proposed that the discussion of the whole matter be postponed indefinitely, as there was no time for the Senate to discuss it. The Senators appeared to agree to the proposal, but the presiding officer closed the debate without vote having been taken. Action may be taken to-morrow or, as is also probable, the matter may be allowed to drop entirely. Congress will adjourn on the 31st instant. Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, BEAUPRÉ. Bogotá, October 29, 1903. (Received 6.55 p. m., November 6.) October 29, 1 p. m. Please give instructions to consul-general at Panama keep me advised by cable matters of consequence. BEAUPRÉ. Mr. Hay to Mr. Beaupré [Telegram.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, October 30, 1903. You may avail yourself of leave of absence under authorization cabled to you July 9. Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] UNITED STATES LEGATION AT BOGOTÁ, HAY. October 31, 1903. (Received November 6, 1903.) Congress adjourned to-day. No action has been taken upon the last report concerning the canal. Therefore nothing more than the vote of August 12 rejecting treaty done. The people here in great anxiety over conflicting reports of secession movements in the Cauca and Panama. BEAUPRÉ. Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, Bogotá, November 1, 1903. (Received 7.15 p. m., November 8.) November 1, 10 a. m. The Government issued manifesto to the nation to-day severely criticising acts of Congress and discussing important questions which have been presented and unsatisfactorily dealt with. With regard to canal, states that Colombian chargé d'affaires has been instructed to inform the Government of the United States that the Colombian Government would consider new negotiations, which it is believed will be accepted by the next session of Congress. Therefore, if the Government of the United States still desires to open canal, which it is presumed that it does, as neither by act nor word has it shown any other intention, it is to be hoped that the great work will be carried out in the end through Colombian territory. I took the opportunity of informal visit to the President yesterday to inform him of substance your cipher telegram October 22. BEAUPRÉ. No. 199.] Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: I have the honor to report that the extraordinary session of the Colombian Congress was adjourned at half past 2 o'clock on Saturday, the 31st ultimo. In so far as the Hay-Herran treaty for the construction of a Panama Canal is concerned, the only definite and recorded action of this Congress is the vote taken on August 12, 1903, rejecting that treaty. Under article 76 of the Colombian constitution, Congress can exercise its functions in certain cases by the enactment of laws, and in that way only. Thus it is that when such matters are presented, whether by individual members, ministers of the Government, or by committees, they are accompanied by what is termed "projects of law." Under section 20 of said article 76 of the constitution, the Congress, by making a law for that purpose, may "approve or disapprove the treaties entered into by the Government with foreign powers." The vote taken in the Senate on August 12, 1903, rejecting the treaty, is not understood to have been a legal or constitutional disapproval of that pact. It was, in effect, an expression of opinion; but since no other action on this question was taken, and the treaty was not approved within the time fixed for the exchange of ratifications, it has died by limitation rather than by any legal enactment of the Colombian Congress. It has been understood for some time that in all probability no further action would be taken by Congress in this matter, and when it was finally brought up in the last days before adjournment it was more for the purpose of giving vent to individual opinion than anything else. On Tuesday, the 27th ultimo, the report of the committee on the project of law authorizing the President to negotiate for the construction of an interoceanic canal was brought before the Senate for discussion. Four senators spoke during the debate. Senator Caro opposed it on the ground that to grant an authorization to the Government to conclude a treaty, on certain bases, was an absurdity. It was impossible to limit the power of the Executive, who could conclude any treaty it pleased and submit it to the next Congress. This project of law was, moreover, an unconstitutiona one, as this Congress had no right to arrogate to itself the powers and privileges which would legitimately fall to its successor. He then turned to the attitude of the senate on the canal question. It had been correct on the main point from the beginning. Mistakes there had been, but they were mistakes of which the Government and not the senate had been guilty. The first great error had been the reading of the correspondence which had passed between the United States minister and the minister for foreign affairs prior to the rejection of the treaty. It had made it appear as if the Senate had rejected the treaty as a protest against the attitude of the United States, and this was tantamount to a reflection on the conduct of President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, under whose instructions their representative in Bogota had acted. This was how the matter had been viewed in the United States. In support of this statement he quoted various extracts taken from United States newspapers. Among these was an interview by Walter Wellman, who, Senator Caro stated, was well aware of the opinions held by the Department of State. He then emphatically stated that the reading of the American minister's notes had nothing to do with the action taken by the Senate with regard to the Hay-Herran treaty. The Senate rejected that treaty because its terms were a violation of the constitution and harmful to the interests of the Republic. No reflection could be cast on that body for its action, but the minister for foreign affairs, in causing the notes to be read, had made it appear that the Senate was actuated by motives which did not exist. The second great error committed by the Government was the appointment of Señor Obaldia to the governorship of the Department of Panama. The election of General Reyes to the Presidency of Colombia meant the election of a Congress next year pledged to pass whatever canal treaty the Government should present. Señor Obaldia was therefore a supporter of the candidacy of General Reyes, and it was for this reason that he was appointed governor of the Isthmus. But Señor Obaldia was before all an isthmanian, and he was known to have said that should the department rise in favor of the canal he would be with Panama. Therefore the Government had for electioneering purposes endangered their possession of the Isthmus. He read to the Senate an extract from the New York Herald, containing an interview with Governor Obaldia, in which the above-mentioned facts were stated, and in which Señor Obaldia said that, before leaving Bogota, he had had several interviews with the American minister, to whom he had communicated these facts, which Mr. Beaupré had doubtless telegraphed to his Government. The reading of this extract caused much excitement. Senator Caro pointed out that whatever the views of President Roosevelt may