I have thus examined, at length, the nature and the practical operation of the Mosaic institutions in regard to servitude. But one point remains, to settle the inquiry whether we can derive an argument from the Mosaic institutions in defence of slavery as it exists in our land, or to determine whether it is proper to infer, as is often done, that because the Hebrew institutions tolerated slavery, that, therefore, the system is right as it exists in the United States. This will make it necessary to compare the Mosaic arrangements already described, with those existing in this country.

§3. Comparison of the Mosaic institutions in relation to Slavery with those existing in the United States.

and

The Mosaic institutions are, as has been before remarked, often appealed to in support of slavery as it exists at the present time. It is inferred, that because Moses permitted it, under the sanction of God, that therefore it is lawful now. This argument supposes that slavery, as Moses tolerated it, had substantially the same features which it has now, that consequently it is right to argue from one to the other. It is important, therefore, to bring into comparison the features of slavery as it exists now, with those which were tolerated under the Mosaic laws; for nothing can be clearer than that if an argument can be constructed at all in favour of slavery from the fact that it was tolerated by Moses, that argument can be adduced only in favour of those features of servitude which he himself imbodied in his civil code.

Before proceeding, however, to notice the things in which slavery in this country differs essentially from that tolerated under the Mosaic laws, there is one remark which it is important to make, in order to obtain a clear view of the argument. It is, that it is no certain evidence that a thing is approved, or is regarded as best, because it is tolerated. The circumstances may be such that the evil could not at once be prevented without tearing up the very foundations

of society, and, therefore, it may be necessary to connive at it. The ultimate good may on the whole be more promoted, if it is permitted, with arrangements to modify it, and ultimately to remove it, than it would be if there were a violent effort to remove it at once. We have certain evidence that there were some things allowed by Moses, and for which he legislated, which were not regarded as arrangements moşt conducive to the happiness of society, and which it was never intended should always exist. Among these things we may mention (a) polygamy. Nothing can be clearer from the New Testament than that polygamy was not originally designed when man was made, (Matt. xix. 4,) and that it was not regarded as the best institution for society, or to be perpetuated for the good of mankind, (1 Tim. iii. 2; 1 Cor. vii. 2;) and yet this was practised by nearly all the patriarchs, and was tolerated by the Mosaic laws I am aware that it is denied by the advocates of slavery,* and by some most decided abolitionists -extremes meeting here-that Moses tolerated polygamy, or that he ever legislated for it, and that even Dr. Dwight denies it. The argument on which Dr. Dwight rests, and the only one, is the marginal reading in the English version of Lev. xviii. 18, "Thou shalt not take one wife to another." The reading in the text is, "Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, to vex her, besides the other, in her lifetime." But, that the reading in the text is the correct one, is apparent, (1.) because the main discussion in the chapter is not about polygamy, but about marrying near relations. Having stated the general principles on that subject, nothing was more natural than for the lawgiver to add, that though, in itself, it was not unlawful to marry the sister of a wife, and he did not mean to prohibit that—a question

* See the Southern Literary Messenger, for September, 1845, p. 521. See the Letters of the Rev. A. A. Phelps, to Professor Stowe, Theology, vol. iii. pp. 419, 420.

which could not but occur-yet that it was not proper to do There were obvious evils and impro

it in her lifetime.'

prieties accompanying such a step, which would render it undesirable that it should be done. (2.) This is the fair construction of the Hebrew-na wife to her sister,' and it will not properly bear any other. So the Vulgate explicitly-Sororem uxoris tuæ in pellicatum illius non accipies-adhuc illâ vivente. So the LXX, Tuvaixa in' ådɛnpy ἀντῆς, κ. τ. λ. So the Targum of Onkelos, the Samaritan, the Syriac, and the Arabic. So Coverdale renders it. Indeed, there is no interpretation of a passage better settled than this. That polygamy was tolerated by Moses, will further appear from the following remarks:

