the others must be wrong: if those of the Jews be good, all the rest must be bad. How can it be otherwise?

And where Ignorance is, there likewise is Want of Learning, and Instruction in necessary points.

It is granted.

Then, as you are sensible of this, you will for the future apply to nothing, and think of nothing else, but how to acquaint yourself with the Criterion of what is agreeable to Nature; and to use that, in judging of each particular Case.

§. 2. At present the assistance I have to give you, towards what you desire, is this. Doth Affection seem to you to be a right and a natural Thing *?

How should it be otherwise?

Well and is Affection natural and right, and Reason not so?

By no means.

Is there any Opposition, then, between Reason and Affection?

I think not.

If there was, of two Opposites if one be

* The Stoics say, that wise and good Men have the truly natural Affection towards their Children; and that bad Persons have it not. DIOG. LAERT. L. vii. § 120.

natural,

natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural. Must it not?

It must.

What we find, then, at once affectionate, and reasonable, that we may safely pronounce to be right and good.

Agreed.

Well, then you will not dispute, but that to run away, and leave a sick Child, is contrary to Reason. It remains for us to consider, whether it be consistent with Affection.

Let us consider it.

Did you, then, from an Affection to your Child, do right in running away, and leaving her? Hath her Mother no Affection for the Child?

Yes, surely, she hath.

Would it have been right, then, that her Mother too should leave her; or would it not?

It would not.

And doth not her Nurse love her?

She doth.

Then ought not she likewise to leave her?

By no means.

And doth not her Preceptor love her?

He

He doth.

Then ought not he also to have run away, and left her and so the Child to have been left alone, and unassisted, from the great affection of her parents, and her friends; or to die in the hands of people, who neither loved her, nor took care of her?

Heaven forbid !

But is it not unreasonable and unjust, that what you think right in yourself, on the account of your Affection; should not be allowed to others, who have the very same Affection as you ?

It is absurd.

Pray, if you were sick yourself, should you be willing to have your Family, and even your Wife and Children, so very affectionate, as to leave you helpless and alone?

By no means.

Or would you wish to be so loved by your Friends, as from their excessive Affection, always to be left alone when you were sick? Or would you not rather wish, if it were possible, to have such a kind of Affection from your Enemies, as to make them always keep from you? If so, it remains, that your Behaviour was by no means affectionate.

affectionate.

Well then : was it merely nothing that induced you to desert your Child?

How is that possible?

No but it was some such Motive, as induced a Person at Rome to hide his face while a Horse was running, to which he earnestly wished success: and when, beyond his expectation, it won the race; he was obliged to have recourse to spunges, to recover his senses..

And what was this Motive?

At present perhaps it cannot be accurately explained. It is sufficient to be convinced, [if what Philosophers say be true] that we are not to seek it from without; but that there is universally one and the same Cause, which moves us to do or forbear any Action; to speak or not to speak; to be elated or depressed; to avoid or pursue that very cause which hath now moved us two; you, to come, and sit and hear me; and me, to speak as I do.

And what is that?

Is it any thing else, than that it seemed right to us to do so?

Nothing else.

And

And if it had seemed otherwise to us, what should we have done else, than what we thought right? This, and not the Death of Patroclus, was the cause of lamentation to Achilles, [for every man is not thus affected by the Death of a Friend] that it seemed right to him. This too was the cause of your running away from your Child, that it seemed right and if hereafter you should stay with her, it will be because that seemed right. You are now returning to Rome, because it seems right to you; but if you should alter your Opinion, you will not return. In a word, neither Death, nor Exile, nor Pain, nor any thing of this kind, is the cause of our doing, or not doing, any Ac tion: but our Opinions and Principles. Do I convince you of this, or not?

You do.

§. 3. Well then such as the Cause is, such will be the Effect. From this day forward, then, whenever we do any thing wrong, we will impute it only to the Principle from which we act: and we will endeavour to remove that, and cut it up by the Roots, with greater care than we would Wens and Tumours from the Body. In like manner, we will ascribe what we do