again have sufficient ground power to offset German contributions to, and thereby the need for, an EDC. The tactic paid off when EDC was defeated by a single vote on August 30, 1954.

Obviously, the Soviets could not use their interests in seeing EDC dissolved as a strong lever against any Chinese ambitions. The lever used may have been the aforementioned Soviet aid which, as revealed by Khrushchev's trip to Peking and the subsequent treaties signed on October 12, was vital to the CPR's First Five Year Plan. Although announced in January 1953, the plan required two years and a series of Soviet aid agreements (of which the October treaties were the last) to get started in February 1955. The Soviets may therefore have urged upon the CPR at Geneva, were the Chinese not already convinced (which, as indicated, seems unlikely), the importance of stopping Ho Chi Minh from provoking American intervention. Had the Chinese refused to do so, or had they failed, the price would have been the diversion of Soviet rubles away from Peking.

The recourse to serious diplomatic bargaining under the impetus of China's revised world outlook and Soviet urgings of mild terms for France was also linked to military realities and assessments. In the short run the Chinese probably argued in meetings with the Vietminh delegation against the resumption of a sustained drive south. Since the Vietminh's principal supply and communications complex existed near the China frontier, a vast follow-up assault would have hazarded overextension of the supply line and have encountered unprecedented problems of logistics and telecommunications. Having gained the decisive revolutionary objective where success was certain, the CPR apparently chose not to extend the battle line and introduce the element of doubt. In Peking's projection, control of the Indochinese states, the national goal, was postponable, the more so as the Vietminh had long since indicated designs upon the area which would have run contrary to Chinese ambitions.10 In return for acquiescing in China's veto of a renewed offensive, the Vietminh may have received the assurance of future Chinese support for unification.11

In the long run, however, the move toward a settlement of the crisis was, from the military angle, probably keyed to China's assessment of the risks further Vietminh advances carried for Peking. Although the preponderance of American military power in the Far East seems

Isaac Deutscher, "How the Russians Bet a Little in Asia to Win a Lot in Europe," The Reporter, II, No. 5 (September 23, 1954), 19-20; David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (Philadelphia, 1961), pp. 153-54; Raymond Aron, "Indo-China: A Way Out of the Wood," Réalités, No. 40 (March, 1954), p. 10. The possibility that, by secret agreement, working to defeat EDC became France's quid pro quo for Moscow's support of lenient terms should not be overlooked.

8 These agreements included Soviet withdrawal from the Port Arthur naval base by May 31, 1955; Soviet removal from co-sponsorship of several joint companies, and surrender of full control to the CPR in furtherance of the Five Year Plan; exchange of scientific and technical information; and construction of two rail lines. DAFR 1954, pp. 328-32. The Soviets also gave a long-term credit.

I am indebted for this point to O. Edmund Clubb.

10 It will be recalled that the ICP [Indochinese Communist Party] of 1930 embraced all Indochina, that a National United Front existed even when the ICP was officially dissolved, and that the Vietminh supervised and inspired the Pathet Lao and Khmer resistance forces. In addition, a Vietminh agent had been the guiding light behind an abortive Southeast Asia League formed at Bangkok in September 1947 to include Thailand and Burma as well as the Indochinese states. Richard Butwell, "Communist Liaison in Southeast Asia," United Asia, VI, No. 3 (June, 1954), 150. The unification of Vietnam under Vietminh auspices may therefore have been considered by Peking as a threat to China's unquestioned paramountcy in Southeast Asia. The suggestion of such a deal has been made by Nguyen Ngoc Bich, "Vietnam-An Independent Viewpoint," in P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today (New York, 1962), p. 129.

