1 *ply the filer em, then Serenaty & fæng Lua. me andra banda, with male slota, zad explanteri d captain kind in d. Tekiness before that body. Exkind might but tavaly multiplied, but it is a matter kulal boat la bug test in the days of the men who framed u belea Comm Tibution if sois 4 Common practice to maintain alea poldi par und erbations between Congress and the Cabinet In 1901 ando commultos, appointed for the purpose of Mh allige the question of the relation of the executive to the 1.Elite Repeatril in bacon of giving heads of departments the ki, ha kepgo at du fagora! This committee urged that such a hecy fodation of the principle of separation of powers; thed coud to dalinn of the two departments would produce radictour par sly sta Though the two departments of natural have a sparite existence, runs the report, "they unted to cooperate with each other as the different na nalica, or Pk, human bos'y must cooperate with each other in nh, bà ban the ngure and perform the duties of a perfect Eh, paliocu tra of heads of departments upon the dom al (tai sen, Pi vonn the urged, would make the inforwivel to Co95, ca these ntiment and conclusive, and won siara, the members of the à posture on the alert to see that Daveways Folke was wy 19 paperboa to the value of the information, and thus would enable the public to determine whether that influence was exerted by partisanship or by argu ment. In answer to those who urged that it would institute an unconstitutional relation between the executive and Congress, the committee reported: “No one who has occupied a seat on the floor of either house, no one of those who year after year so industriously and faithfully and correctly report the proceedings of the houses, no frequenter of the lobby or the gallery, can have failed to discern the influence exerted upon legislation by the visits of the heads of departments to the floors of Congress and the visits of the members of Congress to the offices in the departments. It is not necessary to say that the influence is dishonest or corrupt, but that it is illegitimate; it is exercised in secret by means that are not public - by means which an honest public opinion cannot accurately discover and over which it can there fore exercise no just control." In response to the contention that the imposition of these quasi-legislative responsibilities upon heads of departments would make it impossible for them to perform their regular administrative duties, the committee recommended that under-secretaries should be appointed to whom should be confided the routine business requiring only order and accuracy, so that the chief officers could confine their attention to those larger duties involving important policies. In spite of these convincing arguments, the report of the committee was simply buried in the dreary waste of congressional documents, The case against an approach to parliamentary govern By the following order issued November 26, 1909, President Taft proposed to cut off the subterranean connection between the subordinates in the executive departments and Congress: "It is hereby ordered that no bureau, office, or division chief, or subordinate in any department of the Government, and no officer of the Army and Navy or Marine Corps stationed in Washington, shall apply to either House of Congress, or to any committee of either House of Congress, or to any Member of Congress for legislation or for appropriations or for congressional action of any kind, except with the consent and knowledge of the head of the depart ment; nor shall any such person respond to any request for information from either House of Congress or any committee of either House, or any Member of Congress, except through, or as authorized by, the head of his department.” An attack was made on this order, in the House, on January 27, 1919, see Congressional Record for January 28, 1910. ment has been stated by President Lowell as follows. I be Cabinet officers sat in Congress, the power of the President wound. be reduced and the chief control of the administration would ass to the legislature. If the President were of nosite paty from that in power in Congress, as administrative autority would be reduced to almost nothing, or, in those countries where parliamentary government been introduced the titular executive officer, whether he be the King Engiandor the President of France, 'oses his political power. Furthermore, deadlocks between the Senate and the House over my ministerial policy would inevitably lead to the supremacy of branch of the legislature and the decline of the other. If our development should follow the line indicated in other countries having parliamentary government, the rouse of Representatives would become supreme, the Senate would ank into a mere opposition of the House ake the House of Lords in England, and the President would become merely a nominal head. Furthermore, such a fusion of executive and legislative departments would strengthen the federal government at the expense of the states. and would destroy the power of the courts to declare statutes inglid In other words, it is contended, anything like parliamentary government would make a revolution in the whole frame work of our federal system, and dislocate the distribution of prowers among the three departments, This argument, of course, does not apply to the proposal of the Senate committes to allow cabinet officers to discuss and defend administrative policies in either house of Congress. Toughtless such moderate change, however, would be regarded as a step in the direction of a political revolution, and we shall podmbly combine to maintain, by subterranean and extra-legal metluuls, the comnections between the executive and legislature which are maintained openly and in the full light of public arrutiny in England and in France, ↑ Fecare an Government, pp. 25–45. CHAPTER XI THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION THE innumerable duties to be fulfilled in the execution of federal law under presidential supervision are distributed among nine great departments and certain commissions, established by Congress. Curiously enough, the Constitution makes no direct provision for these branches of the federal administration; but it evidently assumes their existence, for it authorizes the President to require in writing the opinion of the heads of the executive departments, and also gives Congress power to vest in them the appointment of inferior officers. It is on this constitutional basis, therefore, that Congress assumes the power to create departments by law, regulate the duties of their respective heads down to the minutest details, and prescribe their internal organization and the powers and duties of the chiefs of even the minor subdivisions. Occasionally, however, the President takes the initial steps in the organization of a bureau by executive order, and Congress has subsequently sanctioned the act by a special law, or a regular appropriation. The Heads of Departments The head of a federal department occupies a position radically different from that of a cabinet officer in any other country. He is appointed by the President,' and may be removed by him or by impeachment. His duties, however, are prescribed minutely, not in presidential orders, save in certain instances, but in statutes enacted by Congress. He is responsible to the President for the faithful execution of the law; but the President cannot alter or diminish any of the duties laid down by Congress, and cannot prevent Congress from imposing or taking away duties or from prescribing such minute details as amount to a 1 With the Senate's approval. Above, p. 189. of the government Exercise or control the discretion repræet sy new in the Secretary attur Treasury, or ʼn my head or subordinate of a department: The Presuden, as we ive seen hus the Dover of remova somaner, and may exercise it for the puroSKE of directing us suoorksAČAS lu actu. practice, therIDE yanatams from Mr. Ster Argument, escena.y when a strop-viei Pradent has a firm pricy of his own which he is determined ༣,ཙ Indeed, the ungest spilation of his doctrine wowd amount to a fun tuete decentralization of the administrative negatizatim and a destruction of the President's responsibuld y While it is impossible to give here a full account of the duties of each secretary, it seems desirable to consider some matters which are common to them all. In the first place, a large appointing power to minor offices is conferred by law upon the departmental head, but this is now exercised under civil service rules which restrict his choice, in all rept the important subordinate positions, to the candidates who have qualified by examination. The power of removal generally accompanics the power of appointment, although there are some important exceptions by law and by executive order. 4. In the second place, the head of a department enjoys a certain range of freedom in issuing departmental orders, for, by act of Congress, he may "prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of ita vilwers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its * durman R. Cužnoms, Vol. I. p. 440; Readings, p. 200. |