6. Effect of Marriage of Female Servant on contract of Service.

She must still serve her time out, and her husband cannot lawfully take her away; nor, on the other hand, is the mere fact of the marriage a sufficient ground on which to discharge her. (5 Burn's Just. 605-'6; Com. Dig. Justices of Peace (B. 6, 3).)

78. Authority of Master over Servant; W. C. 1h. Doctrine at common law.

The servant must obey his master's orders, even though they involve a painful sacrifice of feeling (e. g., omitting to visit a very ill parent); and for wilful disobedience he may be discharged. The master, however, is bound to take as much care of his servant as he would of himself, and may not expose him to danger. (1 Pars. Cont. 520-21, 528; Priestly v. Fowler, 3 Mees. & W. 1; Turner v. Mason, 14 Do. 112.)

The master may also chastise his servant (if under age), with moderation, for neglect of duty, abusive language, &c.; and it is even said that the common law permitted him to correct any servant, of whatever age, so it were done in reason. (1 Bl. Com. 428; 5 Burn's Just. 761; Bac. Abr. Master, &c. (N).) 2h. Doctrine, by Statute, in Virginia.

The master may exercise over any minor hired for a period not less than one month, the same authority, control and discipline as over an apprentice, unless it be otherwise stipulated in the contract of hire. (V. C. 1873, c. 122, § 4.)

88. Obligation of Master in respect of the Servant.

The obligation of the master in respect to the servant leads us to advert to, (1), The master's obligation as to wages; (2), As to maintenance; (3), As to medicines and medical attendance; (4), As to the servant's personal safety; and (5), As to indemnifying the servant;

W. C.

1b. The Master's obligation in respect of wages.

The master is under a legal obligation to pay wages according to contract, express or implied, and the retainer is presumed to be in consideration of wages, unless the contrary appear. (1 Bl. Com. 428, & n (18); 1 Tuck. Com. 77, B. I; Bac. Abr. Master, &c. (N); 1 Pars. Cont. 530-'31, & n's (d) and (e); Ante, p. 169, 179, 189.)

All compensation, however, may be forfeited by the servant's gross misconduct. Thus, if an agent or

trustee deliberately retain trust funds in his own hands, appropriate them to his own use, and refuse or fail for years to render any account to the principal, he is held to forfeit all claim to compensation. (Segar v. Parrish, 20 Grat. 681-22);

W. C.

11. When payment of wages is presumed,

Where it has been usual to pay weekly, &c., and a considerable time has elapsed, and particularly if the servant has left the master's employment. (Sellen v. Norman, 4 Carr. & P. (19 E. C. L.) 80; 1 Pars. Cont. 532; Chit. Cont. 581.)

2. When payment of infant's wages will be allowed;

W. C.

1. Allowance of payments, as against the parent of

the infant-servant.

The father certainly, and possibly, if he be dead, the mother, is entitled to the earnings of an infant child, unless the parent relinquishes the claim, which, however, is easily implied, as where the child has for some time been permitted, without objection, to receive his wages himself. Payments to the parent, therefore, will in general be valid. (1 Pars. Cont. 257-'8.)

2. Allowance of payments, as against the infant himself.

Payments in money to the infant (supposing him entitled to receive his wages), are always valid, but payments in supplies which are not necessaries, or in money paid by the master for such supplies, (e. g., a silk dress for a female servant), may be disaffirmed by the infant. (Hedgeley & wife v. Holt, 4 Carr. & P. (19 E. C. L.) 104; 1 Pars. Cont. 528, n (x).) 3. Set-off against wages, of the value of things lost or broken by gross negligence.

Not allowed except by agreement. Master must bring his action for damages. (Le Loir v. Bristow, 4 Campb. 134; Addis. on Cont. 743.)

2. Master's obligation in respect to Maintenance.

It depends on the terms of the contract; but prima facie, the master, it is believed, is bound to supply board, at least in the case of laborers, menials, and apprentices, unless it be otherwise agreed.

3. Master's obligation in respect to Medicines and Medical Attendance.

The master is not bound to supply these to a hired servant, whether menial or laborer (as he is to an apprentice, ante p. 183, 11), unless by special agreement, not even though the illness were caused by an accident

occurring in the master's service. But if the master himself send for the medical man, he is responsible to him, and it is said cannot deduct the amount paid from the servant's wages, unless it be so agreed, which, if it be so, probably arises from its being deemed an act of charity and good-will, arising naturally out of the relation, and therefore not warranting the implication of a promise to repay. (Sellen & wife v. Norman, 4 Carr. & P. (19 E. C. L.), 80; Cooper v. Phillips, Id. 581; Rex v. Smith, 8 Carr. & P. (34 E. C. L.) 153; Newby v. Wittshire, 4 Dougl. (26 E. C. L.) 284; Wennall v. Adney, 3 Bos. & Pul. 247; Chit. Con. 581; 1 Bl. Com. 425, n t.)

In case of slave servants, the doctrine in Virginia was precisely analogous; that is, medical bills were to be paid ultimately by the owner, and not by the temporary hirer, although the doctor might exact the amount from the hirer, if he employed him. (Easley v. Craddock, 4 Rand. 425; Isbell's adm'r v. Norvell's ex'or, 4 Grat. 176.)

