(9) The United States should encourage strong and expeditious action by the United Nations Security Council inasmuch as North Korea has proved unwilling to comply fully with the following:

(A) North Korea's December 1991 denuclearization agreement with South Korea pledging not to possess, manufacture, or use nuclear weapons, not to possess plutonium reprocessing facilities, and to negotiate the establishment of a nuclear inspection system.

(B) The nuclear safeguards agreement North Korea signed with the IAEA on January 30, 1992.

(C) The agreement on IAEA inspections North Korea accepted on February 15, 1994.

(10) Unless North Korea unequivocally adheres to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and abides by all provisions of that treaty, the President should seek international consensus to isolate North Korea, including the imposition of sanctions, in an effort to persuade Pyongyang to halt its nuclear weapons program and permit IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities.

(11) Recognizing that within the international community China has significant influence over Pyongyang, the nature and extent of Chinese cooperation with the rest of the international community on the North Korean nuclear issue, including Chinese support for international sanctions should such sanctions be proposed and/or adopted, will inevitably be a significant factor in United States-China relations.

(12) If unable to achieve an international consensus to isolate North Korea, the President should employ all unilateral means of leverage over North Korea, including, but not limited to, the prohibition of any transaction involving the commercial sale of any good or technology to North Korea.

(13) The President should consult with United States allies in the region regarding the military posture of North Korea and the ability of the United States and its allies to deter a North Korean attack, or to defeat such an attack should it

occur.

(14) Toward these ends, the United States and South Korea should take all steps necessary to ensure that United States and South Korean forces stationed on the Korean peninsula can defend themselves, including the holding of Team Spirit or other joint military exercises, the deployment of Patriot missiles to South Korea, and other appropriate measures.

(15) The problem posed by North Korea's nuclear program is not a bilateral problem between the United States and North Korea, but a problem in which virtually the entire global community is united against North Korea.

(16) The international community must insist upon full compliance by North Korea with all its nonproliferation commitments including acceptance of regular and ad hoc inspections of its declared nuclear facilities on a continuing basis, as well as special inspections of all suspected nuclear sites as the IAEA deems appropriate.

(17) International concerns about North Korea's nuclear intentions and capabilities will not be adequately addressed until North Korea cooperates fully with the IAEA, all North Korea nuclear facilities and materials are placed under fullscope safeguards, and North Korea adheres unequivocally to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as well as to its 1991 denuclearization agreement with South Korea.

(18) The Administration should work to encourage a productive dialogue between North and South Korea that adequately addresses all security concerns on the Korean peninsula.

SEC. 530.80 ENFORCEMENT OF NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES.

(a) POLICY.-It is the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to enhance the role of that institution in the enforcement of nonproliferation treaties through the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution which would state that, any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the United Nations Security Council, in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to have terminated, abrogated, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement would be subjected to international economic sanctions, the scope of which to be determined by the United Nations Security Council.

(b) PROHIBITION.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no United States assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall be provided to any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the President to have terminated, abrogated, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguard agreement or materially violated a bilateral United States nuclear cooperation agreement entered into after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. (c) WAIVER.-The President may waive the application of subsection (b) if—

(1) the President determines that the termination of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security; and

(2) the President reports such determination to the Congress at least 15 days in advance of any resumption of assistance to that state.

SEC. 531. TAIWAN.

In view of the self-defense needs of Taiwan, the Congress makes the following declarations:

(1) Sections 2 and 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act are reaffirmed. 81

(2) Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act take primacy over statements of United States policy, including communiques, regulations, directives, and policies based thereon.

(3) In assessing the extent to which the People's Republic of China is pursuing its "fundamental policy" to strive peacefully to resolve the Taiwan issue, the United States should take into

80 22 U.S.C. 2429a-2.

81 For text, see page 1428.

account both the capabilities and intentions of the People's Republic of China.

(4) The President should on a regular basis assess changes in the capabilities and intentions of the People's Republic of China and consider whether it is appropriate to adjust arms sales to Taiwan accordingly.

SEC. 532. WAIVER OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ΤΟ PROMOTE DEMOCRACY ABROAD.

(a) AUTHORITY.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized and encouraged to exempt from sanctions imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia those United States-supported programs, projects, or activities involving reform of the electoral process, or the development of democratic institutions or democratic political parties.

(b) POLICY.-The President, acting through the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should propose that any action, past or future, by the Security Council pursuant to Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, with respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, should take account of the exemption described in subsection (a).

