Khmer Rouge by elements of the Thai military and to urge the Thai Government to intensify its efforts to terminate that support, in accordance with the Paris Peace Accords;

(5) the Government of Thailand should continue to allow the democratic leaders of Burma to operate freely within Thailand and to grant them free passage to allow them to present their case at the United Nations and other international gatherings; (6) the President of the United States should urge the Government of Thailand to prosecute, with the full force of law, those responsible for the trafficking, forced labor, and physical and sexual abuse of women and children in Thailand, and to protect the civil and human rights of Burmese women in Thailand and prevent their further victimization; and

(7) the United States should work with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Government of Thailand, and other relevant parties to ensure that the rights of asylum seekers in Thailand, and in particular the Hmong people from Laos, are fully respected and that force is not used in any repatriations.

SEC. 516. PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should(1) strongly encourage all parties to the conflict in the North of Ireland to renounce violence and to participate in the current search for peace in the region; and

(2) assist in furthering the peace process where appropriate. SEC. 517. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT.

(a) SENATE FINDINGS.-The Senate makes the following findings: (1) The freedom and security of the international community rests on the sanctity of the rule of law.

(2) The international community is increasingly threatened by unlawful acts such as war crimes, genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity, terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and other crimes of an international character.

(3) The prosecution of individuals suspected of carrying out such acts is often impeded by political and legal obstacles such as amnesties, disputes over extradition, differences in the structure and capabilities of national courts, and the lack of uniform guidelines under which to try such individuals.

(4) The war crimes trials held in the aftermath of World War II at Nuremberg, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan, demonstrated that fair and effective prosecution of war criminals could be carried out in an international forum.

(5) Since its inception in 1945 the United Nations has sought to build on the precedent established at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials by establishing a permanent international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international character.

(6) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/39, adopted on December 4, 1989, called on the International Law Commission to study the feasibility of an international criminal court.

(7) In the years after passage of that resolution the International Law Commission has taken a number of steps to advance the debate over such a court, including—

(A) the provisional adoption of a draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind;

(B) the creation of a Working Group on an International Criminal Jurisdiction and the formulation by that Working Group of several concrete proposals for the establishment and operation of an international criminal court; and (C) the determination that an international criminal court along the lines of that suggested by the Working Group is feasible and that the logical next step would be to proceed with the formal drafting of a statute for such a court.

(8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/33, adopted on November 25, 1992, called on the International Law Commission to begin the process of drafting a statute for an international criminal court at its next session.

(9) Given the developments of recent years, the time is propitious for the United States to lend its support to this effort. (b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.-It is the sense of the Senate that

(1) the establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international character would greatly strengthen the international rule of law;

(2) such a court would thereby serve the interests of the United States and the world community; and

(3) the United States delegation should make every effort to advance this proposal at the United Nations.

(c) REQUIRED REPORT.-Not later than 14 days after the date of enactment of this Act the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a detailed report on developments relating to, and United States efforts in support of, the establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international character.

SEC. 518. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT PARTICIPATION.

The United States Senate will not consent to the ratification of a treaty providing for United States participation in an international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international nature which permits representatives of any terrorist organization, including but not limited to the Palestine Liberation Organization, or citizens, nationals or residents of any country listed by the Secretary of State under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 as having repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, to sit in judgement 72 on American citizens.

SEC. 519. PROTECTION OF FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.

The United States Senate will not consent to the ratification of any Treaty providing for United States participation in an international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international character unless American citizens are guaranteed, in the terms establishing such a court, and in the court's operation, that

72 As enrolled. Should read "judgment".

the court will take no action infringing upon or diminishing their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the United States.

SEC. 520. POLICY ON TERMINATION OF UNITED STATES ARMS EMBARGO. (a) FINDINGS.-The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On July 10, 1991, the United States adopted a policy suspending all licenses and other approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles and defense services to Yugoslavia.

(2) On September 25, 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 713, which imposed a mandatory international embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.

(3) The United States considered the policy adopted July 10, 1991, to comply fully with Resolution 713 and therefore took no additional action in response to that resolution.

(4) On January 8, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 727, which decided that the mandatory arms embargo imposed by Resolution 713 should apply to any independent states that might thereafter emerge on the territory of Yugoslavia.