4. Master's obligation in respect to the personal safety of the Servant; W. C.

1. In regard to Employment.

The master has no right to expose his servant to danger without the latter's consent, and is bound to provide for the servant's safety in the course of his employment, to the best of his judgment, information, and belief; but he is not responsible for an accident happening in the course of his service, unless he knew that it exposed the servant to peculiar danger, and the servant did not. (Priestley v. Fowler, 3 Mees. & W. 6; 1 Pars. Cont. 528; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Fort, 17 Wal. 557.)

The hirer of a slave was restricted by a similar limitation. He was not at liberty to engage him in a peculiarly dangerous employment without the master's assent; and if he perverted him from the agreed or represented purposes for which he hired him, he was answerable for the consequences which ensued from such perversion, although he was guilty of no negligence, nor of any default other than the perversion. (Spencer v. Pilcher, 8 Leigh, 566; Ħarvey v. Epes, 12 Grat. 153; Harvey v. Skipwith & als, 16 Grat. 393; Bell v. Bowen, 1 Jones, N. C. (Law), 316; Randolph v. Hill, 7 Leigh, 383.) 21. In regard to injuries arising from the default of Fellow-Servants.

If the master has selected as his servants persons of

competent care and skill, having reference to the employment, he is not answerable to one of them for injuries occasioned by the negligence of a fellow-servant in the course of their common business. Hence, the servant of a railroad company injured whilst travelling on the road of his employers, about their business, by the carelessness of other employees of the company, cannot recover of the latter;, but he might have recovered had he been travelling on his own business. (Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1; Huchinson v. New York, &c., Railway Co., 5 Excheq. 351; Wigmore v. Jay, Id. 357; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 620; 1 Pars. Cont. 528; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Fort, 17 Wal. 557; Packet Co. v. McCue, Id. 508.) 5. Master's obligation in respect to indemnifying Servant.

The master is under an implied obligation to indemnify his servant against all pecuniary damages incurred by him, without his fault, in the course of the employment, and in consequence of it. (D'Arcy v. Lyle, 5 Binn. 441; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 691; Smith's Merc. L. 109-'10.)

2. Peculiar privileges of Apprentices in carrying on trade. These privileges result from many English statutes (which have not been enacted in Virginia), the general object and policy of which are to secure to the country a class of skilled artizans. (1 Bl. Com. 427-'8; Bac. Abr. Master, &c. (D).)

3. Doctrine touching homicide of Masters by Servants.

By Stat. 25 Edw. III, c. 2, homicide of masters by servants was declared petit treason, and punished with cruel severity. But in Virginia it is treated as any other homicide, the distinction as to petit treason being abolished. (4 Bl. Com.. 203; Synops. of Crim. L. 60; V. C. 1873, c. 195, § 4.)

4. Obligation of Master touching testimonials to servants' character; W. C.

18. Obligation of Master to give testimonials to character. No obligation exists. (1 Pars. Cont. 529.) 28. Liability of Master on account of testimonials; W. C. 1h. Liability to Servant.

Whether the character be given voluntarily or by request, it is a privileged communication; and in order to make the master responsible, it must be, not only false, but malicious; and the malice is not implied, as in other cases, from the falsity, nor from the occasion of speaking, but it must be proved. That the communication is voluntary, is a circumstance to be considered in determining the bona fides of it. (Child v.

Affleck, 9 B. & Cr. (17 E. C. L.) 403; Rogers v. Clifton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 587; 1 Pars. Cont. 529.) 2h. Liability to third Person.

A third person injured by the master's false representation (knowingly), of good character in the servant, may recover of the master; for fraud and damage together always constitute a cause of action. (Pasley & als v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51; Vernon v. Keys, 12 East, 632; Tapp & als v. Lee, 3 Bos. & Pul. 367; 1 Chit. Pl. 157.)

5. Doctrine touching Liability of Servant to Master; W. C. 18. Liability of Servant, in respect to Duration of Service.

If the service is entire, in point of time, or otherwise, the servant must perform it completely, before he can demand his compensation, although if part be paid (not exceeding the proportion of service rendered,) the master cannot recover it back. (1 Bl. Com. 425, n t; Id. 428, n (18); ante p. 190 & seq., 35; 1 Pars. Cont. 522 & seq., & n (1), &c.)

28. Liability of Servant, in respect of his conduct; W. C. 1h. When the Servant receives a Reward.

He must observe with diligence and care, the interests of his master, as the master himself would do; must adhere to his reasonable orders, and is liable for not doing so, but is not liable for a loss by robbery, without his default. (1 Bl. Com. 428, n (16); Countess of Shrewsbury's case, 5 Co. 14 a; Lord North's case, 2 Dyer, 161 a; Catlin v. Bell, 4 Campb. 183; Shiells v. Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 161; Bac. Abr. Master, &c., (M), 1; Bernard v. Maury & Co., 20 Grat. 434).

Hence a factor who sells produce on credit when instructed to sell for cash, is liable for any loss which may ensue; and if he use the proceeds of sale as his own, as by keeping them amongst his general deposits in bank, he is liable for any resulting loss. (Hairs ton v. Medley, 1 Grat. 96; Johnson & al v. O'Hara, 5 Leigh, 456.) On the other hand, if he treats the money as belonging to the principal, as by depositing it to the principal's credit in bank, or to his own credit as agent, or even to his own individual credit, he having no money of his own on deposit there, and designing it for the principal's benefit, he is not liable for a loss arising from the insolvency of the bank, supposing him to have exercised due care in the selec tion, and due vigilance; nor from the failure of the currency (e. g. Confederate currency) in which the collection was made. Neither is he guilty of any de