the freight to the initial company to its receipt by the plaintiff from the receiving company occurred while the defendants were responsible for the freight, in whole or in part, and the justice's court might very well infer that the injury to the freight occurred during the six days. The serious question in the case, however, is raised by the first objection. What was the duty of the defendants, in this regard, upon the arrival of the freight at the siding at Charlotte? By section 34 of chapter 676 of the Laws of 1892, it is provided that every railroad corporation "shall furnish sufficient accommodations for the transportation of all passengers and property which shall be offered for transportation at the place of starting within a reasonable time previously thereto, and at the junctions with other railroads, and at the usual stopping places established for receiv ing and discharging way passengers and freight," etc. The defendants are common carriers. They had a traffic arrangement with the initial road in regard to the carrying of freight. They shared with this road in the profits of such carriage. They had notice of the arrival of this freight at the place where it was their duty to receive it, and from the nature of the freight specified in the "through waybill," and the rate charged, the justice's court had a right to find that they knew it was perishable. They also knew that they were sharing in the profits of carrying this perishable freight at advanced rates. They had the right to take this freight, and transport it in other cars. It was their duty to do so, rather than let it remain five or six days, until the cars were repaired in which it came, and during which time, from the nature of the freight, it was liable to be destroyed. The defendants cannot shelter themselves from the responsibility, under the arrangement with the initial company that it should repair the cars when their inspector pronounced them defective. A railroad company receiving perishable property for transportation is bound to forward it im mediately to its destination. This was their obligation at common law. Tierny v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 76 N. Y. 308. At the time of the decision in this case, there was a statute in force imposing that duty (chapter 140, § 36, Laws 1850), which was repealed by the railroad act of 1892, but the common-law obligation still remains. In Insurance Co. v. Wheeler, 49 N. Y. 616, the defendants were operating a railroad running east from Ogdensburg. The Northern Transportation Company, operating a line of propellers on the Great Lakes, and connecting with the defendants' road at Ogdensburg, and having a traffic arrangement with the defendants, delivered a quantity of flour at a warehouse in Ogdensburg used in common by the two concerns, the expense of handling being paid in common. Held, that a delivery to this warehouse by the transportation company, with notice of the arrival of the flour, placed it in the possession of the defendants, and imposed upon them the duties and liabilities of a common carrier with reference thereto. A strong case in this direction is Mills v. Railroad Co., 45 N. Y. 622. In Livingston v. Railroad Co., 76 N. Y. 631, 632, the court sustain the submission to the jury, by the trial court, whether the sending of the waybill to the defendant, in a case very much like this in its leading features, did not put upon the defendant the responsibility of taking care of the goods and seeing that they were forwarded, and whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the defendant,-the same question of fact submitted to the justice's court in this instance. The through waybill was the history of the transit of the freight, made up for both railroad companies, governing the transit, and defining the rights of the connecting corporations with reference to this freight; and upon its receipt by the defendants, it being at the place of connection, and subject to the defendants' control, the duty was imposed upon them to receive and transport the freight within reasonable time, considering its character, to the place of destination; and, the trial court having found the defendants negligent in this regard, the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur. (85 Hun, 580.) In re HARDENBURG'S WILL. (Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department. April 12, 1895.) WILLS-EXECUTION-CODICIL. After the scrivener prepared the will, he read it to testator, who said that he intended by the tenth clause, instead of giving the residue to his "children" living at the time of his death, to give it to his living "sons." Thereupon the scrivener appended what he called a "codicil" to carry out testator's wishes, and the paper was signed by the testator and the attesting witnesses at the end as it was originally written, and also at the end of the codicil. The subscribing witness testified that the codicil was written in the presence of testator, and that testator was asked if the paper (the will and codicil) was his will, and he said it was. Testator fully understood the whole transaction. Held, that the will and codicil were one paper, the execution of which constituted one transaction. Appeal from surrogate's court, Chautauqua county. Proceeding to revoke the probate of the will of Volkert Hardenburg, deceased. From a decree revoking