had been much reduced, and (b) that any Soviet military commitment on behalf of China was probably not automatic and predetermined but would be decided on the basis of a careful Soviet evaluation of the actual situation. 4. The crisis failed to confirm China's estimate of the existing balance of forces; rather the nature of the United States response tended to support the uncertainty present in the Soviet estimate of the existing strategic balance. 5. Even as military activity continued, China's main objectives were moving more directly to the political plane. The aim now was to resist any two-China solution, and, by such devices as intermittent cease fires and odd-day shelling, to maintain a "safe" level of tension in the area high enough to make it embarrassing for the United States to compel a Chinese Nationalist evacuation of the islands (that is, an evacuation that would be attributed to Chinese Communist military pressure); low enough to prevent an expansion of hostilities that might prematurely involve China and/or the Soviet Union in a nuclear exchange with the United States. Such a state of chronic, moderate tension would serve the long-term political-military objectives of Communist China in the Far East, which call ultimately for the control of Taiwan and the retreat of America from the Western Pacific. The 1958 Taiwan crisis not only confirmed the impossibility of China's achieving even local objectives in the face of United States opposition without overt Soviet backing but also had the incidental effect of demonstrating the poor quality of Communist China's air force, whose Mig's were outflown tactically by the outnumbered F-86 aircraft of the Chinese Nationalists even before the latter began using the Sidewinder. This failure was never publicly admitted, but the air force's poor initial performance and subsequent inability to take counteraction must have pointed up to Peking the inadequacies of China's equipment and training programs. This recognition, together with the ambiguity surrounding the Soviet deterrent shield, could only have underscored for the Chinese their general military weakness on the international scene. THE LONG-HAUL APPROACH Developments of the last quarter of 1958 and the first half of 1959 reinforce our hypothesis that during the course of 1958 the Chinese had accepted a strategic estimate that recognized, temporarily at least, China's weakness and the limitations on military activities that such weakness imposed, and subordinated immediate military goals to the long-range achievement of political, economic, and military objectives. The long-haul approach was dramatically reaffirmed in late October, and at the same time it became evident that the Chinese were revising upward some of their evaluations of Western strength. Transitional strategic concepts, pending China's own development of nuclear weapons, appeared to dominate Chinese military thinking. In fact, as the commune movement gathered momentum, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] was increasingly mobilized for internal economic purposes; the professional military officers who might have challenged its enlistment in such nonmilitary activities were further curbed. At the same time, however, the pursuit of scientific development in the interest of national defense and under Party leadership clearly remained a major, long-term objective. These developments took place within a framework of Sino-Soviet security arrangements that still did not appear to have been fully defined. On October 20, Shih-chieh Chih-shih first published the short collection of Mao Tse-tung's writings, under the title "Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers." It was reprinted in the Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao on October 28,19 and, in expanded form, in the October 31 issue of Jen-min Jih-pao. The latter edition included such statements as: "Capitalism had reached a decrepit, moribund state"; "All reactionaries are paper tigers"; and "United States military bases on foreign territories are all nooses around the necks of the United States imperialists." It also quoted Mao's reply to Anna Louise Strong, in 1946, as follows: The atom bomb is a paper tiger with which the American reactionaries try to terrify the people. It looks terrible, but in fact is not. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass annihilation; the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new weapons.20 In addition, however, the collection included certain excerpts from Mao's Moscow speech of November 18, 1957, published here for the first time, in which Mao, having called the reactionaries "paper tigers," insisted nevertheless that "strategically we should despise all enemies, and tactically take them seriously." 21 The picture in late October was in keeping with standard communist propaganda practice whenever one line is being abandoned in favor of another. As earlier themes were reiterated, there was evidence of a new orientation, which seemed to include a re-evaluation of previous assumptions with respect to Western weakness. The same anomaly was noticeable in November in the publicity campaign for the study of Mao's paper-tiger writings. A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of November 12, which dealt with the recently published collection of Mao's statements, again depicted the United States as unsheathing its claws, baring its fangs, and brandishing atomic weapons, and warned the people to recognize the true nature of the paper tiger and not to overestimate the might of the Western imperialists. But the editorial ended on a different note: Viewed from the over-all situation of the struggle, the way their relative strength is developing, and the essence of the matter, the imperialists and all reactionaries are paper tigers and the revolutionary people have every reason to despise them. But in the actual struggle against the imperialists and on specific questions, revolutionaries should pay great attention to the enemy and concentrate their strength in the battle so as to ensure the winning of victory. . . . 22 19 Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), October 28, 1958, in Union Research Service, Vol. 13, No. 9, October 31, 1958. 20 Mao Tse-tung, "Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers," in CB, No. 534, November 12, 1958, p. 8. There are several versions of Mao's reply to Miss Strong. That given in Shih-chieh Chih-shih reads: "The atomic bomb is a paper tiger and has not much use. Is it not that the goats on the boats near Bikini survived the atomic bomb?" (See Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong], October 28, 1958, in Union Research Service, Vol. 13, No. 9. October 31, 1958, p. 127.) For the version given by Miss Strong in her book Dawn out of China, published in 1948, see pages 1 and 2. 21 Mao Tse-tung, "Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers," in CB, No. 534, November 12, 1958, p. 11. 22 JMJP, November 12, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1897, November 19, 1958, pp. 6-8. 