Wishing to give to your excellency as soon as possible the required answer to the two notes to which I refer in the present, I will appreciate it if you will inform me that if among the circumstances alluded to in the paragraph, a version of which I have transcribed, there exist any others not mentioned in the notes which your excellency has seen fit to address to me on this subject. With this motive I renew to your excellency the assurance of my highest consideration. (Signed) His Excellency A. M. BEAUPRÉ, LUIS CARLOS RICO. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States. [Inclosure 2.] Mr. Beaupré to Doctor Rico. His Excellency Dr. LUIS CARLOS RICO, LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your excellency's courteous note of to-day, quoting a paragraph of my note of the 5th instant, and asking if the statement therein contained is based upon information not mentioned in my previous notes. In reply I have the honor to inform your excellency that the antecedent circumstances to which I made reference are fully outlined in my previous notes, and particularly in the one of June 10, 1903. If your excellency will permit me a few words more on this subject I would like to refer to the extraordinary efforts made by my Government to keep faith with Colombia after an agreement had been reached between the executive Governments of the two nations. As your excellency is aware, when the canal convention was presented to the Senate of the United States it encountered the most violent opposition. Not only were strenuous efforts made to defeat the treaty in its entirety, but many amendments of varying degrees of importance were presented and urged. During all that period the friends of the Government were steadfast in their determination to uphold the action of the Executive and to preserve intact the agreement made with Colombia. It was a momentous struggle, and the final and close victory was secured in the end only by the most stupendous efforts on the part of the Administration, imbued as they were with the idea that such a compact, made after mature and careful consideration by the executive departments of the two Governments, must be ratified as it stood. In view of the foregoing, it is absolutely believed by my Government, that any modification, as such, to the pending treaty could not be safely submitted to the present Senate. The intense feeling over large sections of the United States in favor of the Nicaragua route on the one hand and interests on the other hand hostile to any canal at all, and especially the Panama route, are circumstances that, I fear, your excellency's Government and the people of Colombia have not weighed sufficiently to attach to them the importance they deserve. While my previous notes may have expressed an almost exaggerated desire to impress upon your excellency the dangers of delay or modification of any kind, they were inspired by a full knowledge of conditions in my own country, which I feared would not be fully appreciated in Colombia. The condition which appears to me to be absolute, at least, is that the proposed treaty should be ratified as it is, in good faith with my Government, or the opportunity will be lost for any later negotiations of any kind whatever. In my own behalf, I most earnestly desire to assure your excellency that, aside from fulfilling the instructions of my Government, I have the deepest personal concern in the honor and glory of the country to which I am accredited, and in which I have been extended so much kindness and consideration. Every conviction of my mind leads me to the belief that enormous aggrandizement must accrue to Colombia if an interoceanic canal be constructed through her territory, while the desire to bring the two countries into closer and lasting friendship is ever present. Feeling thus deeply every effort I may have made, or shall make to this end, has or will have as its incentive the ultimate good not only of the country which I represent but of that in which I have the privilege and pleasure of residing. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew, etc. (Signed) Mr. Loomis to Mr. Beaupré. [Telegram.] A. M. BEAUPRÉ. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Keep the Department advised and embody date in messages. August 12, 7 p. m. The treaty was rejected by the Senate to-day in its entirety. Confidential. Do not accept this as final. There is still some hope. Wait for further advices. BEAUPRÉ. Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, Bogotá, August 12, 1903. (Received 23.) August 12, 9 p. m. Referring to my telegram of August 12, 7 p. m., I do not believe that rejection of treaty is final, for the following reasons: Yesterday's debate and vote was undoubtedly previously arranged. This I believe both from the tone of the debate and from information which I had already received through persons of high influence. Debate lasted five hours. All communications between myself and the Colombian Government read. The fact that the Government of the United States can not accept modifications or delay was made clear to the Senate. The most important speech made was that of General Ospina. It was to the effect that while desiring canal he could not give his vote for the ratification of the treaty because the terms were contrary to the provisions of the constitution. He implied that to bring negotiations to a conclusion the constitution should be modified, so as to allow negotiations to be brought to a successful conclusion without prejudice to the honor of the country. He stated also that to effect this no delay was necessary, as two debates will be sufficient for the purpose; he intimated that the Congress should be immediately dismissed by a decree for the purpose of modifying the constitution. Upon that a new law will be passed authorizing the Executive, without further recourse to Congress, to conclude a canal treaty with the United States. Should this prove true the text of the present treaty could be accepted without hesitation. By this means Congress will be able to conclude negotiations without individual senators publicly speaking in favor of it. Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] BEAUPRÉ. UNITED STATES LEGATION, Bogotá, August 12, 1903. (Received 19.) August 12, 10 p. m. Confidential. General Reyes called to inform me that this day's action of Congress was in accordance with plans perfected by the Government and influential Senators and citizens in the belief that the treaty could not now be passed without amendments, but that within a very short time such a reaction in public sentiment can be created as will enable the President to present the treaty again to the Senate and secure its passage without amendments. I have been aware of such a movement for some days, hence my telegram advising that there was still hope. General Reyes asks if you will give two weeks more for the consummation of this plan before taking other action, and requests immediate reply. He doubts whether the constitution can be amended in time, and thinks it is not necessary. Mr. Loomis to Mr. Beaupré. [Telegram.] BEAUPRÉ. