it exists in a very faulty degree, and though it may occasion us trouble, and may stand in the way of the accomplishment of our favorite objects; we should still treat it with the utmost forbearance and lenity. And if, after all our appeals to reason, benevolence, and piety, we are not so happy as to find, that the time has come, when the proposed changes can be peaceably and harmoniously effected; then, instead of giving way to fretfulness or sourness of temper, let us cherish feelings of perfect good-nature. And as others may not be so pliable as we wish, and may not bend to the new plan of benevolent action, which we should prefer, let us learn to be pliable ourselves, and quietly go along with them a while longer, in the old way, thus avoiding the evils of division and strife, and keeping the unity of spirit in the bond of peace. ARTICLE II. AUTHORITY, A SOURCE OF MORAL OBLIGATION. By Rev. L. P. Hickok, Prof. of Didactic Theology, Western Reserve College, Ohio. A PREVAILING spirit of insubordination to law fearfully characterizes the present day. It is evinced in the thousand individual cases where inclination, ambition and interest trample upon authority-in the frequent appeals to a false code of honor-in the frenzy and corruption of contested elections—in the violent assumption of law by reckless men into their own hands, and wreaking private hate by a tumultuous and summary vengeance and in the excited commotions of a collected and frantic populace, rushing like a tempest over all law to its object amid scenes of riot, conflagration and blood. Yea, in addition to the licentiousness openly advocated by some shameless lecturers both male and female, there are not wanting instances where the influence of a christian name and profession is directly applied to the dissemination of principles which sap the foundations of all authority, and prostrate the salutary restraints of civil legislation. All witness the prevalence of this disorganizing spirit, and all the wise and good deplore it. Perhaps this result was to have been expected from the pro gress of free principles, and the operation of a free government. It is human nature to take extremes, and thus it might have been anticipated that many minds, when loosed from the point of passive obedience, would swing over to the opposite point of licentious indulgence. But if from the nature of man such an anticipation were rational, it by no means diminishes the danger from the fact itself. There can be no safety in leaving this spirit to its unhindered action, and permitting it to move on to its certain issue, with no vigorous efforts in counteraction. The Repository, it is true, is not the proper medium for reaching the great mass of disorganizers and levelers, still in the higher and purer atmosphere where it moves, it is not to be presumed that there are none, who, if they do not directly throw all their influence against the majesty and authority of law, are yet entirely prevented, and from confused or perverted views absolutely disqualified, from standing out its firm supporters and defenders. A thorough, honest and serious discussion of the subject in these pages can hardly fail to subserve the interests of patriotism, philanthropy and religion. The present Article is designed as a small contribution to this object. Conscience may be reached, and a sense of obligation awakened from two sources, the nature of things, and, authority. The first is by a direct intuition of right, or a reflective perception of expediency, in things themselves-the second is by the legislation of a sovereign enactment. One has the approbation or remorse of natural conscience for its sanctions, the other has the additional retributions of positive rewards and punishments. Both have a direct appeal to the ultimate principle of rightthe first, to the rightness of the precepts-the second, to the rightness of the authority. Both lay inviolate obligations upon conscience, but from two distinct sources. One insisting, thus saith nature-the other, thus saith law. One inquires, How reasonest thou?-the other, How readest thou? The present design includes the latter only, and accordingly we will consider to some extent the nature of authority as a source of human obligation. viz. Two inquiries will cover the ground we propose to occupy, I. Why is authority necessary as a source of obligation? II. What is the test of legitimate authority? The necessity of authority in the direction of human conduct is the main point of controversy. It is strenuously denied that Law there is any necessity for it in the government of man. has no claims to obedience for its own sake. Man is fully competent from his own reason for all the purposes of self-government as a member of civil society, and thus all authority is at the best superfluous. If it require what the man does not approve, it is tyranny; if it require only what he does approve, it is useless. All that man needs is instruction, not authority; he must be convinced, not commanded. From this general assumption originate a variety of differently modified theories. One affirms that pleasure or happiness is the only good, and this is found in the gratification of his constitutional susceptibilities, and thus while it is right to follow natural appetite, this too is a sufficient directory. Gratify it when it craves, and stop when it is satiated. Another, on the same principle that pleasure is the only good, admits that a wakeful discretion is necessary, lest its possession be more than counterbalanced by subsequent suffering. But it is earnestly asserted that every man's own faculties are abundantly competent to make the estimate and guide the conduct. Another would so cultivate the social sympathies and natural sensibilities that they shall preserve the order and peace of society. Another assumes that a proper appeal to man's natural sense of justice and reciprocal rights, and especially to the feelings of kindness and benevolence are sufficient for all the purposes of social regulation without any positive enactments-and