act no otherwise* than thus, he is neither free nor omnipotent. If his will changes, he is not immutable. If he permit machines, which he has endowed with sensibility, to experience pain, he is deficient in goodness. If he has been unable to render his productions solid and durable, he is deficient in skill. Perceiving as we do the decay and ruin not only of all animals but of all the other works of deity, we cannot but inevitably conclude, either that everything performed in the course of nature is absolutely necessary, the unavoidable result of it simperative and insuperable laws, or that the artificer who impels her various operations is destitute of plan, of power, of constancy, of skill, and of goodness.

"Man, who considers himself as the master-work of the divinity, supplies us more readily and completely than any other production, with evidence of the incapacity or malignity+ of his pretended author. In this being, possessed of feeling, intuition, and reason, which considers itself as the perpetual object of divine partiality, and forms its God on the model of itself, we see a machine more changeable, more frail, more liable to derangement from its extraordinary complication, than that of the coarsest and grossest beings. Beasts which are destitute of our mental powers and acquirements, plants which merely vegetate, stones which are unendowed with sensation, are, in many respects, beings far more favoured than man. are, at least, exempt from distress of mind, from the tortures of thought, and corrosions of care, to which the latter is a victim. Who would not prefer being a mere unintelligent animal, or a senseless stone, when his thoughts revert to the irreparable loss of an object dearly beloved. Would it not be infinitely more

They

The freedom of any being consists in the power of doing what he pleases. If he performs his will, he is free.

+ If he is malignant, he is not capable; and if he is capable, a term comprehending both power and wisdom, he is not malignant.

The author here falls into an inadvertence to which we are all liable. We frequently say, I had rather be a bird, or a beast,

desirable to be an inanimate mass, than the gloomy votary and victim of superstition, trembling under the present yoke of his diabolical deity, and anticipating infinite torments in a future existence? Beings, destitute of sensation, life, memory, and thought, experience no affliction from the idea of what is past, present, or to come; they do not believe there is any danger of incurring eternal torture for inaccurate reasoning; which is believed, however, by many of those favoured beings who maintain that the great architect of the world has created the universe for themselves.

"Let us not be told that we have no idea of a work without having that of the artificer distinguished from the work. Nature is not a work: She has always existed of herself.* Every process takes place in her bosom. She is an immense manufactory, provided with materials, and she forms the instruments by which she acts: all her works are effects of her own energy, and of agents or causes which she frames, contains, and impels. Eternal, uncreated elements,-elements indestructible, ever in motion, and combining in exquisite and endless diversity, originate all the beings and all the phenomena that we behold; all the effects, good or evil, that we feel; the order or disorder which we distinguish, merely by different modes in which they affect ourselves; and, in a word, all those wonders which excite our meditation and confound our reasoning. These elements, in order to effect objects thus comprehensive and important, require nothing beyond their own properties, individual or combined, and the motion essential to their very existence; and thus preclude the necessity of recurring to an unknown artificer, in order to arrange, mould, combine, preserve, and dissolve them.

than a man, with such pains and griefs as I am now experiencing. But when we hold such language, we do not in fact advert to the circumstance, that it strictly implies a wish for annihilation, for if you become anything but what you now are, you retain, of course, nothing of yourself.-French note.

You assume the question in dispute; a case of frequent occurrence with system-makers.—Ibid.

VOL. III.

U

"But, even admitting for a moment that it is impossible to conceive of the universe without an arti ficer who formed it, and who preserves and watches over his work, where shall we place that artificer?* shall he be within or without the universe? is he matter or motion? or is he mere space, nothingness, vacuity? In each of these cases, he will either be nothing, or he will be comprehended in nature, and subjected to her laws. If he is in nature, I think I see in her only matter in motion, and cannot but thence conclude, that the agent impelling her is corporeal and material, and that he is consequently liable to dissolution. If this agent is out of nature, then I have no idea of what place he can occupy, nor of an immaterial being, nor of the manner in which a spirit, without extension, can operate upon the matter from which it is separated. Those unknown tracts of space which imagination has placed beyond the visible world, may be considered as having no existence for a being who can scarcely see to the distance of his own feet; the ideal power which inhabits them can never be represented to my mind, unless when my imagination combines at random the fantastic colours which it is always forced to employ in the world on which I am. In this case, I shall merely reproduce in idea what my senses have previously actually perceived; and that God, which I, as it were, compel myself to distinguish from nature, and to place beyond her circuit, will ever, in opposition to all my efforts, necessarily withdraw within it.

