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10. Arms Control and Disarmament Act Authorization for Fiscal
Years 1986 and 1987
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Partial text of Public Law 99-93 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
NOTE.-Except for the provisions included below, this Act consists of amendments to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act and title V, United States Code. Those amendments have been incorporated at the appropriate places.
AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 for the Depart-
SEC. 705. NEW BUILDING IN GENEVA FOR THE USE OF THE UNITED
STATES ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING TEAMS. (a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that
(1) the United States is party to vital talks on arms control in Geneva, Switzerland;
(2) these talks include negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate range nuclear weapons, space and defense systems, a bilateral United States-Soviet forum, called the Standing Consultative Commission and a multilateral forum, called the Conference on Disarmament;
(3) the United States delegations to these talks occupy buildings and spaces insufficiently secure, modernized, or large enough to permit those delegations to conduct their work efficiently;
(4) the United States delegations to the strategic, intermediate and space and defense talks in particular occupy space in the Botanic Building that is also occupied by offices of numer
othernon-United States organizations, and shares common walls and parking facilities with these delegations;
(5) arms control negotiations require sophisticated security facilities, telecommunications equipment, simultaneous translation capabilities and other specialized services; and
(6) the Soviet Union, for its part, has made available for its negotiating team a modern, secure, well-equipped building
dedicated for the use of its arms control negotiating teams. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
(1) in order to facilitate the effective work of the United States arms control negotiating teams, and to provide for them a dedicated structure capable of supporting their vital tasks on a permanent basis, the Secretary of State should submit to the Congress a report on the feasibility, cost, location, and require ments of a structure to house the United States arms control negotiating teams in Geneva;
(2) this report should be submitted as soon as possible; and (3) this matter should be included in the consideration of the
1985 supplemental appropriation process. SEC. 706. STUDY OF MEASURES TO ENHANCE CRISIS STABILITY AND CON.
TROL. (a) STUDY. - The Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall conduct a detailed and complete study and evaluation of additional measures which both enhance the security of the United States and reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons use by contributing to crisis stability or crisis control capabilities, including specific consideration of the following measures:
(1) Increased redundancy of direct communications link circuits, including the creation of new survivable circuits and terminals, located outside the national capital which have access to the command and control system of the country in which they are located.
(2) Establishment of redundant, survivable direct communications links between and among all nuclear-armed states.
(3) Conclusion of an agreement creating "non-target" sanctuaries only for certain direct communications link circuits to enhance survivability of communications.
(4) Creation in advance of standard operating procedures for communicating, and possibly cooperating, with the Soviet Union and other states in the event of nuclear attacks by third parties on either the United States or Soviet Union.
(5) Addition to the Incidents At Sea agreement of a prohibition on the “locking on" of fire control radars on ships and planes of the other side, an agreement on the separation of naval forces during specified periods of crisis, and other such measures relevant to the Incidents At Sea agreement.
(6) Placement by the United States and the Soviet Union of unmanned launch sensors in the land-based missile fields of both countries.
(7) Establishment of anti-submarine operations free zones de signed to enhance the security of ballistic missile submarines.
(8) Installation of permissive action links aboard the ballistic missile submarines of the United States, which might possibly be activated or deactivated at various levels of alert, and encouragement of the Soviet Union to do the same.
(9) Establishment of training programs for National Command Authority officials to familiarize them with alert proce dures, communications capabilities, nuclear weapons release authority procedures, and the crisis control and stability implications thereof.
(10) Include in standard operating procedure the relocation in a crisis of a National Command Authority official outside Washington, D.C. to a secure location with access to the strategic command and control system, and announce the institution
of this procedure to relevant foreign governments. (b) REPORT.-The Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall submit a report of the study and evaluation under subsection (a) to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives by January 1, 1986. Such report should be available in both a classified, if necessary, and unclassified format. SEC 707. POLICY TOWARD BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. (a) FINDINGS. –The Congress finds that
(1) chemical weapons are among the most terrible weapons in today's military arsenals;
(2) it is the objective of the United States to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare through a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons;
(3) the United States is vigorously pursuing a multilateral agreement to ban chemical weapons;
(4) the negotiation of a verifiable, bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would be a significant step toward achieving a worldwide ban on chemical weapons;
(5) bilateral discussions relating to a ban on chemical weapons took place in July and August of 1984 between the United States and Soviet delegations to the Conference on Disarmament; and
(6) such endeavors could serve the security interests of humankind. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of the Congress that the President
(1) should be commended for his efforts to negotiate a multilateral agreement banning chemical weapons;
(2) should continue to pursue vigorously such an agreement; and
(3) should seek the continuation and development of bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weap
ons. SEC. 708. POLICY REGARDING A JOINT STUDY BY THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SOVIET UNION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLE
AR WINTER. It is the sense of the Congress that the President should propose to the Government of the Soviet Union during any arms control talks held with such Government that
(1) the United States and the Soviet Union should jointly study the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear explosions, sometimes known as "nuclear winter", and the impact that nuclear winter would have on the national security of both nations;
(2) such a joint study should include the sharing and exchange of information and findings on the nuclear winter phe nomena and make recommendations on possible joint research projects that would benefit both nations; and
(3) at an appropriate time the other nuclear weapons states (the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China) should be involved in the study.
11. Arms Control Provisions in Department of Defense
Authorization Acts 1
a. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
Partial text of Public Law 103-160 (H.R. 2401), 107 Stat. 1547 at 1841, approved
November 30, 1993
An Act To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1994 for military activities of the
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
This Act may be cited as the “National Defense Authorization
SUBTITLE A–PROGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SEC. 1601. STUDY OF GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF STRATEGIC AND AD
VANCED CONVENTIONAL MILITARY WEAPONS AND RELAT.
ED EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. (a) STUDY.—The President shall conduct a study of (1) the factors that contribute to the proliferation of strategic and advanced conventional military weapons and related equipment and technologies, and (2) the policy options that are available to the United States to inhibit such proliferation.
(b) CONDUCT OF STUDY.—In carrying out the study the President shall do the following:
(1) Identify those factors contributing to global weapons proliferation which can be most effectively regulated.
(2) Identify and assess policy approaches available to the United States to discourage the transfer of strategic and advanced conventional military weapons and related equipment and technology.
Other provisions contained in Department of Defense authorization acts that relate to arms control issues, including the Conventional Force Reductions in Europe, may be found in Legisla. tion on Foreign Relations Through 1993, vol. I-B, beginning at page 228. See also Legislation on Foreign Relations, vol. V, sec. F, for Arms Control and Disarmament, Treaties and Agreements.