(5) On February 29 and March 1, 1992, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted in a referendum to declare independence from Yugoslavia.

(6) On April 7, 1992, the United States recognized the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(7) On May 22, 1992, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted to full membership in the United Nations. (8) Consistent with Resolution 727, the United States has continued to apply the policy adopted July 10, 1991, to independent states that have emerged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(9) Subsequent to the adoption of Resolution 727 and Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence referendum, the siege of Sarajevo began and fighting spread to other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(10) The Government of Serbia intervened directly in the fighting by providing significant military, financial, and political support and direction to Serbian-allied irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(11) In statements dated May 1 and May 12, 1992, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe declared that the Government of Serbia and the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav National Army were committing aggression against the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and assigned to them prime responsibility for the escalation of bloodshed and destruction.

(12) On May 30, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 757, which condemned the Government of Serbia for its continued failure to respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(13) Serbian-allied irregular forces have occupied approximately 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, committed gross violations of human rights in the areas they

have occupied, and established a secessionist government committed to eventual unification with Serbia.

(14) The military and other support and direction provided to Serbian-allied irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes an armed attack on the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Government of Serbia within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

(15) Under Article 51, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a member of the United Nations, has an inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against the armed attack from the Government of Serbia until the United Nations Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

(16) The measures taken by the United Nations Security Council in response to the armed attack on Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been adequate to maintain international peace and security.

(17) Bosnia and Herzegovina have been unable successfully to resist the armed attack from Serbia because it lacks the means to counter heavy weaponry that Serbia obtained from the Yugoslav National Army upon the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and because the mandatory international arms embargo has prevented Bosnia and Herzegovina from obtaining from other countries the means to counter such heavy weaponry.

(18) On December 18, 1992, with the affirmative vote of the United States, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/121, which urged the United Nations Security Council to exempt Bosnia and Herzegovina from the mandatory arms embargo imposed by Resolution 713.

(19) In the absence of adequate measures to maintain international peace and security, continued application to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the mandatory international arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council prior to the armed attack on Bosnia and Herzegovina undermines that government's right of individual or collective self-defense and therefore contravenes Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

(20) Bosnia and Herzegovina's right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter includes the right to ask for military assistance from other countries and to receive such assistance if offered.

(b) POLICY ON TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO. (1) It is the sense of the Congress that the President should terminate the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina upon receipt from that government of a request for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

(2) As used in this subsection, the term "United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina" means the application to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of

(A) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 Fed. Reg. 33322) under

the heading "Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to Yugoslavia"; and

(B) any similar policy being applied by the United States Government as of the date of receipt of the request described in subsection (a) pursuant to which approval is routinely denied for transfers of defense articles and defense services to the former Yugoslavia.

(c) POLICY ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE.-The President should provide appropriate military assistance to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina upon receipt from that government of a request for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

SEC. 521. SENSE OF SENATE ON RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM.
It is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) the Government of the United States is committed to seeking the fullest possible accounting of American servicemen unaccounted for during the war in Vietnam;

(2) cooperation by the Government of Vietnam on resolving the fate of those American servicemen unaccounted for has increased significantly over the last three years and is essential to the resolution of outstanding POW/MIA cases;

(3) substantial and tangible progress has been made in the POW/MIA accounting process;

(4) cooperative efforts between the United States and Vietnam should continue in order to resolve all outstanding questions concerning the fate of Americans missing-in-action;

(5) United States senior military commanders and United States personnel working in the field to account for United States POW/MIAS in Vietnam believe that lifting the United States trade embargo against Vietnam will facilitate and accelerate the accounting efforts;

(6) therefore, in order to maintain and expand further United States and Vietnamese efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting, the President should lift the United States trade embargo against Vietnam expeditiously; and

(7) moveover,73 as the United States and Vietnam move toward normalization of relations, the Government of Vietnam should demonstrate further improvements in meeting internationally recognized standards of human rights.

SEC. 522. REPORT ON SANCTIONS ON VIETNAM.

Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report, taking into account information available to the United States Government, to the Senate and the House of Representatives on achieving the fullest possible accounting of United States personnel unaccounted for from the Vietnam War, including

(1) progress on recovering and repatriating American remains from Vietnam;

(2) progress on resolution of discrepancy cases;

73 As enrolled. Should read "moreover".