state, picked, like yourself? O what a fine citizen, and senator, and orator! For Heaven's sake, Sir, ought we to pray for a succession of young men, disposed and bred like you! §. 7. Now, when you have once heard this discourse, go home, and say to yourself; It is not Epictetus who hath told me all these things (for how should he?) but some propitious God by him *; for it would never have entered the head of Epictetus, who is not used to dispute with any one. Well; let us obey God then, that we may not incur the divine displeasure. If a crow had signified any thing to you, by his croaking; it is not the crow that signifies it, but God, by him. And, if you have any thing signified to you by the human voice, doth he not cause the man to tell it you, that you may know the divine efficacy, which declares its significations to different persons in different manners; and signifies the greatest and principal things, by the noblest messengers . What else doth the poet mean, when he says, "For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your "Father which speaketh in you." Matt. x. 20. This passage hath a remarkable likeness to Heb. i. 1, 2. "God, who, at sundry times and in divers manners, spake "in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath, in "these last days, spoken unto us by his Son" Hermes Hermes I sent, his purpose to restrain. Hermes, descending from heaven, was to warn him; and the gods now, likewise, send a Hermes to warn you, not to invert the wellappointed order of things; nor be curiously trifling but suffer a man to be a man; and a woman, a woman: a beautiful man, to be beautiful, as a man; a deformed man, to be deformed, as a man: for you do not consist of flesh and hair, but of the faculty of choice. If you take care to have this beautiful, you will be beautiful. But all this while, I dare not tell you, that you are deformed; for I fancy you would rather hear any thing than this. But consider what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of all men, Al- . cibiades. "Endeavour to make yourself beautiful. What doth he mean to say to him; Curl your locks, and pick the hairs from your legs?" Heaven forbid! But, Ornament your choice: Throw choice: Throw away your wrong. principles. What is to be done with the poor body then? Leave it to nature. Another hath taken care of such things. Give them up to Him. What! then, must one be a sloven? By By no means: but be neat, conformably to your nature. A man should be neat, as a man; a woman, as a woman; a child, as a child. If not, let us pick out the mane of a lion, that he may not be slovenly; and the comb of a cock; for he ought to be neat too. Yes; but let it be as a cock; and a lion, as a lion; and a hound, as a hound. CHAP. II. In what a Proficient ought to be exercised; and that we neglect the principal Things. §. 1. THERE are three topics in philosophy, in which he, who would be wise and good, must be exercised *. That of the desires, and aversions; that he may not be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other. That of the pursuits and avoidances ; and, in general, the duties of life; that he may act with order and consideration, and not carelessly. The third topic belongs to circumspection, and a freedom from deception; and, in general, whatever belongs to the assent. Sce Introduction, §. 3, 4, 5, 6. §. 2. Of these topics, the principal and most urgent, is that of the passions: for passion is produced no otherwise, than by a disappointment of the desires, and an incurring of the aversions. It is this which introduces perturbations, tumults, misfortunes, and calamities: this is the spring of sorrow, lamentation, and envy this renders us envious, and emulous; and incapable of hearing reason. §. 3. The next topic regards the duties of life. For I am not to be undisturbed by passions, in the same sense as a statue is; but as one who preserves the natural and acquired relations; as a pious person, as a son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen. §. 4. The third topic belongs to those who are now making a proficiency; and is a security to the other two, that no unexamined appearance may surprize us, either in sleep, or wine, or in the spleen. This, say you, is above us. But our present philosophers, leaving the first and second topics [the affections, and moral duties], employ themselves wholly about the third; convertible, definitive, hypothetical propositions [and other logical subtilties]. For, they say, that we must, by engaging even in these subjects, take care to guard against deception. Who must? Is this secu must? A wise and good man. rity from deception, then, the thing you want? Have you mastered the other subjects? Are you not liable to be deceived by money? When you see a fine girl, do you which is raised in your appearance oppose the mind? If your neighbour inherits an estate, do feel no vexation? Do you, at present, you want nothing more than perseverance? You learn even these very things, wretch, with trembling, and a solicitous dread of contempt; and are inquisitive to know, what is said of you; and, if any one comes and tells you, that, in a dispute which was the best of the philosophers, one of the company said, that such a one was the only philosopher, that little soul of yours grows to the size of two cubits, instead of an inch: but if another should come and say, "You are mistaken, he is not worth hearing; for what doth he know? He hath the first rudiments, but nothing more;" you are thunderstruck; you presently turn pale, and cry out, "I will show what I am; that I am a great philosopher." It is evident [what you are], by these very things; why do you aim to show it by others? Do not you know, that Diogenes showed some sophist in this manner, by extending his |