26-365-69-4 The more cautious line expressed in this last paragraph gained ground in November and thereafter. In a November 22 broadcast to the armed forces, General Yang Yung admitted: Our enemies are still powerful. They will desperately fight for their The fact that the shift in the Chinese propaganda line occurred in the period following the Quemoy crisis, and more particularly following Khrushchev's clarifying statement of October 5, suggests that this shift reflected a Chinese reaction not only to their own poor performance in the Quemoy affair but also to the firm posture that the United States had assumed and the USSR had failed to assume on that occasion. The nature of the United States response in the Taiwan area could only have cast doubt on Peking's evaluation of Western weakness. In any event, China's discontinuance, shortly after Quemoy, of any dramatic assertions of impending Western doom gave greater prominence to the long-haul orientation that had become increasingly evident in the fall of 1958. The paper-tiger theme, however, was revived briefly in early January, when the USSR launched its "cosmic" rocket.24 But at the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU there was further evidence that Peking's line was moving closer to Moscow's. Khrushchev described the Soviet Seven Year Plan as a "decisive stage in the economic competition of socialism and capitalism." He added that the plan, when fulfilled, will so greatly increase the economic potential of the USSR that, When the USSR becomes the world's leading industrial power, when the PRC becomes a mighty industrial power, and when all the socialist countries together will be producing more than half of the world industrial output, then, said Khrushchev, "the international situation will change radically": The new balance of forces will be so evident that even the most diehard imperialists will clearly see the futility of any attempt to unleash a war against the socialist camp. 25 Speaking of the present military balance, however, Khrushchev went. no further than to say that "the correlation of real forces in the world today now is such that we shall be able to repel any attack by any enemy." 26 Chou En-lai, who addressed the Congress on the following day, appeared to place a greater emphasis than Khrushchev on the present danger of war, much like USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Mali 23 Chinese Home Service, Peking, November 22, 1958. 24 See NCNA, Peking, January 4, 1959. 25 Khrushchev's speech to the Twenty-first Party Congress, Pravda, January 28, 1959, in CDSP, Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 19. CDSP, Vol. 11. No. 5, p. 17. novsky. But in the general tenor of his speech, Chou went along with Khrushchev's stress on peaceful economic competition and the change that would take place in the international situation when the Seven Year Plan had been realized: At the present time, peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism is taking place on a world-wide scale. The socialist camp is growing ever more prosperous while the imperialist camp totters to its fall. This enables people to see clearly that the socialist system, full of vigor and vitality, is incomparably superior to the decadent capitalist system. The socialist camp has long since gained absolute superiority over the imperialist camp in terms of popular support, size of populations, and rate of increase of production. In the most important branches of science and technology—in developing rockets, for instance the Soviet Union has already left the United States far behind. The Soviet Union's great plan to build Communism indicates that the competition between socialism and capitalism has reached a new stage. When this seven-year plan is realized, the Soviet Union will have surpassed Britain and West Germany in per capita production; and in another five years it will have outstripped the United States in per capita production. During this period, China and the other socialist countries will also develop by leaps and bounds. By that time, the socialist camp will have gained absolute superiority over the imperialist camp in material production. We can say with full confidence that the day is not far off when socialism will gain the decisive victory in its peaceful competition with capitalism. Latest international developments indicate that the enemy rots away with every passing day while for us things are daily getting better. . . . 27 Chou En-lai, speech delivered to the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU on January 28, 1959, NCNA, Moscow, January 28, 1959, in SCMP, No. 1948, February 4, 1959, pp. 2-7. [From Reporter in Red China. Copyright © 1966 by Charles Taylor. Random House. Reprinted by permission.] ENVOYS TO THE GREAT WITHIN* By Charles Taylor (Foreign Correspondent, Toronto Globe and Mail) On the sea, east of Peking, is a small town called Pei Tai Ho, with a beach and a hotel. Here, in July and August, foreign residents in Peking are permitted to take their holidays. There is little to do except sleep and lie in the sun. But even when engaged in such innocent. pursuits, foreigners arouse the stern suspicion of Chinese officials and are subject to careful regulation. There is a notice board on the beach with instructions in Chinese, Russian, and English. Some of the points are routine, but three are remarkable: -Sea bathers must wear dark-colored swimming suits. The mentally defective should be kept from sea bathing. -To promote the spirit of friendship and mutual help, collective sea bathing is recommended. (signed) The People's Council of Pei Tai Ho District. It was only in 1861 that the Chinese established their Foreign Ministry. Before that they made do with an Office for Barbarian Affairs. Today something of the arrogance implied in that earlier title is still manifest in Chinese dealings with foreign residents and visitors. For while it would be absurd to maintain that Communism has not brought great changes to China and has not influenced the mentality and methods of the leaders, the Chinese name for their country is still Chung Kuo-the Middle Kingdom. As under previous dynasties, the Chinese still show deep feelings of cultural and racial superiority, and a conviction that the world revolves around Peking. To them, to some extent, we are still barbarians who come bearing tribute to the Celestial Court and are graciously permitted in turn to study the excellence of Chinese civilization. Today nearly fifty nations have embassies or trading offices in Peking, with hundreds of diplomats, secretaries, and family members. About thirty foreign correspondents are resident in the capital, and *NOTE BY SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF. The book from which this excerpt is taken, was the result of eighteen months spent by the author in China as resident correspondent for the Toronto Globe and Mail, Mr. Taylor was based in Peking from May 1964 to October 1965, as one of four correspondents from the West, and the only North American. |