lord anybody participating in that government simply entered a pigpen. Under Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship, whoever participated in his government at most was given a position as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, or Minister of Economic Affairs or Minister of Health. What use was that? If our country joins the United Nations, we cannot have a majority in voting; formally the difficult situation may be moderated to some extent, but actually the struggle that arises will be more violent and we shall lose our present freedom of action. Though standing outside of the United Nations, we could still participate in the Bandung Conference. We made tremendous achievements in that conference. Last year we signed treaties of friendship with five countries (Cambodia, Nepal, Afghanistan, Yemen and Guinea), and settled problems about the boundary lines between China and Burma and between China and Nepal just because the United States had no chance to join in the negotiation or to exert pressure. At the present moment we have established diplomatic relationships with 39 countries, without any possibility of being hindered by the United States. Outside of the United Nations, we have enjoyed a peaceful coexistence with the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the peaceful area is being enlarged. The present situation is to stand firm against the United States and maintain peaceful coexistence with many other countries. As for the attitude towards new China, some people adopted the nonrecognition policy; some adopted the semirecognition policy; and some gave complete recognition. Some wanted to imitate China and came to learn some lessons from us. Some accorded recognition out of fear; some gave recognition because of their dependence on China; some wished to limit the development of China by dragging it into the United Nations in order to harness it. In general, the situation is very complicated. At present, there is a note in international affairs sounding a call to mediate between China and the United States and to act as a bridge between China and the United States. Both Japan and England wanted to do some work by bridging the relations between China and the United States. We have no objection to this, provided they build the bridge. After the bridge is built, who will take the first step to cross it? Will the United States come first? Or shall we go first? The United States must withdraw from Taiwan so that we shall meet at the center of the bridge, and neither one will have an advantage over the other. The world is like a chessboard, and "one careless step will cause the loss of the whole game." We must struggle hard to take even one step. It is entirely reasonable for us to require the United States to withdraw from Taiwan. We must struggle hard to take this step. . . . The international situation makes it impossible for us to be easygoing, casual and indecisive. Time does not wait for us, so that we must hasten forward and catch up with the others. If we surpass the others, we must do so at a price; we must be ready to suffer injury and accidents. Because of the severe natural disasters and because our grain production was reduced, we must be satisfied with a lower standard and an alternative goal that is almost as good as our original goal. We must conquer the temporary difficulties and be ready to struggle against hardship; with diligence and thrift and economy we must stand united in spirit and in endeavor so as to overcome the temporary difficulties. Our position and prestige in the international scene we must gain through our own efforts, for we cannot depend on others to be generous enough to give us what we want. The imperialists speak of "the position and policy of strength" while we speak of the position and policy of revolutionary strength. The imperialists resort to counterrevolutionary methods, while we use revolutionary methods to deal with them. Generally speaking, because of domestic unity, internal construction and the correct foreign policy, our country has won for itself a very high position in the international scene. We must not, however, be proud or conceited, but be modest and humble though not submissive. It is the joint strength of China and the Soviet Union that can hold back American imperialism, strong and great as it is. Without this, many serious problems will arise in the world. We have already resisted it for 11 years and we are ready to resist it for another 11 years or so. If we want to have relatives [sic] we should look for them in Socialist countries and countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, not in the Western countries, especially the United States. There is nothing which can prevent China from becoming strong and wielding some influence in the world. Our enemies have felt happy about the natural disasters that descended upon our country, pleased beyond expression, forgetting that they too may meet catastrophes on a large scale in the future. Some of our friends do not really understand us and we must be patient, not reckoning our accounts with them too exactly. This is a part of our understanding as friends, for their attitude towards us and ours towards them are simply parts of our understanding. Africa is now both the center of the anticolonialist struggle and the center for East and West to fight for the control of an intermediary zone, so that it has become the key point of world interest. The general situation is the forced withdrawal of old colonialism from Asia or at least a large part of Asia and the changing of the last battlefield to Africa. The entry of America's new colonialism into Africa has resulted in the crowding out of old colonialism. The present struggle will go on even for one inch of territory. We must also develop our relationship with the movement for national independence in various parts of Africa... The cyclic frequency of economic crises in the United States being shortened, Kennedy said after his inauguration that this problem will not be solved during his presidency. On account of the growing strength of the Socialist camp, there has been some industrial construction in the national states of Asia and Africa and the markets for goods of the United States have gradually become contracted. All these are symptoms indicating the arrival of great waves of economic crises in the Western world; it is incorrect to say that great waves came immediately but also incorrect not to recognize this symptom. Internal conditions in countries of the Western world are clearly decaying. The smell of gun powder is more evident in Kennedy's administration than in Eisenhower's, for it is more reactionary, treacherous, elusive and deceitful. There was a kind of saying during Kennedy's presidential campaign and after his election that he was comparatively realistic, loving peace, and desirous of relaxing the world situation. But facts have proved that the cards he played in Laos, Cuba and the Congo did not show any indication of relaxation. The general characteristics of speeches made by the principal personnel in Kennedy's government are: active preparation for war and a struggle for supremacy in nuclear armament. What the United States thought was that before strengthening its armed power the people of the world should be given a wrong impression and an illusion by posing in an attitude of relaxing the international situation. At present the United States dares not undertake a large-scale nuclear war because it could not