ROOSEVELT AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

(April 3, 1903)

Considering President Roosevelt's love for a fight, it is not surprising that he should measure this country's future standing among nations by the size of the club we are able to wield. The club which the President refers to particularly is the United States Navy. And it is in the interest of the Monroe doctrine that we must carry about with us this stout hickory to impress our enemies, according to the best usages of the far-famed Donnybrook fair. President Roosevelt, in his speech in Chicago last night, was so explicit and withal so picturesque on that point that we reproduce his words here:

I believe in the Monroe doctrine wth all my heart and soul; I am convinced that the immense majority of our fellow-countrymen so believe in it; but I would infinitely prefer to see us abandon it than to see us put it forward and bluster about it, and yet fail to build up the efficient fighting strength which in the last resort can alone make it respected by any strong foreign Power whose interest it may ever happen to be to violate it. There is a homely old adage which runs: "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” If the American nation will speak softly, and yet build, and keep at a pitch of the highest training a thoroughly efficient navy, the Monroe doctrine will go far. I ask you to think over this.

To be sure, it is well that President Roosevelt feels his responsibility. But he must pardon others for not feeling so insecure. We should be inclined to smile at the Irishman who would carry his stout black-thorn cudgel through the streets of Baltimore

in order to protect himself from attack. The cowboy in New York city, loaded down with big guns and long rifles, would be an object of tolerant curiosity. Yet either would probably need the "big stick" as badly as America needs an overwhelming naval force today in order to protect itself and the Monroe doctrine. President Roosevelt should not forget that the Monroe doctrine has about eighty years to its credit, and during all of that period it has never been assailed successfully. The United States was a nation of but ten millions of inhabitants when it coolly announced to the world that the nations already here could and would take care of the Western Hemisphere. No big club was prepared in anticipation of this announcement.

And the Monroe doctrine has been tried. France and England once challenged it in concert in connection with Cuban affairs. But the United States was ready and the Europeans did not press the challenge. Louis Napoleon actually broke into our preserve when we were engaged in more important business than enforcing the Monroe doctrine, but when we looked around and found him he moved on. England again talked boldly about what she would do with territory claimed by a weak South American State; but when President Cleveland drew his chalk line, John Bull promptly placed his toes to it. In none of these instances was our "big stick" ready. At the time that President Cleveland issued his Venezuelan message, our navy would have been anything but a terror to "the mistress. of the seas."

A mild suggestion on the part of President

surance was kept with an honora which merits full acknowledgment

It was not because of the size of stick" that they halted. The con these two Powers would have over force five to one. They respected o resources, our general fighting po they ever had any designs upon S territory. As a matter of fact, En the United States a hostage for Canada is an all-sufficient assura Britain will cross swords with the only in the last extremity. And whi is our friend no other Power is lik clusions with us. Our resources ar would be suicidal for any Power w a wanton attack upon us. It is should never be in position to make upon anybody else-and the "big s a temptation. Let us have a navy spectable, efficient navy-capable of mate demands; but if we load ourse a barbarous club bigger than our carry, we shall simply handicap ours in the race of civilization.

ONE LESSON FROM THEODOR MOMMSEN

(November 3, 1903)

We habitually conceive of the typical German scholar as a man completely wrapped up in his specialty, a recluse, a devotee who thinks his life well spent if he has "settled hoti's business"; and so far as single-minded devotion to the pursuit of the particular department of learning or science in which he is engaged is concerned, the generally received notion of the German Gelehrter is entirely correct. His absorption in his work is complete, sincere, unqualified. He has not one eye on his manuscript or his retorts and the other on the stock market or the doings of "the 400." His personal ambitions, aspirations, hopes, all lie in the field of his vocation. But no mistake would be greater than to suppose that this attitude of mind, so far as individual desires and ambitions are concerned, involves any narrowness of vision or limitation of interest as to the large questions of literature and life, and especially public life. The German scholar, specialist though he be in his work, has plenty of psychic energy to spare for the large concerns of mankind, both in speculative thought and in action. And, best of all, the history of German universities testifies abundantly to the fact that these noble nurseries of learning have also been the stronghold of liberal thought, and furnished the germ of political freedom for their country.

Seldom has the compatibility of enormous learn