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to have had the greatest impact upon the Soviet position at Geneva, it has been shown that the new attention of the Eisenhower Administration to Asian affairs, its touted reliance upon air-atomic power, and its talk of nuclear weapons even at the tactical level, coming at a time of growing Chinese awareness of atomic power, attracted considerable attention in Peking. The fifty-five day siege of Dienbienphu had been conducted with Chinese heavy artillery and advisors present, but apparently under a calculation of costs and gains far different from that which Peking applied to the problem of military action with the Geneva Conference in progress. Peking must surely have been aware that the British would remain averse to American intervention plans only so long as the Communists showed a genuine willingness to compromise at Geneva. Renewed fighting amidst intransigence and stalling at the conference table might throw the British in with the Americans and revitalize united action. As has been suggested, the CPR delegation was aware of American pressure upon their allies to walk out of the conference; with the conclusion of United States-United Kingdom talks on collective defense in Southeast Asia and the return of Dulles to Paris, Chou En-lai had voiced concern to Eden about the proposed pact. The United States was not in a position, as during the impasse at Panmunjom over the prisoners-ofwar exchange, to issue strong signals threatening to widen the scope of the war unless the Chinese changed their attitude. But while the American nuclear potential did not take on the aura of an immediate threat to Peking, it probably provided a further reason for the Chinese to consider a drive to unify Vietnam unduly risky of gains already made, and to deem the time propitious for reaping the credit of having brought the war to an end. In this respect, the partition of Vietnam was the best outcome the West could have hoped for, but also the most the Chinese thought politically expedient or militarily sound to demand.

12 See Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962), chapter 2.

[Chapter XII, Faithful Echo. Copyright © 1960 by Robert B. Ekvall. Twayne Publishers. Reprinted by permission.]

REPATRIATION OF CIVILIANS: THE SINGLE
AGREEMENT*

By Robert B. Ekvall

(Interpreter for the U.S. Negotiating Team, 1955 Geneva Ambassadorial Talks; now Honorary Curator, Asian Ethnology, Thomas Burke Memorial State Museum, University of Washington)

Choosing the right word at the conference table is a split-second decision, although in any conference, ready-made and much-worn clichés are common coin. Choice of the right word in the text of an agreed announcement or joint communiqué, on the other hand, is the end result of argument, hard semantic bargaining, and, if need be, linguistic chicanery which may at times backfire. Such hair-splitting may seem unnecessarily fine, yet it deals with reality, and the results mean loss or gain as may be seen in the agreed announcement that came out of the Sino-American talks in September of 1955.

In the summer of 1955, forty-one Americans, arrested on a variety of charges, were in Communist Chinese jails, brainwashed, broken, sick, and unwilling pawns in a series of intricate moves in power politics. On the first of August of that year, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, representing the government of the United States of America, and Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, representing the government of the People's Republic of China, together with their assistants and interpreters, met in the president's room of the Palais des Nations in Geneva to negotiate the release and return of these Americans.

The wording of the understanding which had brought the United States and the People's Republic of China face to face at a conference table was carefully impartial. The subject of the talks was to be "the return of civilians and other practical matters at issue." The formula tacitly admitted the fiction that there were Chinese civilians in the United States who would equally benefit, though as a matter of fact no Chinese were being similarly held in the United States. At the first meeting, after procedural matters had been settled, it was agreed that the return of civilians would constitute the first item of the agenda.

*NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF. The Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks in Geneva to secure the release of the Americans in China took place August 1, 1955 to September 10. 1955. The exchanges in these meetings are still secret, so this first-hand account by Colonel Robert B. Ekvall, an ingenious interpreter, is of special interest.

Washington and Peking concluded an agreement in six weeks of hard negotiations. This single agreement (the only concluded transaction which the U.S. has had on a government-to-government basis with Peking) was promptly violated by Peking, from the American standpoint, and became a matter of bitter dispute between the two countries. Peking did not immediately release the American prisoners, as the Americans sincerely thought the agreement meant, and the prisoners were dribbled out of China over a long period of time. As of 1969 a few Americans were still in Chinese jails.

It was also agreed that the meetings would be private in nature, that is, disagreement would remain within the conference room and only agreements would be publicly announced.

The subject appeared too simple and uncomplicated to be true. It wasn't; or at least not entirely so. Behind this simple façade was the extremely complicated range of the different postures, diverse motivations, and opposed policy objectives of the two governments. The summary of these differing motivations and objectives which follows is not an official one; nor is it one admissible by either side. It is a distillation of all the ideas and impressions left in the mind of this interpreter by reason of his function and has validity only in that context as his personal opinion.

The Americans wished to secure the release of all their nationals held in Communist Chinese jails while according the minimum possible degree of recognition-quasi-diplomatic, de facto, or whatever other sort to the People's Republic of China and at the same time. move forward as slowly as possible-always talking, however, rather than risking war-in negotiation and agreement on whatever else might be comprehended within the term "other practical matters at issue."

