Is it fit to trust to any thing unsteady?
No.

Is Pleasure then, a steady thing?

No.

Take it, then, and throw it out of the Scale, and drive it far distant from the Place of Good things. But, if you are not quick-sighted, and one Balance is insufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by Good?

Yes.

Is it fit, then, to be elated by a present Pleasure? See that you do not say it is; otherwise I shall not think you so much as worthy to use a Scale. Thus are things judged, and weighed, when we have the Rules ready. This is the Part of Philosophy, To examine, and fix the Rules and to make use of them, when they are known, is the Business of a wise and good Man.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of Disputation.

WHAT things are to be learned,

§. 1. in order to the right Use of Reason, the Philosophers of our Sect have accurately taught: but we are altogether unpractised in the due Application of them. Only give any of us, us, that you please, some illiterate Person, for an Antagonist, and he will not find out, how to treat him. But when he hath a little moved the Man, if he happens to answer beside the Purpose, he knows not how to deal with him any further; but either reviles, or laughs at him; and says, "He is an illiterate Fellow: there is no making any thing of him." Yet a Guide, when he perceives his Charge going out of the Way, doth not revile, and ridicule, and then leave him; but leads him into the right Path. Do you also show your Antagonist the Truth, and you will see, that he will follow. But till you do show it,

do

do not ridicule him; but rather be sensible of your own Incapacity.

§. 2. How then, did Socrates use to act? He obliged his Antagonist himself to bear Testimony to him; and wanted no other Witness. Hence he might well say, "I give up all the rest; and am always satisfied with the Testimony of my Opponent and I call in no one to vote, but my Antagonist alone." For he rendered the Arguments drawn from natural Notions so clear, that every one saw, and avoided the Contradiction." Doth an envious Man rejoice?"-" By no means. He rather grieves." (This he moved him to say, by proposing the contrary.)-" Well and do you think Envy to be a Grief, for Misery?" -And who ever envied Misery ?—(Therefore he makes the other say, that Envy is a Grief, for Happiness.)-" Doth any one envy those who are nothing to him?"

No, surely." Having thus drawn [from his Opponent] a full and distinct Idea, he then left that Point; and doth not say, "Define to me what Envy is:" And after he had defined it; "You have defined it wrong; for the Definition doth not reciprocate to the thing defined." Technical

Terms,

Terms, and therefore grievous, and scarcely to be made intelligible to the Illiterate, which yet We, it seems, cannot part with. But we have no Capacity at all to move them, by such Arguments, as might induce them, in following the Track of the Appearances in their own Minds, to allow, or disprove, any Point. And, from a Consciousness of this Incapacity, those among us, who have any Modesty, give the Matter intirely up but the greater Part, rashly entering upon these Debates, mutually confound, and are confounded; and, at last, reviling, and reviled, walk off. Whereas it was the principal and most peculiar Characteristic of Socrates, never to be provoked, in a Dispute; nor to throw out any reviling or injurious Expression: but to bear patiently with those who reviled him; and to put an End to the Controversy. If you would know how great Abilities he had in this particular, read Xenophon's Banquet, and will see, how you how many Controversies he ended. Hence, even among the Poets, that Person is justly mentioned with the highest Commendation,

Whose lenient Art attentive Crowds await,

To still the furious Clamours of Debate.

VOL. I.

P

HESIOD.

But

But what then? This is no very safe Affair now, and especially at Rome. For he who doth it, must not do it in a Corner; but go to some rich Consular Senator, for instance, and question him. Pray, Sir, can you tell me to whom you intrust your Horses?"" Yes certainly."-" Is it then, to any one indifferently, though he be ignorant of Horsemanship?"-"By no means.' -"To whom do you intrust your Gold, or your Silver, or your Clothes ?”—“ Not to any one indifferently.". -"And did you ever consider, to whom you committed the care of your Body?"-" Yes, surely." "To one skilled in Exercise, or Medicine, I suppose. "Without doubt."-" Are these things your chief Good; or are you possessed of some thing better than all of them?""What do you mean?"—" Something which makes use of these; and proves, and deliberates about each of them?". "What then, do you mean the Soul?”

You have guessed right; for indeed I do mean that.”—“ I do really think it a much better Possession than all the rest."-" Can you show us, then, in what manner you have taken care of this Soul? For it is not probable, that a Person of your Wisdom, and

approved