(1.) The act of legislation in Ex. xxi. 7-10, has reference to polygamy, and authorized it. "And if a man sell his daughter to be a maid-servant, she shall not go out as the men-servants do. If she please not her master, who hath betrothed her to himself, then shall he let her be redeemed': to sell her unto a strange nation he shall have no power, seeing he hath dealt deceitfully with her. And if he have betrothed her unto his son, he shall deal with her after the manner of daughters. If he take him another wife, her food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage, shall he not diminish.” The case supposed is that of an Israelite who should sell his daughter to be a ‘maid-servant,' and that the daughter thus sold' might be betrothed' to him or to his son. If, after being thus betrothed to her master, she did not please him, the law was that she should be allowed to be redeemed. no case should she be sold to a strange people. In case she was betrothed' to his son, and he chose to take to himself another wife, there were certain things which were not to be withheld from her. She was not to be discarded, or deprived of support, or treated in any other way than she would have been if the other wife' had not been taken. "Her food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage, shall he not diminish." The argument in this passage turns on the meaning of two

In

words; that rendered 'betrothed,' and that rendered duty of marriage.' About the former, there can be little difference of opinion. The Hebrew word " means properly, to point out, to appoint, to fix. The idea of designating, appointing, fixing as of a time or place for worship, for a meeting, for trial, &c., is the essential idea in the word. Job ii. 11, ix. 19; Neh. vi. 2, 10; Amos iii. 3; Jer. xlix. 19, 1. 44. It is rendered in this place, by Gesenius, "to fix upon as a wife or concubine, to betroth ;" and there can be no doubt that the thing contemplated was such a designation as a wife or as a concubine, since she had already been 'purchased' as a maidservant. The case seems to have been such as would not unfrequently occur, in which after one had been procured as a 'maid-servant' by the promise or payment of wages, or of a 'price' to her father-with the security that she could never be sold' he who had thus secured her for his employ, or his son, might be disposed to sustain to her the nearer relation of a husband. The law was designed to guard that point, so that no advantage should be taken of her condition as a servant, to oppress her, or to do her wrong. If the father who had secured her services was not pleased with her, after having designed to enter into this new relation, he should not take advantage of the fact that he was the purchaser, and sell her, but should allow her to be honourably redeemed, or restored again to freedom; if the son, who had no claim of purchase, he should be bound to treat her as a wife, even if he chose to marry another. The law, therefore, was every way humane, and was designed to prevent the worst kind of oppression that of an unprotected female in humble life. The other word on which the interpretation of the passage depends, rendered duty of marriage,' niy, is derived from a verb (y) which means to rest, to dwell; and the noun means a living together, cohabitation, says Gesenius, "in the conjugal sense.". So the Talmud understands it in this place. The Hebrew noun occurs nowhere else except in Hos. x. 10, where it is rendered furrows, though the reading

there is doubtful, and by a different pointing the word would mean, more appropriately, sins. In the passage before us, the versions all sustain the interpretation which supposes that the reference is to cohabitation as man and wife. Thus the Vulgate renders it, et pretium pudicitiæ non negabit. The Septuagint, τὴν ὁμιλίαν οὐκ ἀποστερήσει he shall not de prive her of her marriage rites.'* The Chaldee Paraphrase has the same word as the Hebrew, and the Arabic renders it, her times.' The Syraic renders it by a word still more expressive, about which there can be no doubt, meaning accubitus; lying with, cohabitation. There can be no wellfounded doubt, therefore, about the meaning of this passage, (ver. 10,) and if the interpretation given be correct, it proves that Moses contemplated, that in the case referred to, while the son had another wife, he should in all respects, in her food, her raiment, and in respect to the marriage rights, regard and treat her as his wife. He was not at liberty to treat her otherwise because he had taken another. The fair meaning of the word here, it seems to me, will not bear the interpretation proposed by Mr. Phelps,t of habitation, meaning that he should furnish her a residence. If it will not, then polygamy in one form was tolerated by Moses, and legislated for.

(2.) The act of legislation in Deut. xxi. 15, 16, proves that polygamy was tolerated by Moses. "If a man have two wives, one beloved, and another hated, and they have born him children, both the beloved and the hated; and if the firstborn son be her's that was hated: then it shall be, when he maketh his sons to inherit that which he hath, that he may not make the son of the beloved firstborn before the son of the hated, which is indeed the firstborn." In this case it is supposed that a man might have two wives,' and the design of the ordinance is to prevent a kind of injustice which would not be unlikely to occur, when a man, in disposing of his property by will, might be induced to depart from the

* Thompson.

† Letter to Prof. Stowe.