"It will be observed and insisted upon by some, that if a statue or a watch were shown to a savage who had never seen them, he would inevitably acknowledge that they were the productions of some intelligent agent, more powerful and ingenious than himself;

*Does it belong to us to find a place for him? It is for him to fix ours. This is a sufficient answer.-French note.

Are you so constituted as to have ideas of everything, and do you not perceive in that same nature, an admirable intelligence?-Ibid.

Either the world is infinite, or space is infinite; take your choice.-Ibid.

and hence it will be inferred, that we are equally bound to acknowledge that the machine of the universe, that man, that the phenomena of nature, are the productions of an agent, whose intelligence and power are far superior to our own.

"I answer, in the first place, that we cannot possibly doubt either the great power or the great skill* of nature: we admire her skill as often as we are surprised by the extended, varied, and complicated effects which we find in those of her works which we take the pains to investigate; she is not, however, either more or less skilful in any one of her works than in the rest. We e no more comprehend how she could produce a stone or piece of metal, than how she could produce a head organized like that of Newton. We call that man skilful who can perform things which we are unable to perform ourselves. Nature can perform everything; and when anything exists, it is a proof that she was able to make it. Thus, it is only in relation to ourselves that we ever judge nature to be skilful: we compare it in those cases with ourselves; and, as we possess a quality which we call intelligence, by the aid of which we produce works, in which we display our skill, we thence conclude, that the works of nature which most excite our astonishment and admiration, are not in fact hers, but the productions of an artificer, intelligent like ourselves, and whose intelligence we proportion, in our minds, to the degree of astonishment excited in us by his works; that is, in fact, to our own weakness and ignorance."+

See the reply to these arguments under the articles ATHEISM and GOD, and in the following section, written long before the " System of Nature.'

* Powerful and skilful! On that I take my stand. He who is powerful enough to form man and the world, is God. You admit

a God while you contend against him.-French note.

+ If we are so ignorant, how can we venture to affirm that everything was made without God.-Ibid.

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SECTION II.

If a clock is not made in order to tell the time of the day, I will then admit that final causes are nothing but chimeras, and be content to go by the name of a finalcause-finder ;-in plain language, fool-to the end of my life.

All the parts, however, of that great machine the world, seem made for each other. Some philosophers affect to deride final causes, which were rejected, they tell us, by Epicurus and Lucretius. But it seems to me, that Epicurus and Lucretius rather merit the derision. They tell you that the eye is not made to see; but that, since it was found out that eyes were capable of being used for that purpose, to that purpose they have been applied. According to them, the mouth is not formed to speak and eat, nor the stomach to digest, nor the heart to receive the blood from the veins and impel it through the arteries, nor the feet to walk, nor the ears to hear. Yet, at the same time, these very shrewd and consistent persons admitted, that tailors made garments to clothe them, and masons built houses to lodge them; and thus ventured to deny to nature the great existence, the universal intelligence-what they conceded to the most insignificant artificers employed by themselves.

The doctrine of final causes ought certainly to be preserved from being abused. We have already remarked that M. le Prieur, in the Spectacle of Nature, contends, in vain, that the tides were attached to the ocean to enable ships to enter more easily into their ports, and to preserve the water from corruption: he might just as probably and successfully have urged, that legs were made to wear boots, and noses to bear spectacles.

In order to satisfy ourselves of the truth of a final cause, in any particular instance, it is necessary that the effect produced should be uniform and invariable in time and place. Ships have not existed in all times and upon all seas; accordingly, it cannot be said that the ocean was made for ships. It is impossible not to