to involve a good deal of unpleasantness. On the other hand, we need not fear that occasional hard words will have permanent bad effect on our relations. The Russian is never more agreeable than after his knuckles have been sharply rapped. He takes well to rough play and rarely holds grudges over it. Let us not forget Stalin's first reaction when he met Ribbentrop. It was to joke good-naturedly and cynically about the bitter propaganda war which had been waged for so many years between the two countries. The Russian governing class respects only the strong. To them, shyness in dispute is a form of weakness. I. Coordinate, in accordance with our established policies, all activities of our government relating to Russia and all private American activities of this sort which the government can influence. The Russians are quick to take advantage of conflicts, inconsistencies, and the seeking of private aims on the part of our nationals or agencies of our government. Their own system is designed to produce the maximum concentration of national energies. We cannot face them effectively unless we do all in our power to concentrate our own effort. J. Strengthen and support our representation in Russia. The American embassy in Moscow is the symbol of our country to the Russians. It is watched intently by many people. It must be not only the representation of our society but also a guiding brain center of our policy toward Russia. In the face of frequent neglect and discouragement, always the object of attacks by jealous self-seekers and discontented liberals, never enjoying the full backing or understanding of people in Washington, never properly staffed or properly housed, it has nevertheless managed to become a pioneering establishment in the American Foreign Service and the most respected diplomatic mission in Moscow. It could do far more and play a far greater role in the Soviet Union if it received proper support. This means that failure of the Soviet government to grant quarters and other facilities for the performance of diplomatic work in Moscow must sooner or later be made an open issue between the governments and pressure must be brought to bear to improve these conditions. It means that the mission must be adequately staffed with American personnel. Finally it means that the mission must at all times be led by someone capable of and prepared for hard and tedious work over a long period of time, someone who has in high degree the qualities of modesty and patience, who is animated solely by devotion to the interests of our country, and is generally fitted by personality and background to earn the respect of a nation unexcelled in the psychological analysis of the human individual. In the case of Ambassador Harriman, I can sincerely say that I consider these prerequisites fulfilled. But I make this observation with an eye to the future. The post of ambassador to Moscow is not a sinecure which can be lightly disposed of; and the department must be prepared to use its influence to see that it is effectively filled. The Moscow mission works, and has always worked, under strain, in the face of multitudinous obstacles. A vain, fussy, and ignorant ambassador is capable of breaking its back, and of doing lasting (if not readily apparent) damage to the fabric of Russian-American relations. [Excerpts from The Operational Code of the Politburo, RAND Corporation Monograph R-206, August 1, 1950. Copyright © 1951 by RAND. Reprinted by permission.] THE OPERATIONAL CODE OF THE POLITBURO* By Nathan Leites (Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago) The intention is not to discuss the major theories of LeninismStalinism but to discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective political conduct. . . . Unless otherwise stated, the rules given below are believed to apply (in varying degrees) to both the Leninist and the Stalinist eras of Bolshevism. The rules cited in this study fall into three categories. Some have been explicitly stated by Lenin and Stalin and appear as direct quotations from their writings. Some are so clearly implied for specific situations that Bolsheviks would easily recognize them as they appear below. Others seem to be operative among Bolsheviks but might not be recognized easily by them. For the sake of clarity, the general rules of Bolshevik conduct are given in full-width text and the examples illustrating them, in indented text. Throughout, statements have been constructed using words and phrases from the writings and speeches of Lenin and Stalin. This results in statements which may often be imperfect, or contradictory, from a scientific point of view, but which do represent an actual pattern of Bolshevik thought. PREDICTABILITY AND UNPREDICTABILITY 1. One point of Bolshevik doctrine affirms that future developments are either inevitable or impossible. Intermediate probabilities are excluded. This is a characteristic "all-or-none" pattern of Bolshevik thought. . . . 2. Despite such beliefs in determinism, Bolshevik doctrine also contains contrasting points. Thus, although it is always asserted that the direction and end of a major historical development (e.g., the transition from capitalism to communism) is predictable, the length of time and the path such a development will take are not held to be predictable. NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF. This pioneer study was done in 1950 and is based on the writings of Lenin and Stalin. We think it is still most interesting and we have included excerpts from some of its chapters, renumbering paragraphs in a few instances. As a reading of recent Soviet books on diplomacy indicates. Lenin is treated as a kind of "father figure" for present-day Russian policymakers and diplomats. Currently, also, the Image of Stalin is being refurbished as a great, patriotic military leader in World War II. In 1918, during the debates of the Brest-Litovsk peace, 3. The Party must not fall into despair if certain gains take much longer than had been estimated. On a historical scale, such differences in rate of development are minor. 