be, this much was certain, he had no intention of adopting the Nicaragua route. The only possible explanation of the present inactive attitude of the United States Government was that events on the Isthmus were being watched. Senator Caro then, for the first time, openly attacked the policy of the United States Government. Colombia was told that the construction of the canal was essential to the commerce and, therefore, to the progress of the world, and that she should not, therefore, stand in the way of so important an undertaking merely because of the loss of sovereignty over a small strip of territory. But why, he asked, did the United States wish to deprive Colombia of her sovereignty? It was because the United States wanted the canal for themselves, and not for commerce and civilization. Senator Rivas Groot, who had reported to the Senate against the granting of authorization to the Government to conclude a canal treaty, then spoke, supporting the views expressed by Senator Caro. Senator Pedro Nel Ospina's speech was devoted to an explanation and defense of the law of authorization which he had drawn up. Neither of these speeches had any special significance. The day's debate was, however, closed with an important speech by Senator Arrango, which was the outcome of a tacit understanding with the majority of his colleagues. He pointed out that this project of law, worded in general terms, authorizing the President to conclude a canal treaty with a foreign power or company, was a clumsy attempt to befog the real issue. It was perfectly well known that a canal, if constructed at all, would have to be constructed by the United States Government, and it would, therefore, be more straightforward to frankly own that fact instead of vaguely talking of foreign powers and companies. When the Hay-Herran treaty was brought forward for discussion it was believed that the Senate would be willing to ratify the treaty, with essential modifications. The United States minister had, however, made it clear that his Government would not accept these modifications, and it was, therefore, decided to reject the treaty. Now, this project of law was nothing more or less than the Hay-Herran treaty, with the modifications necessary to have rendered it acceptable to the Senate. If this was the course proposed, it would be a more reasonable policy to reconsider the Hay-Herran treaty, put in the modifications desired by the Senate, and return it, thus amended, to the United States Government for their consideration. An important event had, however, occurred, which rendered any consideration of the canal question useless. The vice-president had decided to dissolve Congress on the 31st instant. There remained, therefore, no time for deliberation, and the only possible course for the Senate to adopt was to decide on the indefinite suspension of any further discussion regarding the canal question. The Senate then adjourned. On the following day, the 28th ultimo, news of an insurrectionary outbreak in the Department of Panama leaked out, and three members of the cabinet were summoned to the Senate for the purpose of eliciting information on the subject. On the arrival of the minister of war, however, the Senate was declared in secret session. It was given out that the trouble on the Isthmus consisted merely of an invasion of 70 men from Nicaragua. The president of the Senate, however, informed me that there was much anxiety, both on the part of the Government and Congress, as to the turn events were taking on the Isthmus. The session of the 29th occupied itself with the passing of laws of minor importance and routine work. On Friday, the 30th, the Panama Canal question was treated for the last time. The Senate unanimously resolved to adopt the course proposed by Senator Arrango in his speech of the 27th, which was to indefinitely suspend the consideration of the matter. The Government thus remains with its ordinary authority to treat the question afresh, subject to the approval of a future Congress. Senator Caro spoke with some heat to the effect that the Government had rendered it impossible for the Congress to carry out its work by introducing extra laws which had not been treated of in the message, and then cutting short the deliberations of the legislative body. Saturday, the 31st ultimo, was the last day of Congress. The members of the Senate met in the forenoon, and the minister of war, who had been specially summoned, was present. He was again questioned, this time publicly, as to the state of affairs in the Department of Panama. The telegram received from Governor Obaldia had, it appeared, been badly transmitted, but he gathered from the message that an invasion of 70 men from Nicaragua and a rising in the frontier province of Veraguas had occurred simultaneously. The secretary of the Senate informed me that in the telegram it was not clear whether the number of invaders was 70 or 700, most probably the latter, and that the feeling of unrest in the Department of Panama was great. The Senate rose at 11 a. m., and did not return in the afternoon to receive the President's message closing Congress. The Chamber of Representatives remained sitting until half past 2 o'clock p. m., when Congress was declared officially closed by the vicepresident. Yesterday the Government issued a manifesto to the nation, which has been published and posted on the streets this morning. It severely criticises the action of Congress, and especially that of the Senate, which latter body has wasted its time in attacks on the Executive instead of devoting itself to the consideration of measures necessary to the well-being of the country. As regards the canal, it states that the Government has decided to resume negotiations in the hopes of being able to come to a fresh agreement which shall meet with the approval of the next Congress, and that the Colombian chargé d'affaires at Washington has been instructed to convey this information to the Government of the United States. I am, sir, your obedient servant, A. M. BEAUPRÉ. Mr. Beaupré to Mr. Hay. No. 207.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: The manifesto issued by the Government of Colombia to the nation on the 1st instant, the day after the closing of Congress, is interesting as a declaration of attitude and policy. The Government makes reference, in the first place, to the difficulties it had to encounter on first taking charge of the administration; difficulties with the revolution on one hand and with the administration on the other. By difficulties with the administration was evidently meant, though not actually stated, the equivocal position in which the Government found itself after the coup d'état of the 31st of July, 1900. Moreover, the revolutionary party was in a strong position, as it could count on many elements and on the material help of friends outside the country. With the termination of the revolution, the difficulties to be faced by the Government were by no means at an end. The country was suffering from stagnation in its industries, paralyzation of its commerce, the innumerable difficulties created by a depreciated currency, penury of the treasury, and a general demoralization. In the midst of all these difficulties most governors would have been sorely tempted to dictatorially take matters into their own hands, |