10,000 by checking it from the bank, the bank thus avoiding the necessity of hoarding more than its 25 per cent legal reserve, should have no advantage over the man who would borrow $10,000 in cash for immediate distribution. To accomplish this he would substitute a system of bank notes issued with assets as security, for the present system where all notes issued are secured by government bonds. In short, he would allow a banker to issue notes to the limit of his credit. To provide against any possible loss on these notes by the public, the Secretary is in favor of creating a general guarantee fund raised from taxation of all bank-note issues, out of which fund the notes of bankrupt concerns would be made good.

In eighteen months of Mr. Gage's administration, ending January 1, 1900, the most trying period experienced by the Treasury since the Civil War, the Treasury receipts were over $1,100,000,000. The Secretary points with pride to the fact that no accumulation of the people's money has been allowed, notwithstanding this inflow. He considers that the evils of accumulation may be greater than the evils of distribution — both must be intelligent to be beneficial.