The Chinese, by the calculated piecemeal release of the Americans at a rate designed to bring the most benefit in support of their objectives, wished to gain the maximum advantage from an accumulation of quasi-diplomatic contacts and exchanges, such as a well-publicized official contact in regular meetings and the issuance of statements of mutual agreement. The sum total of all this would be an impressive picture of the United States and the People's Republic of China, in increasing harmony, moving toward settlement of such matters as embargo and cultural exchange and finally arriving at a meeting at the foreign ministers level which, inferentially, could only result in de jure as well as de facto recognition. Such a sequence would enhance the international status of the People's Republic of China and, as a useful by-product, would arouse aggravation, frustration, and mounting suspicion of United States motives and policy in the very heart of the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan.

Such was the background, agreed agenda, and masked motives of the talks which began in August of 1955. The talks were not like those of Panmunjom, for though the two interpreters had both been there, everything else was different and the atmosphere was relaxed and easy. With urbanity and even the minimal social amenities the talks moved slowly toward the first agreement.

First, of course, we reached "agreement in principle," which only means that both sides agree to keep on talking. Then we reached agreement "in substance," but much of that substance was unformed, eluding definition. Then, section by section, paragraph by paragraph, and finally, sentence by sentence and clause by clause, the substance of agreement was defined. On the day before the announcement would be made only agreement on two or three words remained as a task not yet finished. That completed, the first agreement between the governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China-fashioned, however, as two separate parallel statements by the respective governments-would be ready for announcement to the world.

Propaganda and fictions held as fact frequently victimize their authors quite as much as the intended dupes. The fiction, held as basic truth by the Chinese, that the Chinese language is internationally equal with English, while possessing a certain validity at the conference table, was a handicap when addressing world public opinion and led to strange linguistic maneuvering with unforeseen consequences.

One item of critical importance in the agreement was when or how soon the civilians would "exercise their right to return." Our aim was the immediate: hours of close and sometimes bitter argument and probing had been spent in trying to determine just when all those who had suffered so long and hoped so long in vain in Chinese jails could expect release. But the stubborn refusal of the Chinese ruled out immediacy for all, though promising it for some. Much hope had been held out, however, that all could leave very soon after we reached agreement on the announcement; such an announcement in itself would be sign and proof of bettered relations between the two countries.

In the English text originally proposed by the United States negotiator, the phrase used was "promptly to exercise their right to return." A Chinese rendering of the word "promptly" was a matter of some difficulty. The word for "promptly" in the most common Chinese use also means "immediately" and we knew that would not be accepted. In the course of explanation, we defined "promptly" in terms of "without delay." But the Chinese would not accept such a definition and rejected the word "promptly" in the English text because it implied a command. Such had not been our intent but, belatedly, it was realized that in certain contexts the word "prompt" did mean something like an order, or at least more than a diplomatic nudge. Disclaiming all intent to give commands, we agreed to drop "promptly."

In the English text which the Chinese proposed the phrase "as soon as possible" was one we could not accept. Although "soon" was what we wanted, we did not want it dependent on the "possible" which introduced a new concept, not of time but of possibility. The attention of both sides then focused on the term used in the Chinese text proposed by the Chinese. It was a compound, chin-su, chin, utmost, and su, fast. It seemed to embody just what we were seeking, and I proposed as its English equivalent "very quickly."

The Chinese felt constrained to consult among themselves and after some discussion countered with their own suggestion. The need to have the last word seems to be one of the compulsions of their negotiating posture. They are never willing to accept what has been suggested by the other side when it is in conformity with their own desires but feel compelled to suggest something that bears their own trademark. In this instance they should have let well enough alone, for they suggested "expeditiously."

It was the best of words for us. In addition to the idea of "quickly,” which was all the Chinese had in mind, it had connotations of efficacy and efficient action far beyond anything we had sought to gain in the word "promptly." It was strong, and as the club they offered us for use, "expeditiously" was heavier than we could have hoped for. The weight of the phrase "expeditiously to exercise their right to return" has pressed strongly ever since on a world opinion that still knows English better than it knows Chinese and which has never noticed, if