CHAP. XXVIII.

That we are not to be angry with Mankind. What Things are little, what great, among Men.

§. 1. WHAT is the Cause of Assent to

any thing?

Its appearing to be true.

It is not possible, therefore, to assent to what appears to be not true.

Why?

Because it is the very Nature of the Understanding to agree to Truth; to be dissatisfied with Falsehood: and to suspend its Belief, in doubtful Cases.

What is the Proof of this?

Persuade yourself, if you can, that it is now Night.

'Impossible.

Unpersuade yourself that it is Day.
Impossible.

Persuade yourself, that the Stars are, or are not, even.

Impossible.

§. 2. When any one, then, assents to what is false, be assured, that he doth not wilfully assent to it, as false (for, as Plato affirms, the Soul is never voluntarily depriv ed of Truth): but what is false, appears to him to be true. Well, then Have we, in Actions, any thing correspondent to True, and False, in Propositions?

Duty, and contrary to Duty: Advantageous, and Disadvantageous: Suitable, and Unsuitable; and the like.

A Person then, cannot think a Thing advantageous to him, and not chuse it.

He cannot. But how

But how says Medea?

"I know what Evils wait my dreadful Purpose;
"But vanquish'd Reason yields to powerful Rage."

Because she thought, that very Indulgence of her Rage, and the punishing her Husband, more advantageous than the Preservation of her Children.

Yes: but she is deceived.

Shew clearly to her, that she is deceived, and she will forbear: but, till you have shewn it, what is she to follow, but what appears to herself?

Nothing.

Why,

* with her,

Why, then, are you angry that the unhappy Woman is deceived, in the most important Points; and instead of a human Creature, becomes a Viper? Why do not you rather, as we pity the Blind and Lame, so likewise pity those who are blinded and lamed, in their superior Faculties? Whoever, therefore, duly remembers, that the Appearance of Things to the Mind is the Standard of every Action to Man: that this is either right or wrong: and, if right, he is without Fault; if wrong, he himself bears the Punishment: for that one Man cannot be the Person deceived, and another the Sufferer will not be outrageous and angry at any one; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, or quarrel with, any one.

§. 3. So then, Have all the great and dreadful Deeds, that have been done in the World, no other Original than Appear

ance ?

Absolutely, no other.

The Iliad con

sists of nothing but the Appearances [of Things to the Mind]; and the Use of those Appearances. It appeared [right] to Paris,

* See Note, p. 84. c. 18. §. 1.

to

to carry off the Wife of Menelaus. It appeared (right) to Helen, to follow him. If, then, it had appeared (right) to Menelaus, to persuade himself, that it was an Advantage to be robbed of such a Wife, what could have happened? Not only the Iliad had been lost, but the Odyssey too.

Do these great Events then, depend on so small a Cause?

What are these Events, which you call great?

Wars, and Seditions; the Destruction of Numbers of Men; and the Overthrow of Cities.

And what great matter is there in all this? Nothing. What great matter is there in the Death of Numbers of Oxen, Numbers of Sheep, or in the burning or pulling down Numbers of Nests of Storks or Swallows? Are these like Cases, then?

Perfectly like. The Bodies of Men are destroyed, and the Bodies of Sheep and Oxen. The Houses of men are burnt, and the Nests of Storks. What is there great or dreadful in all this? Pray, shew me what difference there is between the House of a Man, and the Nest of a Stork, so far as it

VOL. I.

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is

is a Habitation*, excepting that Houses are built with Beams, and Tiles, and Bricks; and Nests, with Sticks and Clay?

What, then, is a Stork and a Man a like thing? What do What do you mean?

With regard to Body, extremely like.

Is there no difference, then, between a Man and a Stork?

Yes, surely but not in these things.
In what then?

Enquire; and you will find, that the difference consists in something else. See whether it be not, in acting with Discernment: whether it be not, in a social Disposition; Fidelity, Honour, Steadiness, Judgment.

§. 4. Where then, is the great Good or Evil of Man?

Where his Difference is. If this is preserved, and remains well fortified, and neither Honour, Fidelity, or Judgment, is destroyed, then he himself is preserved likewise: but when any of these is lost and demolished, he himself is lost also. In this do all great Events consist. Paris, they

The Order of the following Words is disturbed in the Original. The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Correction.

say,