CHAP. VIII. That Faculties are not safe to the Uninstructed. you §. 1. IN as many ways as equivalent Syllogisms may be varied, in so many may the Forms of Arguments, and Enthymemas, be varied likewise. As for instance: If had borrowed, and not paid, you owe me money. But you have not borrowed, and not paid; therefore you do not owe me money. To perform this skilfully, belongs to no one more than to a Philosopher. For if an Enthymema be an imperfect Syllogism; he who is exercised in a perfect Syllogism, must be equally ready at an imperfect one. * Why then do not we exercise ourselves and others, after this manner? Because, even now, though we are not exercised in these things, nor diverted, by me, at least, from the Study of Morality; yet we make no Advances in Virtue. What is to be This is spoken by one of the audience. expected expected then if we should add this Avocation too? Especially as it would not only be an avocation from more necessary studies, but likewise a capital Occasion of Conceit and Insolence. For the Faculty of arguing, and of persuasive reasoning is great; and particularly, if it be much laboured, and receive an additional ornament from Rhetoric. For, in general, every faculty is dangerous to weak and uninstructed persons; as being apt to render them arrogant and elated. For by what method can one persuade a young man, who excels in these kinds of study, that he ought not to be an appendix to them, but they to him? Will he not trample upon all such advice; and walk about elated, and puffed up, not bearing any one should touch him, to put him in mind, where he is wanting, and in what he goes wrong. What then, was not Plato a Philosopher? Well, and was not Hippocrates a Physician? Yet you see [how elegantly]he expresses himself. But is it in quality of Physician, then, that he expresses himself so? Why do you confound things, accidentally united, from different causes, in the same men? If Plato was handsome and well made, must I too too set myself to endeavour at becoming handsome and well made; as if this was necessary to Philosophy, because a certain person happened to be at once handsome and a philosopher? Why will you not perceive and distinguish what are the things, that make men Philosophers, and what belong to them on other accounts? Pray, if I were a philosopher, would it be necessary, that you should be lame too? * §. 2. What then? Do I reject these Faculties? By no means. For neither do I reject the Faculty of Seeing. But if you ask me, what is the Good of Man; I have nothing else to say to you, but that it is a certain Regulation of the Choice, with regard to the Appearances of things. Epictetus, whenever he has occasion to mention himself, speaks with remarkable modesty; and in a stile very different from that of many of the more ancient Philosophers; as appears by the several arrogant speeches recorded of them by Diogenes Laertius, &c. It is probable he might improve in this humble disposition, by the character of Socrates, which he seems particularly to have studied, and admired. Yet other Philosophers had studied and admired the same character, without profiting by it. Perhaps the sober and unassuming temper of Christianity might, from the example of its professors in those days, have produced this, and other good effects, in. the minds of many who knew little, if any thing, of the Gospel itself. er proper food, CHAP. IX. How, from the Doctrine of our Kindred to God, we are to proceed to its Consequences. §. 1. IF what Philosophers say of the kindred between God and Men be true; what has any one to do, but, like Socrates,' when he is asked what countryman he is, never to say that he is a citizen of Athens, or of Corinth; but of the world? For why do you say that you are of Athens: and not of that corner only, where that paltry body of yours was laid at its birth? Is it not, evidently, from what is principal, and comprehends not only that corner, and your whole house; but the general extent of the country, from which your pedigree is derived down to you, that you call yourself an Athenian, or a Corinthian? Why may not he then, who understands the administration of the world: and has learned that the greatest, and most principal, and comprehensive, of all things, is this system, composed of Men and God: om Him the seeds of being are descended, scended, not only to my father or grandfather, but to all things that are produced and born on earth; and especially to rational natures, as they alone are qualified to partake of a communication with the Deity, being connected with him by Reason: Why may not [such a one] call himself a citizen of the world? Why not a son of God?/And, why shall he fear any thing that happens among men? Shall kindred to Cæsar, or any other of the great at Rome, enable a man to live secure, above contempt, and void of all fear whatever: (and shall not the having God for our Maker, and Father, and Guardian, free us from griefs and terrors? §. 2. "But how shall I subsist? For I have nothing." Why, how do Slaves, how do Fugitives? To what do they trust, when they run away from their Masters? Is it to their Estates? Their Servants? Their Plate? To nothing but themselves. Yet they do not fail to get necessaries. And must a Philosopher, think you, when he leaves his own abode, rest and rely upon others; and not take care of himself? Must he be more helpless and anxious than the brute beasts; each of which is self-sufficient, and wants neither proper food, |