probate of the will, proponent appeals. Reversed. Argued before DWIGHT, P. J., and LEWIS, BRADLEY, and WARD, JJ. A. B. Ottaway, for appellant. H. C. Kingsbury, for respondent. WARD, J. Volkert Hardenburg, of the town of Westfield, in Chautauqua county, died on the 15th day of March, 1892, leaving a last will and testament, in which he made various bequests to his wife, his three sons, and a daughter, Jane N. Munger, and other relatives. Before executing his will, and on the 22d of January, 1892, in the forenoon, he sent for Ralph A. Hall, a friend of his, and a banker, and stated to him that he desired him to prepare a will, and gave directions as to its contents, of which Mr. Hall made a memorandum. Hall drew the will as he understood the directions, and in the afternoon presented it to the deceased, read it over to him, and, when he reached the tenth clause of the will as written, which was as follows: "All the rest of my estate, both real and personal, I desire to be divided among my children that may be living at the time of my death, share and share alike therein," the testator, who perfectly understood the paper, said that he desired to change that clause; that he meant to be understood to mean his living sons, instead of his living children. Hall made the desired change in the presence of the testator, but, instead of changing it in the tenth clause, he appended what he called a codicil, so that the paper, when it was ready for signatures, and when it was signed, appeared as follows: "In witness whereof, I have signed and sealed, published and declared, this instrument as my will, at Portland, Chautauqua county, N. Y., on this 22d day of January, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-two. his "Volkert X Hardenburg. [L. S.] mark "Ralph A. Hall, Witness to Mark. "The said Volkert Hardenburg, at Portland, Chautauqua county, N. Y., on the 22nd day of January, 1892, signed and sealed this instrument, and published and declared the same as his last will and testament, and we, at his request, and in his presence, and in the presence of each other, have hereunto written our names as subscribing witnesses. "Ralph A. Hall, Brocton, New York. "Codicil: In the tenth section of this, my last will, I desire it should read: 'All of the residue of my estate, both real and personal, I desire to be divided among my living sons at the time of my death, anything in this will to the contrary notwithstanding.' "Dated at Portland, N. Y., January 22, 1892. "Ralph A. Hall, Brocton, N. Y. his "Volkert X Hardenburg. [L. S.] mark Before any of the signatures were attached, the scrivener asked the deceased whom he wished for the other witness to the will, and he said Mr. Frank J. Scott, who lived across the road from the deceased, and was well acquainted with him. Scott immediately came. Hall testified that the codicil was written in the presence of the testator, and, as he thinks, after Scott arrived. Scott testified that he thought Mr. Hall had just finished writing it after he had stepped into the room, but he heard Hall mention the word codicil; that Hall said he had drawn the will with a typewriter, and the deceased wanted to make a change, so he had added a codicil with a pen. The attesting clause was read over by the scrivener, in the presence of the deceased and Scott. Hall asked the deceased to sign the will, and he said he could not see very well, and asked Hall to sign it for him, and witness it. Hall asked deceased, in the presence of Scott, if that (referring to the paper) was his last will and testament, and he said it was. He then asked the deceased the same question about the codicil. Hall testified: "I asked him [deceased] if the codicil, as I read it to him, was as he wanted it; and he said it was. I asked him if he declared that to be his last will and testament. He said he did. We (Scott and I) witnessed it. He asked us to witness it for him, both instruments. I asked him in reference to both instruments. We both subscribed our names to both the will and the codicil, in his presence and in the presence of each other. At the time of the execution of this will and codicil, I considered him of sound mind and memory. He was upward of ninety. He did not appear to be under any restraint." The witness again says: "I asked him [the deceased] if it was his last will and testament; also the codicil. I think I might have said: "This instrument is your last will and testament; also the codicil.' I signed it as a witness. Mr. Scott signed it as a witness, both in the body of the will and the codicil, at that time. Both instruments were executed in my presence and Mr. Scott's, and in the presence of Mr. Hardenburg, and signed by both of us at that time. I say distinctly that I called his attention both to the will and codicil at the same time. They were both signed right along in connection." The witness Scott says: "I went in where deceased and Mr. Hall were. They had this paper there at this time. Mr. Hardenburg signed this paper there at this time, in my presence; that is, he signed the mark-the cross-in my presence, and in the presence of Mr. Hall. He signed the will there. Mr. Hall asked him if this instrument was his last will and testament, and he said it was. He asked me to sign as a witness. He also signed the codicil in my presence, and in the presence of Mr. Hall. Mr. Hall did not say anything