Second, there is a general Soviet effort to propagate the idea, not always clearly spelled out, of mutual nuclear deterrence at the strategic level and to give an impression of doctrinal rigidity at this level by rejecting such concepts as controlled strategic warfare. This trend in Soviet discourse may relate to a sense of growing doubt among the Soviet leaders as to whether missile-blackmail diplomacy, which once looked highly promising, can in fact be used successfully to force withdrawal of the West from its stubbornly held political and strategic positions around the word.

Third, in notable contrast with the tendency to rigidify the Soviet doctrinal stance at the strategic level, there appears to be a tentative endeavor to project a less rigidly doctrinaire image than formerly with regard to the escalation potential of local conflicts. This suggests that the Soviets may wish to see the "escalation threshold" raised, perhaps in order to provide greater flexibility for local use of military power below the nuclear level and to disarm Chinese criticisms of Soviet failure to give vigorous support to "national liberation" struggles. Rather curiously, while this trend would seem to allow greater freedom of action for Soviet political strategy in the underdeveloped world, more support for softening the customary doctrinal line on "inevitability" of escalation seems to have come from military than from political spokesmen.

Fourth, related to the apparent desire in some Soviet quarters to communicate an image of greater flexibility in the support of local conflicts, there is a new suggestion in Soviet discourse that in certain potential third-power conflicts, such as local hostilities involving West Germany and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union might try to avoid expanding the conflict by withholding nuclear attacks against the United States in return for U.S. abstention. This suggestion seems to relate to a general Soviet concern to reassure the United States against the possibility of a Soviet first strike under borderline conditions in which the question of pre-emption might arise. At the same time, the Soviet position on this point remains somewhat ambivalent. There is still the veiled hint in other Soviet utterances, perhaps intended to reinforce the Soviet deterrent image, that under some circumstances the Soviet Union may entertain what would be in fact, if not in name, a pre-emptive strategy.

Finally, the Soviet voice in the strategic dialogue seems to reflect uncertainty whether the Soviet Union's best interest lies in asserting superiority over the West, at the risk of stimulating greater Western exertions and prematurely jeopardizing the atmosphere of détente, or in settling for a second-best position. Soviet policy on this question is complicated by many factors. For example, not only is the Soviet Union at a relative disadvantage in resources but, as experience shows, it has managed to live for a considerable period in a position of strategic inferiority to its major adversary without being subjected to the "imperialist attack" so often predicted. . . .

IMAGE OF THE ADVERSARY

At a time when both the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be seeking ways to clarify the complexities of their strategic relationship in the nuclear-missile age, greater importance than ever

before attaches to their perception of each other. In this regard the picture of the West that emerges from Soviet discourse of the past year or two has begun in some respects to take on more objective dimensions, notably in treating the United States as a strong but withal somewhat more responsible adversary than was formerly the case. Both editions of the Sokolovskii work were landmarks of a sort in this connection.

The first Sokolovskii volume conveyed an image of the West that in some respects departed notably from familiar Soviet lore on the "imperialist enemy." Though colored, to be sure, by serious distortions of Western motives and intentions, the work contained a relatively straightforward and generally realistic account of U.S.-NATO military strength and strategy. The revised volume largely followed the pattern of the first in this respect, again picturing the United States as a formidable and resourceful opponent. However, its appraisal of Western military strength was tempered by somewhat more stress on internal contradictions and instability of the NATO alliance.

One should caution against assuming that greater realism in looking at the United States is universal among Soviet writers, or that it necessarily connotes a softening of the basic hostility with which the West is viewed. As much of the material indicates, the premises upon which Soviet spokesmen base their interpretation of the adversary remain essentially unchanged. There is a further point to be borne in mind also. Publicly expressed Soviet views of the West more often than not are meant to serve propaganda ends of one sort or another, such as demonstrating aggressive intent in every Western move. The private Soviet assessment, on the other hand, may vary from one case to another. Thus, the image of the West reflected in Soviet public statements does not necessarily correspond in all respects with what Soviet leaders may think privately about the strategies and intentions of their opponents.

...

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE STRATEGIC DISCOURSE

It would be premature in the extreme to suggest that the Soviet image of the West now mirrors reality with reasonable fidelity. Soviet perception of the West is still filtered through ideological and parochial suspicions that produce a woefully distorted picture, particularly of Western motives and intentions. At the same time, it can be said that the successive Sokolovskii editions and some other recent expressions of Soviet strategic thinking have come a little way toward presenting a more objective image of the other side.

This in itself may be a small start toward a more meaningful and mutually instructive dialogue between East and West, particularly between the two great nuclear powers on either side. Some slight change in the mode of discourse with the discussants talking more directly to each other-is another small start that may be discerned in the present trend of affairs. It generally has seemed that the discussants in the strategic dialogue were speaking from an entirely different conceptual framework, arguing from independent systems of logic— which in fact is not far from the mark. As a result, they have talked past each other more often than not. A change in the mode and quality of discourse-if nothing else, a better mutual grasp of its technical

idiom, while unlikely to bridge the conceptual gap, might at least draw the two different systems of logic closer together.

It could be said that there is precious little evidence of improvement in the quality of Soviet discourse in such publications as the two Sokolovskii volumes, the authors' rebuttal addressed to the U.S. editors of their work, the Glagolev-Larionov exigesis on Soviet peace policy and military posture, the Nevsky commentary on problems of strategy, and other recent examples of Soviet strategic thought, not excluding the frequent sallies into this field by policy- and decision-makers like Khrushchev himself. All have more or less in common a penchant for painting the motives of the other side black, the policies of the Soviet Union white, and its superiority unquestionable-a picture which somewhat oversimplifies the situation, to say the least.

