Express Appointment.-Where an agent acts in accordance with the definite instructions of his principal, the principal's consent is, of course, apparent.

An appointment in writing is always advisable, since it is less open to misunderstandings than an oral one.

But authority to execute any contract, which requires a seal to make it binding, can only be given to an agent in writing, signed and sealed by the principal.

For example: an agent with authority to sell land for A, could not give a valid deed of it, without an appointment for this purpose in writing, signed and sealed by A, unless the deed is signed and delivered in A's presence.

Even if a principal should acknowledge that his agent had sufficient authority to execute a deed, probably this deed would not be binding on the principal, unless the agent's authority was given under seal.

A vote of a corporation, however, is a sufficient authority for its agent to execute a deed binding the corporation.

Implied Appointment.-If one allows another to act for him without interfering, an implied agency is created, and the principal is bound by the acts of such an agent.

For example: the agent of an express company used to get a bookseller, who occupied the same store with him, to receipt for packages left when he was out; this practice was known to the superintendent of the company, and the company was held liable on a receipt signed by the bookseller.

So, too, an implied agency may be created in case of great necessity. Thus, in case of a railroad accident, the conductor would have an implied authority to bind the company for the physicians whom he summoned. Or the master of a vessel, in case of disaster, could bind the owners by contracts made to save their property.

Any act done by one in the name of another, may be afterwards ratified by that other, thus making himself liable as for an act of an authorized agent, even though at the time the agent was acting without authority. But the principal must have a knowledge of all the facts connected with the agent's act in order to make his ratification good. This ratification need not be made expressly, but may be inferred from the principal's conduct or from his silence.

A wife can bind her husband only as his agent, acting with his express or implied authority. She has a presumptive authority to purchase necessaries for herself and family, unless her husband himself provides them. But he may direct how and where these should be bought.

If they separate through the husband's fault, the wife carries with her this implied authority to bind him for necessaries; and he cannot relieve himself from his liability by advertising that he will not pay. But if the separation happened through her fault, she would lose her authority.

A father is bound to support his minor children, and is, therefore, bound by their contracts for the necessaries of life. But the child's authority is more strictly construed than is the wife's; and if the father has made provision, this implied authority is gone.

If a boy is driven away from home, he still has this implied authority. But if he leaves of his own accord, or is given his time, he probably loses it altogether.

A father is not bound to support his step-children; but, if he does, then they are in the same position as his own.

A father is not liable for injuries done to another or to another's property by his children, unless he commands them or afterwards approves of their acts.

A father has a right to his minor child's services and earnings, unless he has emancipated the child. He may sue for loss of service, if the child is injured by third persons; but the child must be old enough to render some service, otherwise the father has no ground on which to base his claim for damages.

A widow probably has the same relation to their children as did her deceased husband.

Extent of an Agent's Authority. Within the limits of his employment the acts of an agent are, in legal effect, the acts of his principal. But as soon as he goes outside of these limits, he ceases to represent his principal.

If he is employed to manage some department or interest of his principal's business with, at least apparently, discretionary powers in conducting the affairs of that part of the business, he is a general agent. Any act of his, which is fairly within the authority usual to

his position, will bind his principal, even though contrary to the principal's instructions.

For example: managers of branch stores, agents of corporations, etc. Even clerks in stores may be general agents to sell, according to the authority given them.

But if he is an agent for some particular purpose, without any apparent discretionary powers, then any act done outside the actual authority given him will not bind his principal. Any one dealing with such an agent should ascertain the extent of his authority, or take the risk of being able to hold his principal accountable.

Thus, a drummer, whose duty is to solicit orders for goods, has no authority to warrant them, unless that is the custom with that particular class of goods.

If an agent is acting under written instructions from his principal, and this fact is known to the party with whom he deals, his authority will be strictly limited to these instructions.

The agent is bound to do personally the duty for which he is employed, unless it becomes necessary from the nature of the business, or is the general custom in that particular kind of business, to employ sub-agents. But he is personally responsible for his sub-agent's acts.

