CHAP. XXII.

Of Pre-conceptions.

§. 1. PRE-CONCEPTIONS* are common

to all Men: and one Pre-conception doth not contradict another. For, who of us doth not lay it down as a maxim, That Good is advantageous and eligible, and at all events, to be pursued and followed: that Justice is fair and becoming? Whence, then, arises the dispute?—In adapting these Preconceptions to particular Cases. As, when one cries; "Such a person hath acted well: he is a gallant Man:" and another; "No; he hath acted like a fool." Hence arises

the dispute among men. This is the dispute between Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians, and Romans: not whether sanctity be preferable to all things, and in every instance to be pursued; but whether the eating Swine's flesh be consistent with sanctity, or not. This, too, you will find to have been the dispute beeween Achilles and Agamem

See Introduction. §. 10.

non.

non. For, call them forth. What say you, Agamemnon? Ought not that to be done, which is fit and right?-Yes, surely.Achilles, what say you? Is it not agreeable to you, that what is right should be done?— Yes beyond every other thing. Adapt your Pre-conceptions, then. Here begins the dispute. One says; "It is not fit, that I should restore Chryseis to her Father." The other 66 says; Yes; but it is." One, or the other of them, certainly makes a wrong adaptation of the Pre-conception of fitness. Again: one says; "If it be fit, that I should give up Chryseis; it is fit, too, that I should take some one of your prizes." The other: What, that you should take my Mistress?" Aye: your's." "What, mine only? Must I only, then, lose my Prize?"

66

§. 2. What, then, is it to be properly educated? To learn how to adapt natural Pre-conceptions to particular Cases, conformably to Nature: and, for the future, to distinguish, that some things are in our Power; others not. In our own Power are Choice, and all Actions dependent on Choice: not in our Power, the Body, the parts of the Body, Property, Parents, Brothers, Children, Country; and, in short, all with whom we are engaged in Society.

Where,

Where, then, shall we place Good? To what kind of things shall we adapt the Preconception of it? To that in our own

Power.

§. 3. So, then! is not Health, and Strength, and Life, good? And are not Children, nor Parents, nor Country? Who will have Patience with you?

Let us transfer it, then, to the other sort of things. Can he who suffers Harm, and is disappointed of good things, be happy? He cannot.

And can he preserve a right behaviour with regard to Society? How is it possible he should? For I am naturally led to my own Interest. If, therefore, it is for my Interest, to have an Estate, it is for my Interest likewise to take it away from my Neighbour. If it is for If it is for my Interest to have a Suit of Clothes; it is for my Interest likewise to steal it wherever I find it*. Hence Wars, Seditions, Tyranny, unjust Invasions. How shall I, if this be the Case, be able, any longer, to preserve my Duty towards Jupiter? If I suffer Harm, and am disappointed, he takes no care of

* Wars and Fightings are ascribed to the same Causes, by St. James, iv. I.

me.

me.

And, what is Jupiter to me, if he cannot help me: or, again; what is he to me, if he chuses I should be in the Condition I am? Henceforward I begin to hate him. What, then, do we build Temples, do we raise Statues, to Jupiter, as to evil Demons, as to the goddess Fever? How at this rate, is he the Preserver; and how the Dispenser of Rain and Plenty? If we place the Essence of Good any-where here, all this will follow.-What, then, shall we do? §. 4. This is the enquiry of him who philosophizes in reality, and labours to bring forth (Truth). "Do not I now see what is good, and what is evil?" Surely I am in my senses. I place any-where Good side; in things dependent own Choice? Why, every one will laugh at me. Some grey-headed old Fellow will come, with his fingers covered with Gold Rings, and shake his Head, and say; "Hark ye, Child, it is fit you should learn Philosophy; but it is fit too, you should have Brains. This is nonsense. You learn Syl

Aye: but shall

on this other [only] on my

This seems intended to express the Perplexity of a Person convinced, that Good is not to be found in Externals; and afraid of popular Raillery, if he places it in such things only, as depend on our own Choice,

logisms

logisms from Philosophers: but how you are to act, you know better than they." "Then, why do you chide me, Sir, if I do know." What can I say to this Wretch? If I make no answer, he will burst. I must e'en answer thus: "Forgive me, as they do People in Love. I am not myself. I have lost my Senses."

CHAP. XXIII.

Against Epicurus.

§. 1. EVEN Epicurus is sensible, that we

are by Nature sociable: but having once placed our Good in the mere Shell, he can say nothing afterwards different from that. For, again, he strenuously maintains, that we ought not to admire, or receive, any thing separated from the Nature of Good. And he is in the right to maintain it. But how, then, came* any such suspicions [as your Doctrines imply, to arise], if we have

This Passage is obscure; and variously read, and explained by the Commentators. It is here translated conjecturally.

no