Page images

(1) build international support for the principle that nuclear supply relationships must require purchasing nations to agree to full-scope international safeguards;

(2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within the meaning of the Treaty to undertake a comprehensive review of its own procedures for declassifying information relating to the design or production of nuclear explosive devices and to investigate any measures that would reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear weapons proliferation;

(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce weaponsgrade nuclear material for large-scale commercial uses until such time as safeguards are developed that can detect, on a timely and reliable basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for nuclear explosive purposes;

(4) pursue greater financial support for the implementation and improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with significant nuclear programs, particularly from those nations that are currently using or planning to use weaponsgrade nuclear material for commercial purposes;

(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual financial contributions by all members of the IAEA, including the United States;

(6) pursue the elimination of international commerce in highly enriched uranium for use in research reactors while encouraging multilateral cooperation to develop and to use lowenriched alternative nuclear fuels;

(7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states to develop or use unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for purposes of naval propulsion;

(8) pursue an international open skies arrangement that would authorize the IAEA to operate surveillance aircraft and would facilitate IAEA access to satellite information for safeguards verification purposes;

(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA member nations to share intelligence material with the IAEA on possible safeguards violations without compromising national security or intelligence sources or methods;

(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify the IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards over that facility or technology, regardless of its destination; and

(11) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the right to withdraw from the Treaty.


In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in the implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of the IAEA, the Congress urges the President to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to

(1) improve the access of the IAEA within nuclear facilities that are capable of producing, processing, or fabricating special nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device;


(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA's efforts to meet and to maintain its own goals for detecting the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particular attention to facilities in which there are bulk quantities of plutonium; and

(B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA to meet those detection goals in a particular facility, require the IAEA to declare publicly that it is unable to do so;

(3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations of safeguards procedures, to pay rewards for information on possible safeguards violations, and to establish a "hot line" for the reporting of such violations and other illicit uses of weapons-grade nuclear material;

(4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged in the manufacture of equipment or material that is especially designated or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material or, in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, of any nuclear explosive device;

(5) establish safeguards over nuclear research and development activities and facilities;

(6) implement special inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities, as provided for under existing safeguards procedures, and seek authority for the IAEA to conduct challenge inspections on demand at suspected nuclear sites;

(7) expand the scope of safeguards to include tritium, uranium concentrates, and nuclear waste containing special fissionable material, and increase the scope of such safeguards on heavy water;

(8) revise downward the IAEA's official minimum amounts of nuclear material ("significant quantity") needed to make a nuclear explosive device and establish these amounts as national rather than facility standards;

(9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA inspectors at sensitive fuel cycle facilities;

(10) promote the use of near real time material accountancy in the conduct of safeguards at facilities that use, produce, or store significant quantities of special fissionable material;

(11) develop with other IAEA member nations an agreement on procedures to expedite approvals of visa applications by IAEA inspectors;

(12) provide the IAEA the additional funds, technical assistance, and political support necessary to carry out the goals set forth in this subsection; and

(13) make public the annual safeguards implementation report of the IAEA, establishing a public registry of commodities in international nuclear commerce, including dual-use goods, and creating a public repository of current nuclear trade control laws, agreements, regulations, and enforcement and judicial actions by IAEA member nations.


(a) REPORT REQUIRED.-The President shall, in the report required by section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, describe

(1) the steps he has taken to implement sections 841 and 842, and

(2) the progress that has been made and the obstacles that have been encountered in seeking to meet the objectives set forth in sections 841 and 842.

(b) CONTENTS OF REPORT.-Each report under paragraph (1) shall describe

(1) the bilateral and multilateral initiatives that the President has taken during the period since the enactment of this Act in pursuit of each of the objectives set forth in sections 841 and 842;

(2) any obstacles that have been encountered in the pursuit of those initiatives;

(3) any additional initiatives that have been proposed by other countries or international organizations to strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards;

(4) all activities of the Federal Government in support of the objectives set forth in sections 841 and 842;

(5) any recommendations of the President on additional measures to enhance the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards; and (6) any initiatives that the President plans to take in support of each of the objectives set forth in sections 841 and 842.