still another, more elevated in its conception and plausible in its argumentation, asserts that man is endowed with reason which cannot but be in conformity with universal truth, and all right legislation therefore must be in harmony with it. Obedience to all law will thus exactly coincide with the dictates of pure reason in each individual, and render him the most free when he is the most obedient. All these, however, from the more refined and elevated system of Jean Jacques Rousseau's social contract, down to the gross and insane schemes of Robert Dale Owen and Frances Wright Darismont, involve as fundamental, the principle that man is singly competent to all the purposes of self-government as a member of civil society, and that he needs nothing and should yield obedience to nothing but the law of his own nature within him. All authority in accordance with this law of nature is superfluous, and all that transcends it partakes of the very essence of tyranny, and is to be unconquerably resisted. Man has the right to judge all law and hold himself absolved from allegiance to all authority which does not square with his unerring convictions. All authority is thus completely and forever nullified, for when the precept is obeyed it is never to be because it was commanded, but simply because it was seen to be rational. It is not authority which is to fasten obligation upon the conscience, but the perceived conformity to the nature of things. It cannot be denied that many theories which lead to the above conclusion are made to assume a very plausible appearance, and are supported by very specious arguments. No theory can gain footing in the world and embody among its advocates a large number of confessedly learned and ingenious minds, without involving much truth, and this so skilfully inwrought that it may hold the system together for a time in spite of the dangerous and perhaps fatal errors which are included within it. This is peculiarly true with the subject before us. It is a principle fundamental to all moral freedom and responsibility, which we are to yield only with life, that nothing shall be allowed to intermeddle with conscience. Its rights are sacred, and no authority from heaven or earth can release from its hallowed obligations. Nothing can bind to obedience in opposition to the clear perception of intuitive right. These immutable truths are applied in various forms to the foregoing schemes, and the efforts to sunder the bonds of all authority is made, by a perversion of the most stable principles in moral science. And truly if the claims of positive law cannot be sustained without subverting the rights of conscience, if the obligations of authority cannot be upheld but at such a sacrifice, then let every sceptre fall and every throne crumble. Sooner shall heaven and earth pass away, than one jot or tittle of this law, written upon every man's bosom by God's own finger, shall be erased. But no such sacrifice is demanded. The majesty and authority of law stands firm in perfect harmony with these immutable principles. ALL TRUTH IS ONE, and all its parts in everlasting consistency. A comprehensive view of the subject before us will most surely disclose that the same principles which have been used to nullify all authority as lording it over conscience, demand unqualified submission to legitimate authority as the rightful lord and sovereign of conscience. It is here emphatically true, that "Shallow draughts intoxicate the brain, Two general considerations will suffice to prove the necessity of authority as a source of moral obligation. 1. There are many purposes essential to the government of society, which cannot be gained by leaving mankind to the separate decisions of each one's intuitive or reflective perception. In some things, right is seen by intuition, and obligation at once felt. In other things, duty is found only by a patient examination of circumstances and comparison of probabilities, and thus by reflection the course of duty is seen from the best estimate of practical expediency. And now we say, that if all men be left separately to find each his own duty from either or both of the above sources, there are many purposes essential to the government of man which can never be accomplished. Even in matters of obligation originating in an intuitive perception of right in the nature of things, it is certain that society could not be kept together, if there were no umpire higher than each man's own intuition. For admit that this is the same in kind in all men, and that so far as they see the right, they do and must see it alike, yet it is not and never will be true that all will have the power of intuition equally developed, nor kept equally pure from the perverting influence of sense. Some principles of action absolutely essential to the welfare of society will not be seen at all by multitudes-others will be seen only indistinctly and of course confusedly by the great mass of common minds and even the strongest intellects, in whom the pure reason is the most clear and calm, will be conscious that they stand only upon the shore of the great ocean of truth, which is every where casting up its treasures from depths which they cannot fathom, and over a region wider than they can explore. How then, on these subjects of intuition are we to bring the consciences of men together, and bind them harmoniously with the same obligations? Take as an illustration one fact in the divine government, applicable to many others essential to the well being of any system of moral agents, viz., the obligation that "all men should honor the Son even as they honor the Father." This has its ground in the nature of the divine existence in Trinity, and to the all-perfect mind is seen by intuition. But if it depended upon our intuitive perceptions, when would men recognize this obligation? Both on man and angel the obligation rests, and can rest, upon mere authority only. It is a service which is due to the second Person in the Trinity, but no mind unable to fathom the depths of God's |