about that. Mr. Hall said he had written it with a typewriter, and he wanted to make a little change, and he added it with a pen, and Mr. Hall wrote his name in both places. Both signatures were made at the same time, if I remember right; and after that he declared it to be his last will and testament. I signed in both places, same as Mr. Hardenburg did. That is my signature in both places. At the time, he appeared to be of sound mind and memory, and under no restraint." No witnesses were examined except the subscribing witnesses, Hall and Scott. The three persons were alone in a room. The evidence showed that the testator fully understood, as did the witnesses, the whole transaction. While he was somewhat deaf, and it was difficult for him to see, he was made to understand, and did understand, all that occurred. He knew that the codicil simply carried out his instructions as to the change in the tenth clause, and that that was the purpose of the codicil was fully understood by the witnesses. The will and codicil was admitted to probate by the surrogate, by the consent of all the parties interested in the will, on the 11th of April, 1892. In July afterwards, the daughter, who had consented to the probate, filed a petition for a revocation of the probate of the will; and such proceedings were had thereon that in June, 1893, the surrogate decreed that the probate of the codicil should be revoked, and that the probate of the other portion of the will sustained; so that the will, by his decree, is valid, all except the alteration or the codicil. The evidence above referred to was given upon the proceedings to revoke, and the surrogate based his own conclusion upon what he claimed a want of evidence to show a due publication of the codicil. In the findings which he makes, and that appear in the case before us (being numbers 11 to 15, inclusive), he finds that the deceased, in the presence of Hall and Scott, signed the will produced in evidence by making his mark; that in the same presence he signed the codicil of the will by making his mark; that he told Hall that he could not see very well, and asked him to write his (the deceased's) name; that Hall, in the presence of the deceased and Scott, signed the name of the deceased to the will and codicil, at the places where the deceased had made his mark to the will and codicil;, that Hall, in the presence of Scott, asked the deceased if that was his last will and testament, and the deceased said it was; that Hall wrote the codicil in the presence of the deceased; that deceased told Hall that he desired to change the tenth clause so that it should read "the living sons," instead of "the living children." And he also found the facts as to preparing the will and its being read over to the deceased as above stated. The surrogate refused to find that the deceased requested the witnesses to execute the codicil as witnesses, or that he declared the codicil to be his last will and testament, and for the want of this proof, as the surrogate claims, he rejected the codicil. A careful examination of the evidence taken before the surrogate, together with the findings which he makes, leaves it clearly established that the statutory requirements in the execution of the will were complied with in substance and effect. There was no evidence to show that the testator was under restraint or in any manner influenced in making the will, or but what he had sufficient mind to make a valid will. While the paper is apparently divided into a will and codicil, it was really all one paper, executed at the same time, and to be taken together as one transaction. The purpose of the codicil is undisputed. It was simply to correct the tenth clause of the will. This might have been done by interlining the change of "living sons" for "living children," and, if done before execution, would have been valid. In re Tonnele, 5 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 254. The scrivener, however, thought he must make this change in a separate instrument, which he did, and called it a "codicil." It referred to the change made in the principal paper, and, but for the requirement of the statute that the testator should sign at the end of the will, would have been a valid portion thereof, same as if written in the tenth clause itself. It was not therefore, in a proper sense, a "codicil," but the statutory objection was avoided by the testator's and the witnesses' signing at the end of this paper as well as the other, and the reading of the attestation clause in the presence of the witnesses. And the declaration of the deceased, after he had executed the paper by signing his name twice, that it was his last will and testament, and his request to the witnesses to sign it, was a declaration as to the whole instrument, and also a request as to the same, as it was all one transaction; and therefore it was unnecessary to make a special declaration as to each signature, although the testimony is that that was done. The failure of the witness Scott to remember as fully what was said in regard to the codicil by Hall, who drew the paper, does not disprove the fact testified to by Hall. Rugg v. Rugg, 83 N. Y. 592. And, while the Code (section 2618) requires that at least two of subscribing witnesses shall be produced and examined, yet it is not necessary that both witnesses should state all the material |