Liberty and Johnsville to Uniontown, still further east; the Fifth from Ballinger's Creek via Frederick and Mount Pleasant to Liberty; and the Sixth, following Gregg's cavalry, went from Hyattstown via New Market and Ridgeville, to New Windsor. The outer line of the great fan, it will thus be seen, extended from Emmittsburg on the left to New Windsor on the right-the First Corps under Reynolds forming the left of the army, and the Sixth under Sedgwick its right. This was the position of the Army of the Potomac on the evening of Monday, June 29th, the night before the concentration of Lee's forces began in the direction of Gettysburg.

Tuesday, 30. The First Corps on this day started from Emmittsburg for Gettysburg, but hearing that the enemy were reported to be upon the Fairfield road, General Reynolds halted it at Marsh Creek. The Third Corps marched from Taneytown in the direction of Emmittsburg, and encamped at Bridgeport; the Twelfth Corps marched from the same place, and rested over night at Littlestown; the Fifth Corps from Liberty ria Johnsville, Union Bridge, and Union to Union Mills; and the Sixth went from New Windsor to Manchester. The Artillery Reserve moved from Bruceville to Taneytown. Gregg's cavalry division left Westminster and proceeded to Manchester, and Kilpatrick's division went from Littlestown to Hanover to intercept Stuart. Stuart, who had bivouacked over night at Union Mills, midway between Westminster and Littlestown, hearing that Kilpatrick was at the last named place waiting for him, attempted to avoid an encounter by going through cross roads to Hanover, but Kilpatrick, who was aware of this change, anticipated him and reached that

place first. When Stuart arrived at about ten o'clock in the forenoon, a desperate engagement, which lasted four hours, ensued between Kilpatrick and the Confederate rear under General Wade Hampton. Both sides claim the victory in this engagement; the Confederates, however, were driven further northward.

When at Hanover, Stuart was but twelve miles from Gettysburg, and fourteen from York. Ignorant of the concentration of the Confederate army at the first named place, and expecting to unite with Early at York, as he says General Lee directed, and unaware that Early was then en route from that place to Gettysburg, he pressed on further northward, crossing the tracks of both White's battalion of cavalry and Early's whole division, and yet failed to ascertain the departure of these troops, or the course they had taken. Had he known of Early's departure from York, and the direction he had taken, he could have effected a junction with him before sundown somewhere about East Berlin.* Or had he fallen in with White's battalion, which on that day had gone by the York pike toward Gettysburg, he could have joined it and reached the Confederate advance at Marsh Creek that same night. But he was ignorant of the movements of these two commands, and they were equally ignorant of his approach, for no notice, such as it is alleged General Lee had promised to send Early, had reached him. Had Early known that Stuart had taken the circuitous route around the Federal army, he might have been on the look-out for him, but he was also ignorant

*Colonel W. H. Swallow, in the Southern Bivouac of November, 1885, page 365.

of this. Indeed at one time on that day Stuart was within seven miles of Early's infantry-the latter actually hearing his guns-and yet they were mutually ignorant of each other's proximity. Surely the people who resided in that neighborhood must have been very loyal to their government, and known how to keep their own counsels, or Stuart failed to interrogate them.

At a late hour this day Stuart learned that Early had left York, but was misinformed as to the direction he had taken. He was told that he had gone in the direction of Shippensburg. Misled by this report, he abandoned his design upon York, and turned the head of his column in the direction he supposed Early had gone. Encamping over night somewhere west of York, he resumed his march next morning, and passing through Dillsburg and Churchtown, reached Carlisle in the evening. Here he was surprised to hear that Rodes had marched in the direction of Gettysburg, and the town was in possession of Pennsylvania and New York militia- men under General Smith, who had advanced that day from Harrisburg. After demanding the surrender of the town, and throwing a few shells into it, and burning the United States barracks situated outside of the place, he hastily left and hurriedly made his way to Gettysburg, which he reached in the evening of the ensu ing day. And this was the bold rider who was to "harass and impede" the patriot army in case it should “attempt to cross the Potomac" in pursuit of the invaders of its soil, and the would-be destroyers of its government.

The cavalry brigades of Gamble and Devin, under the command of General Buford, which had rested over night near Fairfield, after their reconnoissance west of the moun

FEDERAL ARMY PREPARING TO CONCENTRATE.

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tain the previous day, marched by way of Emmittsburg to Gettysburg, and proceeding westwardly on the pike leading to Chambersburg, encamped over night about one mile and a half from the town.

Aware of the fact that indications pointed to a probable collision with the Confederate army in a short time, General Meade, soon after assuming command of the army, directed General Reynolds to proceed to Gettysburg and report to him the character of the ground there, at the same time ordering General Humphreys to examine the ground in the vicinity of Emmittsburg. These precautions were taken, not with the purpose to halt the army there and wait for an attack, but to be prepared for any emergency which might arise,-the army in the meantime still pressing forward. On the night of Tuesday, 30th, information reached head-quarters that Lee was concentrating his army east of the mountain in the vicinity of Gettysburg, and General Meade, "ignorant of the nature of the ground in front of him, at once instructed his engineers to select some ground having a general reference to the existing position of the army, which he might occupy by rapid movements of concentration, and thus give battle on his own terms, in case the enemy should advance across the South Mountain. The general line of Pipe Creek was selected, and a preliminary order of instructions issued to the corps commanders, informing them of the fact, and explaining how they might move their corps and concentrate in a good position along the line." * These were but ordinary precautions, which any commander, who had any reasonable sense of the responsibili

* Colonel James G. Biddle, in Annals of the War, pages 208, 209.

ties of his position, would have taken, and yet they have been made the ground of an accusation that General Meade contemplated a retreat from Gettysburg to the position selected at Pipe Creek. This accusation does great injustice to General Meade, and the fact that he was nct unduly committed to that line, nor unwilling to meet the enemy elsewhere, is proven by General Humphreys, who says that in the instructions issued to the corps commanders relating to the line of Pipe Creek, it was expressly declared that "Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions." A very few hours after these instructions were issued, circumstances did cause a change. General Meade himself says: "It was my firm determination, never for an instant deviated from, to give battle wherever and as soon as I could possibly find the enemy."

Simultaneously with the issuing of the instructions to the corps commanders regarding Pipe Creek, General Meade circulated the following timely order:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

June 30th, 1863.

The commanding general requests that previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers will address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in the struggle. The enemy are on our soil; the whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe; our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling millions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of this army. Homes, firesides, and domestic altars, are involved. The army has fought well heretofore; it is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever, if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty this hour. By command of

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General.