As used in this part

(1) the term "highly enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U-235;

(2) the term "IAEA” means the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(3) the term "near real time material accountancy” means a method of accounting for the location, quantity, and disposition of special fissionable material at facilities that store or process such material, in which verification of peaceful use is continuously achieved by means of frequent physical inventories and the use of in-process instrumentation;

(4) the term "special fissionable material" has the meaning given that term by Article XX(1) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done at the Headquarters of the United Nations on October 26, 1956;

(5) the term "the Treaty" means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968; and

(6) the terms "IAEA safeguards", "non-nuclear-weapon state", "nuclear explosive device", and "special nuclear material" have the meanings given those terms in section 830 of this Act.



On the date of enactment of the first Foreign Relations Authorization Act that is enacted after the enactment of this Act, the provisions of parts A and B of this title shall cease to be effective, the

amendments made by those parts shall be repealed, and any provision of law repealed by those parts shall be reenacted.



This title may be cited as the "Protection and Reduction of Government Secrecy Act".

SEC. 902.116 FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) During the Cold War an extensive secrecy system developed which limited public access to information and reduced the ability of the public to participate with full knowledge in the process of governmental decisionmaking.

(2) In 1992 alone 6,349,532 documents were classified and approximately three million persons held some form of security clearance.

(3) The burden of managing more than 6 million newly classified documents every year has led to tremendous administrative expense, reduced communication within the government and within the scientific community, reduced communication between the government and the people of the United States, and the selective and unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.

(4) It has been estimated that private businesses spend more than $14 billion each year implementing government mandated regulations for protecting classified information.

(5) If a smaller amount of truly sensitive information were classified the information could be held more securely.

(6) In 1970 a Task Force organized by the Defense Science Board and headed by Dr. Frederick Seitz concluded that "more might be gained than lost if our Nation were to adopt-unilaterally, if necessary-a policy of complete openness in all areas of information".

(7) The procedures for granting security clearances have themselves become an expensive and inefficient part of the secrecy system and should be closely examined.

(8) A bipartisan study commission specially constituted for the purpose of examining the consequences of the secrecy system will be able to offer comprehensive proposals for reform.

SEC. 903.116 PURPOSE.

It is the purpose of this title to establish for a two-year period a Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy

(1) to examine the implications of the extensive classification of information and to make recommendations to reduce the volume of information classified and thereby to strengthen the protection of legitimately classified information; and

(2) to examine and make recommendations concerning current procedures relating to the granting of security clearances.

116 50 U.S.C. 401 note.


(a) ESTABLISHMENT.-To carry out the purpose of this title, there is established a Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (in this title referred to as the "Commission").

(b) COMPOSITION.-The Commission shall be composed of twelve members, as follows:

(1) Four members appointed by the President, of whom two shall be appointed from the executive branch of the Government and two shall be appointed from private life.

(2) Two members appointed by the Majority Leader of the Senate, of whom one shall be a Member of the Senate and one shall be appointed from private life.

(3) Two members appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate, of whom one shall be a Member of the Senate and one shall be appointed from private life.

(4) Two members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of whom one shall be a Member of the House and one shall be appointed from private life.

(5) Two members appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, of whom one shall be a Member of the House and one shall be appointed from private life. (c) CHAIRMAN.-The Commission shall elect a Chairman from among its members.

(d) QUORUM; VACANCIES.-After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call of the Chairman or a majority of its members. Seven members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

(e) APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS; INITIAL MEETING.-(1) It is the sense of the Congress that members of the Commission should be appointed not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this title.

(2) If after 60 days from the date of enactment of this Act seven or more members of the Commission have been appointed, those members who have been appointed may meet and select a Chairman who thereafter shall have authority to begin the operations of the Commission, including the hiring of staff.


The functions of the Commission shall be

(1) to conduct, for a period of 2 years from the date of its first meeting, an investigation into all matters in any way related to any legislation, executive order, regulation, practice, or procedure relating to classified information or granting security clearances; and

(2) to submit to the Congress a final report containing such recommendations concerning the classification of national security information and the granting of security clearances as the Commission shall determine, including proposing new procedures, rules, regulations, or legislation.


« PreviousContinue »