Whenever, therefore, it is of the same Nature with the objects of its contemplations, it necessarily contemplates itself too. But, where it is of a different nature, it cannot contemplate itself. The Art of Shoemaking, for instance, is exercised upon Leather; but is itself intirely distinct from the Materials it works upon therefore it doth not contemplate itself. Again: Grammar is exercised on articulate Speech. Is the Art of Grammar itself, then, articulate Speech?

By no means.

Therefore it cannot contemplate itself. To what purpose, then, is Reason appointed by Nature?

To a proper Use of the Appearances of Things.

And what is Reason?

A Composition of certain Appearances to the Mind: and, thus, by its Nature, it becomes contemplative of itself too. Again: what Subjects of Contemplation belong to Prudence?

Good, and Evil, and Indifferent;
What, then, is Prudence itself?

Good.

What Imprudence?

You

You see, then, that it necessarily contemplates both itself and its contrary. Therefore, the first and greatest work of a Philosopher is, to try and distinguish the Appearances; and to admit none untried. Even in Money, where our interest seems to be concerned, you see what an Art we have invented; and how many ways an Assayer uses to try its value. By the Sight; the Touch; the Smell; and, lastly, the Hearing. He throws the piece down, and attends to the Jingle; and is not contented with its Jingling only once; but, by frequent attention to it, becomes quite musical. In the same manner, whenever we think it of consequence, whether we are deceived or not, we use the utmost attention to distinguish those things, which may possibly deceive us. But, yawning and slumbering over the poor miserable ruling Faculty, we admit every Appearance that offers. For here the mischief does not strike us. When you would know, then, how very languidly you are affected by Good and Evil, and how vehemently by things indifferent; consider how you are affected with regard to being blinded; and how with regard to being deceived; and you will find, that you are far from

VOL. I.

H

from being moved, as you ought, in relation to Good and Evil.

But much previous Qualification, and much Labour, and Learning, are wanted. What, then? Do you expect the greatest of Arts is to be acquired by slight Endeavours? And yet the principal Doctrine of the Philosophers, of itself, is short. If you have a mind to know it, read Zeno, and you will see *. For what Prolixity is there

in

Zeno, the Founder of the Stoic Sect, was born at Cittium, a Sca-port Town, in the Island of Cyprus. He was originally a Merchant; and very rich. On a voyage from Tyre, where he had been trading in Purple, he was shipwrecked, near the Piræum. During his stay at Athens, he happened to meet, in a Bookseller's Shop, with the Second Book of Xenophon's Memoirs; with which he was extremely delighted; and asked the Bookseller, where such kind of Persons, as the Author mentioned, were to be found. The Bookseller answered, pointing to Crates, the Cynic, who was luckily passing by; Follow him: which Zeno did, and became his Disciple. But his Disposition was too modest to approve of the Cynic Indecency: and, forsaking Crates, he applied himself to the Academics; whom he attended for ten Years, and then formed a School of his own. There was a constant Severity, or, perhaps, Austerity, in his manners, his Dress, and his Discourse; except at an Entertainment, when he used to appear with Chearfulness and Ease. His morals were irreproachable and he was presented by the Athenians with a golden Crown; because his Life was a public Example of Virtue, by its Conformity with his Words and Doctrines. He

in saying, Our End is to follow the gods? And The Essence of Good consists in the proper use of the Appearances of things. Indeed, if you say, What, then, is God? What is an Appearance? What is particular, what universal Nature? Here the affair becomes prolix. And so, if Epicurus should come and say, that Good must be placed in Body; here, too, it will be prolix and it will be necessary to hear, what is the principal, and substantial, and essential Part in us. It is unlikely, that the Good of a Snail should be placed in the shell: and, is it likely, that the Good of a Man should? You yourself, Epicurus, have something superior to this. What is that in you, which deliberates, which examines, which forms the Judgment, concerning the Body itself, that it is the principal Part? And why do you light your Lamp, and labour for us, and write so many Books? That we may not be ignorant of the Truth? What are We? What are we to You? Thus the Doctrine becomes prolix.

lived Ninety-eight Years, and then strangled himself; be cause, in going out of his School, he happened to fall down. and break his Finger. DIOG. LAERT. in ZENO.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Desire of Admiration.

Sta

WHEN a Person maintains his proper tion in Life, he doth not gape after Externals. What would you have, Man?

"I am contented, if my Desires and Aversions are conformable to Nature: if I manage my Powers of Pursuit and Avoidance, my Purposes, and Intentions and Assent, in the Manner I was formed to do."

Why, then, do you walk as if you had swallowed a Spit?

"I could wish moreover to have all who meet me, admire me, and all who follow me, cry out, What a great Philosopher!"

Who are those, by whom you would be admired? Are they not the very People, who, you used to say, were mad? What, then, would you be admired by Madmen ?

CHAP.