get the support of the people and because of the nuclear gap. Hence, Kennedy wants to walk on two legs: on the one hand to raise American technology to the highest degree of perfection in order to reduce the missile gap and on the other hand to enlarge the standing army, develop conventional weapons and prepare actively for a limited and sublimited war. In his public speeches Kennedy said that it was necessary to be ready for three kinds of war: all-out war, limited war and sublimited war, with more odor of gun powder, this being a substantial problem. It is better to maintain a frozen relationship between China and the United States, with a continued impasse for many years. If this problem is to be settled, we want to do so all at once; that is, the United States must withdraw its troops from Taiwan, recognize the new China and be ready to exchange newspaper reporters, etc. These should all be solved simultaneously. In this way we shall continue to raise high the banner of anti-imperialism, freely support the struggle for national independence of colonies and semicolonies, maintain the power to strengthen our political position and lift up our morale. At present our country is still keeping in touch with the United States, and the Warsaw negotiations are still in progress. Some people criticize us for being too stiff and unbending, but this is not correct criticism. Our country has already made many concessions such as giving entry permits to the American writer [Edgarl Snow and an American Negro scholar to visit China; we have further released more than 40 American criminals, but the United States has not made one concession. Up to the present time we can see no expression of relaxation concerning Sino-American relations or any sign of sincerity. This is why we say that the unbending attitude is found on the side of the United States, and not on the side of China. Of course, the far-reaching view of the relationship between the two countries is optimistic and some day this problem will arrive at a satisfactory solution. . . . Recently, most worthy of notice has been [the fact] that from "two Chinas" the United States has changed to seeing "one and a half China." It has virtually admitted that China has suzerainty over Taiwan, making Taiwan into a "semi-independent" state. A big China contains a small China, and one is added to one half. It seems that there are no more "two Chinas." Neither we nor Chiang Kai-shek has ever accepted "two Chinas." Now there is "one and one half China,” and some people are saying "that [if] half of Taiwan is conceded, China may stop there!" We are resolved to oppose this firmly. This method of American imperialism is intended to test our firmness in opposing im perialism, whether we shall yield under pressure or not. China is a new Socialist country, and if it yields or lets an imperialist army occupy our own territory, the international prestige of China will topple over. We need not take back Taiwan at present, so that the United States will continue to be in an equivocal position, criticized but unable to admit the legal status of its occupation. "One and a half China" is in reality a crystallization of the plot of "two Chinas"; it is a cup of poisonous wine, sweet in taste but strong poison, which we can never drink. A general review of the present international situation shows that there is an intensification of the five contradictions on the side of our enemies. They are: (1) the contradiction between the ruling class and their own people; (2) the contradiction within the ruling clique; (3) the contradiction between imperialism and the movement of national independence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; (4) the contradiction between the United States and its allies, together with its satellites; (5) the contradiction between the imperialist camp and the Socialist camp. All these contradictions have been responsible for the tense and complicated appearance of the international situation. Until Socialism secures a complete victory in the world, these contradictions cannot secure a basic solution but can only get partial relaxation. The general trend will be that while relaxation in one part appears, the other part will become tense again. We must be able to analyze concretely the complicated situation and handle it properly. We must unite the progressive forces, strive to get at the intermediate forces and isolate imperialism. We must unite the Socialist camp, support actively the struggle of the people of colonies and semicolonies, try to establish friendly relations with all countries, isolate the bloc including Nehru in India and Tito in Yugoslavia and oppose American imperialism. We must strengthen the internal unity, intensify the great international unity, unite all forces available, carry out successfully domestic construction and proceed with a struggle against American imperialism, like two needles pointing at each other. In order to succeed in all these, we must carry on well the internal construction of our country and realize the importance of our foundation. Only through successful internal construction can we expect great accomplishments in international affairs. [From "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace." Reprinted in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift. The M.I.T. Press, 1964] TIT-FOR-TATISM (Comment by the Editorial Departments of People's FIGHT OR CAPITULATE? World peace can be won only through struggle by the people of all countries and not by begging the imperialists for it. Peace can be effectively safeguarded only by relying on the masses of the people and waging a tit-for-tat struggle against the imperialist policies of aggression and war. This is the correct policy. Tit-for-tat struggle is an important conclusion drawn by the Chinese people from their prolonged struggle against imperialism and its lackeys. Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: Chiang Kai-shek always tries to wrest every ounce of power and every ounce of gain from the people. And we? Our policy is to give them tit for tat and to fight for every inch of land. We act after his fashion. (Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, IV, p. 14.) He added: He always tries to impose war on the people, one sword in his left hand and another in his right. We take up swords, too, following his example. (Ibid.) Analysing the domestic political situation in 1945, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: "How to give 'tit for tat' depends on the situation. Sometimes not going to negotiations is tit-for-tat, and sometimes going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat . . . if they start fighting, we fight back, fight to win peace. Peace will not come unless we strike hard blows at the reactionaries who dare to attack the liberated areas." (Ibid., p. 56.) He drew the following historical lesson from the failure of China's revolution of 1924-27: "Confronted by counter-revolutionary attacks against the people, Chen Tu-hsiu did not adopt the policy of giving tit for tat and fighting for every inch of land; as a result, in 1927, within the space of a few months, the people lost all the rights they had won." (Ibid., p. 16.) The Chinese communists understand and adhere to the policy of giving tit for tat. We oppose both capitulationism and adventurism. This correct policy insured the victory of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese people's subsequent great successes in their struggle against imperialism. |