not so much as know when you do amiss; but you will even begin to make Defences for your Behaviour, and thus verify the Saying of Hesiod:

With constant Ills, the Dilatory strive.

CHAP. XIX.

Concerning Those who embrace Philosophy only in Words.

§. 1. THE Argument, called The ruling one, concerning which Disputants questioned each other, appears to have its Rise from hence*. Of the following Propositions, any Two imply a Contradiction to the Third. They are these. That every thing past is necessarily true: That an Impossibility is not the Consequence of a Possibility: And, That something is a Possi

The curious Reader may see this whole Matter explained, with the greatest Acuteness and Accuracy, by the very learned and ingenious Mr. HARRIS, in Mr. Upton's Notes.

bility,

bility, which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus, perceiving this Contradiction, made use of the Probability of the Two first, to prove, That nothing is possible, which neither is nor will be true. Some again hold the Second and Third; That something is possible, which neither is nor will be true; and, That, an Impossibility is not the Consequence of a Possibility: and, consequently, assert, That not every thing past is necessarily true. This Way Cleanthes, and his Followers took; whom Antipater copiously defends. Others, lastly, maintain the First and Third; That something is possible, which neither is nor will be true: and That every thing past is necessarily true: but, then, That an Impossibility may be the Consequence of a Possibility. But all these Three Propositions cannot be at once maintained, because of their mutual Contradiction. If any one should ask me then, which of them I maintain; I answer him, That I cannot tell. But I have heard it related, that Diodorus held one Opinion about them; the Followers of Panthædes, I think, and Cleanthes, another; and Chrysippus a third.

VOL. I.

S

What

What then is yours * ?

† None. Nor was I born to examine the Appearances of things to my own Mind; to compare what is said by others, and thence to form some Principle of my own, as to the Topic [which you mention]: Therefore, [in respect to it,] I am no better than a Grammarian [who repeats what he hath read]. Who was the Father of Hector? Priam. Who were his Brothers? Paris and Deiphobus. Who was his Mother? Hecuba. This I have heard related. From whom? Homer. But I believe Hellanicus, and other Authors, have written on the same Subject. And what better Account have I of the ruling Argument? But, if I was vain enough, I might, especially at an Entertainment, astonish all the Company by an Enumeration of Authors, relating to it, Chrysippus hath written wonderfully, in his first Book of Possibilities. Cleanthes

* This is spoken to Epictetus by one of his Hcarers. With Mr. Upton, I read oudey: but it seems necessary, that oude should likewise stand; and it is so translated.

Some Philosophers affected to show their Learning at such Times; and it is against this idle Ostentation that Epictetus points his Discourse: for the Study of Logic itself, under pro per Regulations, he often strongly recommends.

and

and Archedemus have each written separately on this Subject. Antipater too hath written, not only in his Treatise of Possibilities, but purposely in a Discourse on the ruling Argument. Have you not read the Work? "No." "No." Read it then.-And what Good will it do Him? He will be more trifling and impertinent than he is already. For what else have you gained by reading it? What Principle have you formed upon this Subject? But you tell us of Helen, and Priam, and the Isle of Calypso, which never was, nor ever will be. And here, indeed, it is of no great Consequence, if you retain the Story, without forming any Principle of your own. But it is our Misfortune to do so much more in Morality, than upon such Subjects as these.

§. 2. Talk to me concerning Good and Evil *.

Hear.

The Wind from Ilium to the Cicon's Shore

Hath driven me.—

* This I apprehend to be spoken by one of the Scholars of Epictetus; who seeing the Contempt with which his Master treats logical Subtleties, in the foregoing Paragraph, desires him to discourse upon Ethics.

Of Things, some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good, are the Virtues, and whatever partakes of them; and the evil, Vices, and what par takes of Vice: the indifferent, lie between these, as Riches, Health, Life, Death, Pleasure, Pain.

Whence do you know this?

Hellanicus says it, in his Egyptian History *. For what doth it signify, whether one names the History of Hellanicus, or the Ethics of Diogenes, or Chrysippus,

any

or

of

Cleanthes? Have then examined you these things, and formed a Principle of your own? But shew me, how you are used to exercise yourself on Shipboard. Remember this Division †, when the Mast rattles, and some idle Fellow stands by you, while you are screaming, and says, "For Heaven's sake, talk as you did a little while ago. Is it Vice to suffer Shipwreck? Or doth it

:

Epictetus gives this absurd Reply to ridicule the Fondness of his Scholars for quoting Authors, and making a Parade of their Reading and insinuates, that it is not at all material, whether a Person, who on such Subjects, means nothing further than Talk, knows of what he is talking, or blunders about it ever so grossly.

Of things into good, evil, and indifferent.

partake