And yet, it is perhaps unwarranted to dismiss out of hand the possibility of raising the level of discourse and moving the strategic dialogue onto more productive ground. The expanded discussion of U.S. strategy in the revised Sokolovskii volume is a case in point. One may feel that the treatment of counterforce strategy was prejudiced by being used to support Soviet charges of aggressive U.S. plans and to fortify Soviet claims to an invulnerable retaliatory posture. However, the analysis demonstrated at least that the authors had done. some homework and had acquainted themselves with the U.S. literature on the subject. If their rendering of the U.S. process of strategy formulation was imprecise, it showed at least an understanding of some of the factors involved, and in the process revealed some of their own concerns, including the strong dependence of the Soviet military posture on a continuing high level of secrecy. The Red Star commentary of the Sokolovskii authors, in itself a forensic development of a rather unusual kind in the strategic dialogue, showed several signs of Soviet desire to clarify foreign understanding of the Soviet military posture, as did the International Affairs article by Glagolev and Larionov and some of the other statements examined.

The question may be raised that an improvement in the quality and level of strategic discourse is not necessarily of any significant moment in itself. No matter how well informed by a common appreciation of the problems and concerns of the parties involved, strategic discourse can never substitute for military force in a world governed by the politics of power. This is no doubt true. Still, the forms and character of the strategic dialogue can influence the policies governing military power. In an age when the destructive potential of military power is so great that its use or misuse is the common concern of all, this would seem to be a sufficient excuse for improving the quality of the dialogue. One of course should expect no miracles. The strategic dialogue is a form of communication between antagonists, not a means for abolishing hostility or for clearing up a deep-seated clash of purposes. It may help opponents to avoid mistaken impressions about each other's posture. It may, of course, have just the opposite effect, but that is a risk that exists in any event. At best, the strategic dialogue could lead to a useful end if it serves, as Walter Lippmann put it recently when describing President Kennedy's influence on the course of world events: "to convince the Soviet Union that it must perforce and that it can comfortably and honorably live within a balance of power which is decidedly in our favor." 2

2 Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1963.

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In assessing the prospects for further development of a useful strategic dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States, the relevance of understandings attained in the field of arms control should not be overlooked. Some improvement in the quality of communication concerning the strategic relationships between the super-powers already has accompanied such steps as the nuclear test-ban treaty, the Moscow-Washington "hot line" agreement, the U.N. resolution against orbiting of nuclear weapons in space, and the joint declaration of intent to cut back the production of fissionable materials.* Although the measures do not directly involve disarmament, they can be said to reflect a mutual desire, among other things, to slow the tempo of the arms race, to ease the economic burden of military preparations, and to reduce the danger of war by miscalculation. As such, they tend to complement the strategic dialogue in what might be described as a tentative exploratory effort to "manage" the U.S.-Soviet confrontation so as to keep it within controllable bounds while not sacrificing the political interests of the adversaries. How well this effort may meet the test of time and circumstances remains to be seen.

*NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF. The declaration of intent to cut back the production of fissionable materials did not deal with existing stockpiles, nor did it contain agreed arrangements for inspection and verification. As it turned out, not only did the Soviets not follow our lead by reducing their production; the Soviets proceeded to increase their plutonium facilities.

[From Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation. Harper and Row. Copyright©1966 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York. Reprinted by permission.]

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC STYLE AND TACTICS

By Arthur H. Dean

(Ambassador in the post-armistice negotiations in Korea; Chairman, U.S. Delegation at the Disarmament and Nuclear Test-Ban Negotiations in Geneva, 1961-63; former member U.S. Delegation to the UN General Assembly.)

THE SOVIET STYLE

Diplomatic style is a kind of national signature, reflecting not only official policies but also characteristics of the society from which the diplomat comes and the outlook in which he has been bred. It influences heavily the reactions of a particular diplomat and the procedures he will be likely to follow. Knowing intimately the diplomatic style of one's adversary, besides being in itself fascinating, can be a real negotiating advantage.

In considering Soviet diplomacy as a whole, two major characteristics stand out: a dogmatic expectation of hostility from the outside world and an iron determination to carry out a program previously determined in Moscow and not subject to change by the diplomat in the field.

The expectation of hostility, which arises from Communist theory and is reinforced by a selective reading of history, permeates every aspect of official Soviet diplomatic behavior. Every Western proposal on disarmament was examined meticulously by the Soviet representatives with a view to discovering its "real, nefarious purpose." Ideological warfare was expected from us, just as it was being conducted by them. In other words, the Soviet diplomat often seemed to think of himself as a "traveler by night in the forest who must be constantly on the watch for the smallest sound or sight of treachery." As a result, his official stance at the conference table was rigid, often rude or at least barely polite, secretive, formal, very general, and given to diatribes and not dialogue as the safest way of dealing with almost any question. As I listened expectantly to innumerable Soviet statements, it seemed to me that both in substance and in form they concealed a curious mixture of feelings of arrogance and fear.

1

The result has been an inflexibility which marks both Soviet policy itself and the conduct of the diplomats charged with communicating it. That the Soviet diplomat is determined to stand by his fixed position

1 Philip E. Mosely, "Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation," in Negotiating with the Russians, ed. by Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951), p. 296.

2 Compare James Reston's interview with Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, published in The New York Times on December 8, 1965.