A Principal's Liability to Persons Dealing with his Agent. As already explained, the agent must act within the authority given him to render the principal liable at all to a third

person.

Thus, authority to collect a debt is authority to take cash only; or authority to sell is not authority to give credit.

In any written contract under seal, unless the principal, and not his agent, appears as the contracting party, and unless the deed is acknowledged in his name, he can neither be held liable on it, nor enforce it himself.

Where negotiable paper is signed by an agent, the principal must clearly appear by the face of the instrument to be the party promising, in order to be held liable on it.

For example: a note, signed "A- B—, Agent," would not bind the principal, the word "Agent" being considered merely a description; were it signed "A- B—, Agent of C— D—," it would not probably bind C-D—; but if A― B— promised in the note,

or signed himself, "Agent for C— D—," or "as Agent of C— D—,” C— D- would be liable.

In all other simple contracts, however, the principal's name need not appear at all. Here it is simply a question whether the agent acted within the scope of his authority, or not. If he did, then the principal becomes the real contracting party, and his rights and liabilities are fixed accordingly.

As a general rule, too, the principal is liable on, and can enforce, such contracts, even though the person dealing with the agent did not know who his principal was.

If, however, the other party, not knowing that he was dealing with an agent, had a claim against the agent, he could set this claim off against a claim of the principal founded on the agent's act.

Or, if the other party should make a payment to an agent, honestly supposing him to be his own principal, the real principal could not make this other pay a second time. But, if the other party knew he was dealing with the agent of somebody, he would make a payment to such an agent with the risk of having to pay again to the principal.

If the agent acts with apparent but no real authority, of course the principal is not bound by such acts, nor does he gain any rights on his side. But he may ratify these acts, and he then assumes the position of principal.

A principal is liable for any fraud, deceit, negligence, or wilful misconduct of his agent, committed while acting fairly within the limits of his agency.

A very common example is that of a railroad accident, caused by the carelessness or misconduct of the company's employees. The company is liable for the injuries to the passengers.

But there is always a practical difficulty in finding whether the act causing the injury is within the scope of the agent's employment. If it is not, even though committed with an honest intention to further his employer's interests, the principal is not responsible.

An Agent's Own Liability for his Acts. — Where a contract clearly shows the intention of the agent to bind his principal, generally he cannot himself be held liable on it.

But where a contract is made in his own "Agent" is added, he will be personally liable.

name, even though He will also be re

sponsible, if the party dealing with him had reasonable cause to believe him his own principal, or if there is a general custom to hold a party making such a contract personally liable.

Of course, if he is his own principal, or if he acts without authority, he will be liable.

A contract might, perhaps, be made, which would bind neither the principal nor agent if the agent acted under an honestly mistaken authority.

If an agent does not disclose his principal's identity, a party dealing with him may choose between him and his agent, but can only enforce his claim against one of them.

On the other hand, wherever an agent would be held liable on a contract, he could probably himself enforce it against the other party, unless his principal had done so already.

The Liability of Employers. As already seen, the relation of principal and agent is created by contract, either express or implied. Accordingly, where there has been no previous agreement as to pay, an agent is entitled to reasonable compensation.

If an agent, while honestly attending to his principal's apparently lawful business, injures some third person, he must be indemnified by his employer for any damages recovered from him by this third person. He must also be indemnified for expenses or losses fairly incurred in the discharge of his duties.

Thus, if A orders one of his employees to cut trees on a certain piece of land, apparently owned by A, and it turns out that B owns the land, and B prosecutes the employee for trespass, the employee can claim of A the amount of damages recovered from him by B.

Probably more litigation arises at the present time over the question of an employer's liability for accidents caused by the negligence of his employees, than from any other one source. It follows from statements already made that, if the accident is caused by the negligence of an employee while acting within the scope of his employment, his negligence is his employer's negligence, and the latter is liable for injuries occasioned thereby. Whether the employee was so acting, is often a delicate question of fact, dependant on the peculiar circumstances of each case.

Towards his own employees, an employer's liability is not so