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, August 13, 1903. Have you received Department cable of July 31? Amendments suggested in your cable of the 5th would be fatal to treaty. No. 105.] LOOMIS. Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: I have the honor to report that the most intensely critical period for the canal treaty seems to have passed, and that now there is some hope for a satisfactory conclusion. Since the rejection of the treaty on the 12th instant there has been an almost hysterical condition of alarm and uncertainty in Bogota as to the future action of the United States. Yesterday there was a widely circulated report that United States troops had landed on the Isthmus. When, finally, large posters were put up all over the city, announcing that because of a desire to maintain the most cordial relations with the United States, a joint committee would be appointed by Congress to confer as to the way and means of an agreement for the construction of a canal, I am certain that there was a genuine feeling of relief. དUས, I uCCIHHHHH་༥ སJOII W COHISC OI спст it might seriously lessen my popularity here, less viewed in the light of the exigency and d in my two notes of the 5th instant and one inister for foreign affairs. These notes were I could make them, with no attempt to dise fact that there was no probability that the ld accept the amendments proposed by the not I was justified in writing such strong e light of events, for they accomplished what , and no other course could have prevented t of the committee. rs and members of Congress are expressing they term my dictatorial attitude, but I do not rovided a satisfactory treaty is finally ratified, e. n on the 12th instant no one in authority Aside from the tone of the public debate, to the public, the Senators had come to an ore as to the policy to be pursued. Because f the amendments proposed, it seems to have se in charge (and I was so informed about the the present state of public opinion, to reject ate, and then, believing that there would be opinion, to resort to some coup to get the ress and pass it. er of getting at this has not been definitely - various ideas of ways and means. hairman of the new committee, stated to a that the main objections to the treaty rested tional grounds. That the treaty was not trary to law 2 of 1886 and law 153 of 1887. ld recommend an annulment of these laws, mit the ratification of the treaty, with some Hed to soothe the apparent inconsistency of action of the 12th instant was taken on the ommittee, and the majority report could still deration had. ator and lawyer of reputation, says that the ional, except with reference to the appointribunals on the isthmus, which is not highly necessary to annul laws, because the treaty perseding law if passed; that the only thing ough votes to pass the treaty when it again owever, and the one most generally talked of oted, is to frame a law authorizing the executhe negotiations for a canal without further Whatever may be the means determined upon, it is altogether probable that the report of the joint committee will be passed when presented. There is a seeming of good intentions in this movement, and yet I can not forget that there has never been a favorable word said for the treaty in the Senate, nor in fact has it been discussed at all, and there is little evidence of a desire to treat the matter with open good faith to the United States. The first weeks of the session were devoted to the discussion of the question as to whether the vice-president must sign the treaty before it was considered by the Senate. In other words, an attempt of the vice president's political enemies to place the responsibility for the negotiations upon him, which he declined to assume. When this point was settled to the satisfaction of the Government and the burden was apparently placed upon Congress, came the appointment of the special committee of one member from each of the nine departments of the Republic, who consumed nearly three weeks in their deliberations, and then reported recommending the nine amendments, which I immediately cabled to you. The first (and only) debate upon the committee's report occurred on the 12th instant, and that you may understand how the matter has been treated I will give a summary of that day's proceedings: Senator Marroquin (son of the vice-president) moved that the debate be preceded by the reading of the correspondence which had passed between the United States minister and the minister for foreign affairs on the canal negotiations. Senator Caro gave notice of a law he would move, containing two clauses, viz: (1) To reject the Hay-Herran treaty. (2) That the United States Government be informed that the Congress of Colombia meant no manifestation of hostility by this act, nor any antagonism to the construction of a canal by the United States. The correspondence above referred to was then read. My memorandum and notes, in which I pointed out that the Colombian Government did not apparently realize the gravity of the situation, and that if Colombia should now reject the treaty or unduly delay its ratification the friendly understanding between the two countries would be so seriously compromised that action might be taken by our Congress next winter which every friend of Colombia would regret, was received with loud murmurs of disapproval by the densely packed gallery. The minister for foreign affairs' replies, read mostly by himself, were, on the other hand, greeted with applause. Besides the above, the tenor of my notes was (a) that any modifications would be fatal; (b) that any modifications affecting the arrangements with the Panama Canal and Railway companies would not be accepted. The minister's replies were to the effect that the Government was bound to submit the treaty to the Congress, and that in the event of its not passing that body he understood that the United States would proceed to the negotiation with Nicaragua; but that he did not see that the refusal to ratify the treaty could in any way alter the friendly relations existing between Colombia and the United States. Senator Caro vehemently attacked the Government for its attitude in the conducting of the negotiations. He taunted the minister for foreign affairs for his action in having the correspondence between the |