Page images
PDF
EPUB

treat, given to one or more of the ministers, then resident abroad, with eventual instructions. Such a course would have saved the dignity of the country, and equally have served its interests. But it would not have satisfied the vanity, or have promoted the personal views of the candidate for a re-election by both adverse parties!

Circumstances occurred at Trenton strongly illustrative of the President's jealous temper. The sixth of October, Hamilton wrote to the Secretary at War: "General Wilkinson has just returned to this city, and will set out together with myself for Trenton on Monday, in order to settle definitively with you the arrangements for the western army." Pursuant to a preconcert of some date with Wilkinson, he proceeded to Trenton without any expectation of meeting the President, nor did he remain there a day longer than was indispensable to this object. Chief Justice Ellsworth had also appointed to meet Governor Davie, his colleague, at the same place, to obtain such information as might be useful in their mission. This casual meeting offended Adams. It was regarded by him as "a mischievous plot against his independence," * though Hamilton's previous letters to the War department fully confirm his statement as to the motives of this journey.

On the twelfth of October, while there, he submitted a "Plan for the disposition of the troops of the United States into Divisions and Brigades." The four old regiments were to form one division and two brigades. The twelve new to form two divisions and four brigades. The principal objects he had in view were, the distribution of the troops by corps in contiguous or relative positions ;

* "Another fact is," Adams wrote, "that I transiently asked one of the heads of departments, whether Ellsworth and Hamilton came all the way from Windsor and Newark to Trenton, to convince me that I ought to suspend the mission."

the reduction of the number of Posts;-the obtaining a reserve force, which, being in a central position, would bear on various points either for succor or attack; and by its concentration, be capable of discipline and ready for active and efficient efforts;-the promoting economy by lessening the garrisons in the most remote stations.

The Post of Michilimackinac he viewed

66 as one of the portals of the North-western territory, important to preserve an influence over the Indians, and which in time he thought would encourage the enterprises of American traders. The force on the Mississippi he would reduce, merely leaving sufficient to impress the adjacent foreign inhabitants, and to keep the Indians in check. The scale of the establishment did not permit an adequate body there to repel a serious attack from Louisiana; and less being out of the reach of succor, would for that reason be in imminent danger, would be still more inadequate to an offensive operation, and by its proximity, might create alarm and occasion reinforcement. A reserved force on the OHIO, at Louisville, would," he suggested, "be a rallying point for the smaller advanced body, in the event of an invasion from below, and also from the militia. If a rupture with Spain," he observed, “should induce us to become the invaders, the force assigned to the undertaking can rapidly descend the Mississippi, and being at a great distance, will have a better chance of masking their approach, and of arriving unexpectedly, than if stationed at a place which, by its nearness, would excite jealousy and vigilance."

A strong fortified post was advised, to guard the southern extremity of the Mississippi, both as an impediment to invasion by the Spaniards, and to have an impressive influence on the powerful tribes in the Southwestern territory; "though," he added, "by no means an advocate for multiplying, in the present circumstances of the country, the number of our fortifications, already too great, I entertain no doubt of the expediency of such an one at Loftus heights, and the object is well worth the

probable expense. For this work he proposed a plan and estimate.

Still looking to the possible invasion of Louisiana, be remarks:

"The position which has been chosen for the reserve corps has various aspects. It looks to the succor of the more northern as well as the more southern posts, and will be likely to control efficaciously the north-western Indians; it has an eye to a co-operation with the troops in the State of Tennessee, whenever a good communication shall be established, which is conceived to be an object of pressing moment; and it is convenient for a descent by the river Mississippi, for offensive operations against our neighbors on the South, if future circumstances should recommend them. But, as well with a view to defence as offence, it is deemed requisite to prepare and keep ready, below the rapids of the Ohio, a number of boats equal to the transportation of three thousand men, with baggage, stores, provisions, artillery, and other apparatus. The number and the estimate of their cost will be found herewith." "This reserved force," he wrote, was "deemed on all hands a cardinal object."

A firm occupation of the straits which connect Lake Erie with the Huron and Ontario, he likewise deemed a material point.

"It would seem to me," he remarked, "desirable ere long to have on each strait a work suitable to about a thousand men, with an interior work in the nature of a citadel, adapted to about two hundred. These might be expected to secure the place against a coup-de-main with a small force, and the growth of settlement in the vicinity will soon furnish, through the militia, the means of augmenting the garrison upon a sudden emergency. The good understanding which at this time subsists with Great Britain justifies an arrangement less efficient than that just intimated; but the permanency of friendship between nations is too little to be relied upon to render it prudent to look forward to more substantial precautions than are immediately meditated.”

Fort Massac was also to be occupied, so as to command the confluence of the Cumberland and Tennessee with the Ohio, and of the Ohio with the Mississippi.

Previous to the presentation of this plan to the Secretary at War, Hamilton submitted it to Washington, whose reply is dated the fifteenth of September. Having stated that he saw no cause to differ as to the disposition of the troops, he observed:

"It may be remembered, that at the time the Secretary at War laid before the General officers in Philadelphia the letters of General Wilkinson, respecting the propriety (in his judgment) of placing a considerable force at the Natchez, I gave it my decided disapprobation, inasmuch as it would excite in the Spaniards distrust and jealousy of our pacific disposition, would cause an augmentation of force on their part; and so on with both, if our government would go into the measure, until the thing which was intended to be avoided, would, more than probable, be produced-that is, hostility-whereas, keeping that force in the upper country, besides its looking to all points, and exciting no alarm in any, might, if occasion should require it, either for defence or offence, descend the stream like lightning, with all its munitions and equipments, which could be accumulated with ease, and without noise at the upper posts, and make the surprise more complete."

Reasons are given in full for the preference of certain interior posts, and for the station of the reserved corps.

Hamilton's attention had been previously directed to the provision of winter quarters for the army. While at Trenton he proposed a plan of huts, containing directions as to their disposition in a cantonment-their size and materials having due regard to the economy which the resources of the Government rendered necessary and to the accommodation of the troops.

CHAPTER CLI.

As soon as the necessary conferences with McHenry permitted, General Hamilton returned to New York, whence he wrote to Washington a private letter, express ing a prophetic apprehension (which was fulfilled) of the consequences of the President's recent decision.

"Dear Sir: * On my return from Trenton the day before yesterday, I found your private letter of the thirteenth, as well as your public letter of the fifteenth instant. The newspapers have probably informed you that poor Avery is dead of the yellow fever.

"The President has resolved to send the Commissioners to France, notwithstanding the change of affairs there. He is not understood to have consulted either of his ministers; certainly not either the Secretary of War or of Finance. All my calculations lead me to regret the measure. I hope that it may not in its consequences involve the United States in a war on the side of France with her enemies. My trust in Providence, which has so often interposed in our favor, is my only consolation."

Washington replied on the twenty-seventh :

"The purport of your (private) letter of the twenty-first, with respect to a late decision, has surprised me exceedingly. I was surprised at the measure, how much more so at the manner of it! This business seems to have commenced in an evil hour, and under unfavorable auspices; and I wish mischief may not tread in all its steps, and be the

* October 21, 1799.

« PreviousContinue »