Kuhn-Loeb interests averted a panic last rough permitting the Northern Pacific

to settle their unperformable obligations easonable basis, certain it is that this action, mane and merciful in itself, was essential to inuance of the grand financiering projects arties who performed this act of clemency. anic as would have resulted had the enforceobligations been insisted on would have the bottom out of the great projects of the kings, as surely as it would have brought undreds of lesser operators, and distress to try at large.

not be denied, then, that in many ways the ation of financial and industrial power in a ent hands is of direct and unmistakable In matters less dramatic than this of the panic, claims of similar benefit have been id made with much appearance of reason. e New York Times, a day or two ago, in an Itorial on "The Steel Corporation and points out very forcibly that the present in the iron and steel market would, under nal play of free competition, justify and bring about extraordinarily high prices for 1 steel. The Steel Corporation, says the

Times, has steadily refused to permit prices to be raised to a figure which it could easily have exacted for the time being under the extraordinary pressure of the present demand. “It requires no great imagination," the Times argues, "to describe what would have happened in the iron and steel markets at any time within the past six months, and especially within the past six days, if the Steel Corporation had not been formed. We should have seen a rapid advance in prices of raw material and finished products, and a great speculative activity in pig-iron, billets, sheets, tinplates and merchant steel. Dealers would have placed all the orders which they could get accepted, and prices to consumers would have taken a rocket flight. Then would have begun a brief era of speculative importations. Meanwhile, consumers would have begun to lose confidence, enterprises predicated upon the use of iron and steel in large quantities would have been postponed, railroads would have delayed purchases, and a feeling of uncertainty would have taken possession of all in interest. This would have checked the advance and perhaps turned the movement in the opposite direction. What would have happened then every one who has been through an iron boom in previous years will know without telling. For those who have not, we need only say that the market would have suddenly and utterly collapsed, and for an uncertain period we should have had the hard sledding' so freely predicted but not yet experienced, nor in sight."

That a regulating and restraining influence such as can be exercised, and upon occasion has been

exercised, by these great repositories of industrial and financial force may often be highly beneficial will, we believe, be conceded by candid critics. But there is more than one reason why this circumstance cannot be accepted as a satisfactory recompense for the evils and the dangers attendant upon this tremendous concentration of power. It is not in accord with the healthy instincts of a virile people to permit their welfare to be parceled out to them through the good will, or the good sense, of a few individuals, even if the possession of these qualities could always be counted upon. Moreover, great as is the power possessed by those who make and unmake these vast financial combinations, the natural conditions upon which, in the last resort, even they must depend for success are still mightier in their potency. The control of the transportation facilities of half a continent involves the dealing with forces and conditions too complex and various to be held tightly in the grooves of any syndicate's financial policy. Finally, it is yet to be seen whether, in the skillful averting of financial panics and even in the prolongation of a period of bustling activity, the calculated policy of the magnates will prove better in the long run than would the rough-and tumble of ordinary competition. The great engineers have strengthened retaining walls and prevented floods, where lesser people might have been unable to cope with the waters; but are they not only putting off the evil day? Is it not their policy to prolong a boom so long as there is any chance of keeping the market high? Will not the pressure at last become too heavy even for them to hold back? And then, when the break

comes, will it not be disastrous beyond all precedent? These are questions which cannot be waved aside by mere general optimism, and which the future alone can answer.

THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

(December 31, 1901)

At the close of the joint session of the American Economic Association and the American Historical Society at Washington last night, a few remarks were made by Professor Cheyney of the University of Pennsylvania, which were received with evident relish and approval by a very large part of the audience present, representing the scholarship of the country in these departments, and were greeted with unusually hearty applause. The subject under discussion was "The Economic Interpretation of History," a phrase by which is generally understood that view which seeks to explain every important phenomenon in human history as an outcome of economic forces, as well as to discover an economic thread which is the clue to the development of mankind as a whole. The theory had been outlined in a previous paper by Professor Seligman of Columbia in a form so cautious and moderate as almost completely to disarm criticism; but Professor Cheyney took it not as it might be when shorn of all its aggressiveness, but such as it is in actual practice by those who are under the sway of its influence. And he proceeded to insert into the theory a few swift and piercing stabs, which, while leaving the theory in a decidedly damaged condition, appeared to afford very considerable mental relief to the audience. In a word, Professor Cheyney declared that the way to interpret history is to go to the facts of history and find out what they mean; not