CHAP. XXX.

What we ought to have ready, in difficult

Circumstances.

WHEN you are going to any of the

Great, remember, that there is Another, who sees from Above, what passes; and whom you ought to please, rather than Man. He, therefore, asks you:

In the Schools, what did you use to call Exile, and Prison, and Chains, and Death, and Defamation ?

I? Indifferent Things.

What, then, do you call them now? Are they at all changed?

No.

Are you changed, then?

No.

Tell me, then, what Things are indifferent.

Things independent on Choice.

Tell me the Consequence too.

Things independent on Choice, are nothing to me.

Tell

Tell me, likewise, what appeared to us, to be the Good of Man.

A right Choice, and a [right] Use of the Appearances of Things.

What his End?

To follow Thee.

Do you say the same Things now, too? Yes. I do say the same Things, even

now.

Well, go in, then, boldly, and mindful of these things; and he [to whom you are going] will see what a Youth, who hath studied what he ought, is among Men, who have not. I protest, I imagine you will have such Thoughts as these: "Why do we provide so many and great Qualifications, for nothing? Is the Power, the Antichamber, the Attendants, the Guards, no more than this? Is it for these, that I have listened to so many Dissertations? These are nothing and I had qualified myself as for some great Encounter."

END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

THE

DISCOURSES

OF

EPICTETUS.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

That Courage is not inconsistent with

§. 1.

Caution.

WHAT is asserted by the Philosophers, may, perhaps, appear a Paradox to some let us, however, examine, as well as we can, whether this be true; That it is possible in all things, to act at once with Caution and Courage. For Caution seems, in some measure, contrary to Courage: and Contraries are by no means consistent. The Appearance of a Paradox to many, in the present case, seems to me to arise from something like this: If, indeed, we assert,

that

that Courage and Caution are to be used, in the same Instances, we should justly be accused of uniting Contradictions; but, in the Way that we affirm it, where is the Absurdity? For, if what hath been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the Essence of Good and Evil consists in the Use of the Appearances; and that Things independent on Choice, are not of the Nature either of Good or Evil; what Paradox do the Philosophers assert, if they say: "Where Things are not dependent on Choice, be courageous; where they are, be cautious?" For in these only, if Evil consists in a wrong Choice, is Caution to be used. And if Things independent on Choice, and not in our Power, are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of Courage. Thus we shall be at once cautious and courageous and, indeed, courageous on the Account of this very Caution; for by using Caution, with regard to Things really evil, we shall gain Courage, with regard to what are not so.

§. 2. But we are in the same Condition as [hunted] Deer: when these in a fright