SEC. 533.82 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN OPEN SKIES TREATY DATA.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Data with respect to a foreign country collected by sensors during observation flights conducted in connection with the Treaty on Open Skies, including flights conducted prior to entry into force of the treaty, shall be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act

(1) if the country has not disclosed the data to the public; and

(2) if the country has not, acting through the Open Skies Consultative Commission or any other diplomatic channel, authorized the United States to disclose the data to the public. (b) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.-This section constitutes a specific exemption within the meaning of section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code.

(c) DEFINITIONS.-For the purposes of this section

(1) the term "Freedom of Information Act" means the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code;

(2) the term "Open Skies Consultative Commission" means the commission established pursuant to Article X of the Treaty on Open Skies; and

(3) the term "Treaty on Open Skies" means the Treaty on Open Skies, signed at Helsinki on March 24, 1992.

SEC. 534. STUDY OF DEMOCRACY EFFECTIVENESS.

(a) REPORT.-Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on a streamlined, cost-effective organization of United States democracy assistance. The report shall include a review of all activities funded by the United States

82 5 U.S.C. 552 note.

Government, including those funded through the National Endowment for Democracy, the United States Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development.

(b) CONTENT OF REPORT.-The report shall include the following: (1) A review of all United States-sponsored programs to promote democracy, including identification and discussion of those programs that are overlapping.

(2) A clear statement of achievable goals and objectives for all United States-sponsored democracy programs, and an evaluation of the manner in which current democracy activities meet these goals and objectives.

(3) A review of the current United States Government organization for the delivery of democracy assistance and recommended changes to reduce costs and streamline overhead involved in the delivery of democracy assistance.

(4) Recommendations for coordinating programs, policies, and priorities to enhance the United States Government's role in democracy promotion.

(5) A review of all agencies involved in delivering United States Government funds in the form of democracy assistance and a recommended focal point or lead agency within the United States Government for policy oversight of the effort.

(6) A review of the feasibility and desirability of mandating non-United States Government funding, including matching funds and in-kind support, for democracy promotion programs. If it is determined that such non-Government funding is feasible and desirable, recommendations should be made regarding goals and procedures for implementation.

SEC. 535. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING UNITED STATES CITIZENS VICTIMIZED BY GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II.

It is the sense of the Congress that United States citizens who were victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Government of Germany during the period 1939 to 1945 should be compensated by the Government of Germany.

SEC. 536.83 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON OCCUPIED TIBET.

(a) REPORT ON UNITED STATES-TIBET RELATIONS.-Because Congress has determined that Tibet is an occupied sovereign country under international law and that its true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in exile—

(1) it is the sense of the Congress that the United States should seek to establish a dialogue with those recognized by Congress as the true representatives of the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama, his representatives and the Tibetan Government in exile, concerning the situation in Tibet and the future of the Tibetan people and to expand and strengthen United StatesTibet cultural and educational relations, including promoting bilateral exchanges arranged directly with the Tibetan Government in exile; and

(2) not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Chairman of the Committee on For

83 22 U.S.C. 2656 note.

eign Relations and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report on the state of relations between the United States and those recognized by Congress as the true representatives of the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama, his representatives and the Tibetan Government in exile, and on conditions in Tibet.

(b) SEPARATE TIBET REPORTS.—

(1) It is the sense of the Congress that whenever a report is transmitted to the Congress on a country-by-country basis there should be included in such report, where applicable, a separate report on Tibet listed alphabetically with its own state heading.

(2) The reports referred to in paragraph (1) include, but are not limited to, reports transmitted under sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to human rights).

PART B SPOILS OF WAR ACT

SEC. 551.84 SHORT TITLE.

This part may be cited as the "Spoils of War Act of 1994".

SEC. 552.85 TRANSFERS OF SPOILS OF WAR.

(a) ELIGIBILITY FOR TRANSFER.-Spoils of war in the possession, custody, or control of the United States may be transferred to any other party, including any government, group, or person, by sale, grant, loan or in any other manner, only to the extent and in the same manner that property of the same type, if otherwise owned by the United States, may be so transferred.

(b) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.-Any transfer pursuant to subsection (a) shall be subject to all of the terms, conditions, and requirements applicable to the transfer of property of the same type otherwise owned by the United States.

SEC. 553.86 PROHIBITION ON TRANSFERS TO COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORT TERRORISM.

Spoils of war in the possession, custody, or control of the United States may not be transferred to any country determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, to be a nation whose government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

SEC. 554.87 REPORT ON PREVIOUS TRANSFERS.

Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing any spoils of war obtained subsequent to August 2, 1990 that were transferred to any party, including any government, group, or person, before the date of enactment of this Act. Such report shall be submitted in unclassified form to the extent possible.

84 50 U.S.C. 2201 note.

85 50 U.S.C. 2201. 86 50 U.S.C. 2202. 87 50 U.S.C. 2203.