4. However, it is a task of the Party to shorten as much as possible the road to (and hence the cost of) victory. 5. This can be done because at many historical junctures more than one outcome is "objectively possible." "Objective conditions" create certain "opportunities" for the Party; whether the Party will succeed in "utilizing" them and transforming them into "realities" cannot be predicted... MEANS AND ENDS 1. The ethics underlying Bolshevik behavior are rarely made explicit. 2. The fundamental law is to do all that enhances the power of the Party, the great and only instrument in the realization of communism, the great and only goal. In 1920, Lenin said: Our morality is deduced from the class struggle of the prole tariat. . . . Communist morality is the morality which serves this 3. In deciding upon what statements to make both within the Party and without, the leadership must not be influenced by considerations of truth. Only the impact of these statements should be considered. Bourgeois governments are held to follow the same rule. There are occasions when falsehoods-which are obvious to all informed groups-are useful. . . 4. The Party leadership need not be concerned with consistency in its public statements. Again, only effectiveness is important. THE CALCULUS OF THE GENERAL LINE ... 1. Every line of Bolshevik conduct is either prescribed or forbidden. It is prescribed if it will maximize the power of the Party. It is forbidden if it will not. There is little behavior that is merely tolerated, or recommended. 2. The Party must at all times have a "complete set" of "definite," "precise," "clear" positions on all matters: "... to the devil with all people with indeterminate views'. . . ." (This is to counteract the fear that the Party might become the victim of "confusion," which is felt by Bolsheviks to be a Russian propensity.) . . . PERSEVERANCE AND FLEXIBILITY 1. "There is no such thing as an absolutely inextricable position." Through perseverance, effective action can be carried out even under the most difficult conditions. 1 V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 9, pp. 475-479. 2. A Bolshevik must persevere to the end of any action, no matter how unpleasant. In 1916, Lenin wrote to a member of the editorial board You write that you "are sick and tired of . . . correspondence 3. "A mass without a Party . . . is incapable of perseverance." The emotions of the "masses" and of the 'intelligentsia" are "unstable"; those of Bolsheviks should be stable. 4. A Bolshevik must oppose "vacillation" ("inability to maintain a definite political line," "lack of steadiness in matters of principle," "hysterical rushing from place to place"). He must also oppose lack of continuity ("incapacity for sustained effort," doing things "spasmodically" rather than "systematically"). In 1921, Lenin said: . . . hard conditions of life give rise to vacillation for the bour- 5. On the other hand, the Party must know how to adapt itself to all changes in its environment: "... it is our duty as Communists... to adapt our tactics to every change that is called forth by something other than our class, or our efforts." In 1905, Lenin said about the agrarian policy of the The decisive point is that the conduct of the revolutionary proletariat towards the conflict between peasants and landowners cannot be the same in all cases and under all conditions of the various phases of the Russian revolution. Under certain conditions. .. this conduct must be not only one of sympathy, but of direct support, and not only one of support, but of "incitement." Under other circumstances, this conduct can and must be a neutral one. . . . It is not only our "Socialist Revolutionaries" who are full of the vulgar illusions of revolutionary democracy, but many Social Democrats who... look for a "simple" solution of the task, one which would be the same for all combinations.* There must be no "doctrinaire attitude . . . against changes in strategy and tactics. . . ." Flexibility is necessary to avoid catastrophe and to ensure victory. Certain Party members maintain that since we have the New 2 V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, 3d ed., Vol. 29, p. 247. 9 V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 9. p. 198. The Party must never tie its hands in advance, that is, never restrict its "freedom in the choice of political means.” In March, 1918, Lenin said, rejecting a proposal by We must in no case, in not even a single strategic maneuver, . . . The Party "must not blindly worship the particular phase in which it may find itself at any particular time or place"; it must be ready to change its strategy, tactics, organization as changed conditions require it, without being hindered by "the prejudices and memories of what was yesterday." 6. Therefore, "If I pursue an enemy who does not move in a straight line but zigzags, then I too must zigzag in order to reach him." 7. When "the turns of history are very sharp," the turns of the Party's policy may also have to be sharp. . . . DECEPTION 1. Bolshevik doctrine stresses the use of deception as an enemy device and the danger of not perceiving this. In 1926, Stalin stated: Lenin often said that it is difficult to take revolutionaries by the by kindness. We must never forget this truth. Hence, a high degree of political insight includes a high degree of suspiciousness (i.e., the absence of "philistine trustfulness"). 2. "The slogan of the Marxist workers is not to believe in words, but to check them most thoroughly. . . . Only fools believe in mere words." Hence, in any dealings with outside groups, "we will wait for their deeds. We do not believe in promises." THE DANGER OF ANNIHILATION 1. In international relations it is one of the main tasks of the Party to know how to "utilize" conflicts between other states. V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, 4th ed., Vol. 27, pp. 96-97. 7 Joseph Stalin, Sochineniya, Vol. 8, p. 361. |