THE CRISIS OF HISTORY.

443

for an aggressive movement until he had further tested the matter, and in the seemingly justifiable delay the opportunity for its successful accomplishment passed away. Perhaps he acted wisely in not putting in jeopardy all he had already gained, but great results are seldom gained except by great risks. Had Grant, or Sherman, or Sheridan, or some other commander been in General Meade's position, the risk might have been taken, and the results might have justified it. If failure had followed, their names would not shine as brightly in history as does that of General George G. Meade.

The battle of Gettysburg, as is universally conceded, was the turning point in the great war of the rebellion, for from it the ultimate failure of the cause for which the South fought was assured. And as that battle was the culmination, the crisis of the war, so the last great effort of the Confederate chieftain, when he hurled fifteen thousand of his choicest troops against the Federal line, was the culmination, the supreme crisis of that battle. The rebellion at that point reached its high-water mark, and from that period it gradually receded. That charge, then, was the supreme crisis in our country's history, and the turning point in its destiny. It failed, and with its failure the fact was demonstrated that a government founded upon oppression and wrong, could not succeed in the light of the civilization and Christianity of this age. The Republic was saved, redeemed, baptized, and consecrated anew to the coming ages.

It is a singular coincidence that the rebellion should receive its most decisive defeat in the east and west at the same time; for the same shadow on the dial which marked

the time of the crushing overthrow at Gettysburg, also indicated a similar event in the great drama twelve hundred miles away at Vicksburg.

The casualties of the two armies during the three days of battle, are officially stated by a publication from the adjutant - general's office, Washington, bearing date, 1886, as follows:

CASUALTIES OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

It will be seen in the foregoing, that the losses of the Confederates at this battle, contrary to the general opinion,

Aggregate.

Aggregate.

THE LOSSES OF THE ARMIES.

445

were less than those of the Federals. The records of prisoners of war on file in the office of the Adjutant - General of the United States Army bear the names of twelve thousand two hundred and twenty-seven wounded and unwounded Confederates captured by the Federal forces at and about Gettysburg from July 1st to the 5th inclusive. This large number of prisoners, in connection with the fact that the number of casualties reported by the Confederate officers does not entirely harmonize with those of the medical director, whose estimate is thus given, leads to the inference that the report is not entirely correct. It may be safely assumed, I think, that the losses of the two armies were about equal.

CHAPTER IX.

RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

HE Confederate army had remaining fit for duty, at the close of the battle of Gettysburg, about fifty thousand men. This force, with its ammunition nearly exhausted, with its immense trains, amidst a terrific rain storm, which swelled the streams and made the roads almost impassable, with a hostile people all about it, and a swollen and impassable river in its rear, was about to be withdrawn from the presence of its victorious enemy and make its way back to Virginia, from which it had come. The distance it had to traverse by the route it chose-by Monterey Pass and Hagerstown to Williamsport-was about forty miles. The task, it will readily be seen, was an exceedingly difficult one, and could not have been made except at a great loss, had the pursuit been vigorous and determined as it should have been.

The Federal army had remaining fit for duty, at the close of the battle, about seventy-two thousand men. This force, with its ammunition somewhat exhausted, but an inexhaustible supply near at hand, elated with victory, in the midst of its friends, and with reinforcements nearly equal in number to its own that could have been called upon for assistance, was about to be employed according

FEDERAL RESOURCES AFTER THE BATTLE.

447

to the best judgment of its commander, in preventing the escape of its enemy. That it should have succeeded in effecting this all-important object, with all these advantages, will scarcely be denied.

In addition to the seventy-two thousand who remained of the Army of the Potomac at the close of the great struggle at Gettysburg, there were available and within reach, the following troops: In the defenses of Washington and Baltimore probably from fifty thousand to sixty thousand; * General Couch's emergency men about Carlisle and Pine Grove, two divisions under Generals Dana and Smith, about twenty thousand; French's division at Frederick and Tennallytown, ten thousand; Milroy's refugees in Bedford and Fulton counties, about three thousand; and several thousand under General Kelly in West Virginia. By a proper use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad a force equal and probably superior in numbers to Lee's, could and should have been drawn from Baltimore, Washington, and West Virginia, and placed upon the south bank of the Potomac. This would have effectually prevented the enemy from recrossing that river. Couch's two divisions could and should have been ordered at an earlier period to advance to the vicinity of Hagerstown, where Milroy's men from the west of the mountain, could have joined them. Thus hemmed in on every side, with a vigorous pursuit made by the army under General Meade, either upon the line the enemy took, or the longer one which Meade chose, the destruction or capture of Lee's army must have ensued. But these combinations were

*General Pleasanton, in Annals of the War, page 458, says that there were at that time seventy thousand troops in the defenses of Washington alone.