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Sur le régime juridique des aérostats.

1. Temps de paix.

1. Les aéronefs se distinguent en aéronefs publics et en aéronefs privés.

2. Tout aéronef doit avoir une nationalité, et une seule. Cette nationalité sera celle du pays où l'aéronef aura été inmatriculé. Chaque aéronef doit porter des marques spéciales de reconnais

sance.

L'État auquel l'inmatriculation est demandée, détermine à quelles personnes et sous quelles conditions il peut l'accorder, la suspendre ou la retirer.

L'État qui immatricule l'aéronef d'un propriétaire étranger ne saurait toutefois prétendre à la protection de cet aéronef, sur le territoire de l'État dont relève ce propriétaire, contre l'application des lois par lesquelles cet État aurait interdit à ses nationaux de faire immatriculer leurs aéronefs à l'étranger.

3. La circulation aérienne internationale est libre, sauf le droit pour les États sous-jacents de prendre certaines mesures, à determiner, en vue de leur propre sécurité et de celle des personnes et des biens de leurs habitants.

2. Temps de guerre.

1. La guerre aérienne est permise, mais à la condition de ne pas présenter pour les personnes ou les propriétés de la population pacifique de plus grands dangers que la guerre terrestre ou maritime. (24 Annuaire de L'Institut de Droit International, p. 346.)

Opinion of Fauchille.-Fauchille, who has given much attention to aerial domain, has recently set forth his ideas upon war in the air in his sixth edition of Bonfils, Droit International Public.

Fauchille says, in regard to the general relations of belligerents and neutrals as concerns the field of aerial warfare:

Quel peut être le théâtre de la guerre aérienne? La guerre, si elle doit nuire aux belligérants, ne peut porter atteinte aux intérêts des neutres. L'application de cette idée conduit à la règle suivante: les États belligérants ont le droit, en quelque partie que ce soit de l'atmosphère, de se livrer à des actes d'hostilité au-dessus de leur territoire continental et au-dessus de la pleine mer ou de la mer qui longe leurs côtes; il leur est, au contraire, interdit d'accomplir des actes hostiles, susceptibles d'entraîner la

chute de projectiles et d'une manière générale de causer des dommages, au-dessus du territoire continental des États neutres à quelque hauteur que ce soit, et à proximité des côtes de ces États dans un rayon déterminé par la force du canon de leurs aéronefs.

Les aéronefs militaires des belligérants, et aussi les aéronefs publics non militaires, ne peuvent, en temps de guerre comme en temps de paix, circuler au-dessus des États neutres qu'avec l'autorisation de ces États; quant aux aéronefs privés, ils n'ont besoin pour circuler d'aucune autorisation. Mais il est défendu aux uns et aux autres de séjourner au-dessus des pays neutres dans un certain rayon près des frontières de l'État ennemi, car il ne faut pas qu'ils puissent, en se tenant au-dessus de ces pays, faire des actes d'observation et d'exploration sur le territoire de l'adversaire. La circulation des aéronefs en temps de guerre est, en tout cas, soumise aux mêmes restrictions que pendant la paix; ils doivent notamment respecter les régions interdites, spécialement les ouvrages fortifiés (n° 531°), et s'abstenir de tous actes dommageables au pays sous-jacent. (Bonfils, Droit International Public, Fauchille's 6° ed., No. 1440.)

In general, the opinion of most writers is to extend so far as possible the principles embodied in the rules for war on land and sea to the conduct of war in which aerial domain is involved.

Opinions on use of aerial space.

But they (the belligerents) clearly do not have the right of using the aerial space surrounding the territory of neutral States (including marginal waters) for military purposes. (A. S. Hershey American Journal of International Law, vol. 6, p. 386.)

Modern law of nations allows acts of war to take place only within the territory of the belligerents or on the high seas. If air forces are allowed to engage in future wars, they, too, will have to observe this principle. They will be limited to the air domain of the belligerents and to the free parts of the air space. (Air Sovereignty-Lycklama à Nijholt, p. 65.)

The great importance of the aforesaid rule lies in its complement, which forbids acts of hostility within neutral territory, Hence the air space of neutral States will be closed to hostilities. (Ibid., p. 65.)

So passage above the neutral land can not be allowed any more than it is permitted on the soil. (Ibid., p. 67.)

In accordance with my conception of the legal nature of the air space over the different parts of the earth's surface, the belligerents can only use the air space over their own territory and over their coast waters, in addition to the air space over the open

sea, and over territory without sovereignty, and can not, on the other hand, use the air space over the territory and the coast waters of neutral States. (Die Luftschiffahrt in Kriegsrechtlicher Beleuchtung, Alex. Meyer, p. 18.)

The air space over the territory and coast waters of neutral States is, in accordance with my conception, by its legal nature, to be considered as neutral territory in every respect. Therefore not only actions which are against the interests of neutral States are prohibited, as, for instance, a battle, but in general all actions not consistent with neutrality. (Ibid., p. 20.)

This author holds that the entrance of belligerent menof-war into neutral waters is not consistent with the neutral character of the territory, and should be prohibited, except in certain special cases, for instance, to transports carrying wounded, therefore-

In the war law of the air this basic principle must be asserted, and, therefore, during a war military airships of the belligerents, on account of the warlike nature of the act, must be prohibited both from passing through neutral air space, and also, in general, from landing in any neutral territory. (Ibid., p. 24.)

Russian regulations, 1904.-During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, Russia issued among the rules to be observed:

The following actions, prohibited to neutrals, are considered as violating neutrality: The transport of the enemy's troops, its telegrams or correspondence, the supplying it of transport boats or war vessels. Vessels of neutrals found to be breaking any of these rules may be, according to circumstances, captured and confiscated. (U. S. Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 728.)

Japanese regulations, 1904.—The Japanese regulations during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 provided for the capture of such vessels as "engaged in scouting or carrying information in the interest of the enemy, or are deemed clearly guilty of any other act to assist the enemy," and also provided for the confiscation of vessels guilty of such service.

The memoranda submitted to the international naval conference in 1908 by the 10 naval powers participating showed:

Qu'une idée commune est admise, d'après laquelle le belligérant peut poursuivre un certain nombre d'actes constituant de la part

des navires de commerce neutres une assistance donnée à l'ennemi. I y a là une violation de la neutralité que le belligérant est en droit d'empêcher. (International Naval Conference, Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous No. 5 (1909), p. 106.)'

Application of principles to blockade.-Whether the doctrine of freedom of the air for all navigators or the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction in the subjacent State prevail, the question of the right of an air craft to enter a blockaded port would be an important one. Must a naval blockading force also maintain an aerial fleet in order that the blockade be binding under the principle that a blockade "to be binding must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy," as provided in the Declaration of Paris in 1856? The United States has interpreted this clause to mean that "an effective blockade is a blockade so effective as to make it dangerous in fact for vessels to attempt to enter the blockaded port; it follows that the question of effectiveness is not controlled by the number of the blockading force." (The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U. S. Sup. Ct. Repts. (1899), p. 510.)

Apparently if a blockade of a place is maintained by seagoing vessels only, it will not be dangerous for air craft to pass the line or to enter overland by making a comparatively short detour. The actual cutting off of communication with a place by means of a maritime blockade is increasingly difficult, if not impossible. As the present rules in regard to blockade are such as have developed for the maintenance of blockade by sea, it is not reasonable to expect that these rules would in all cases apply to aerial navigation.

The service which air craft can at present render to a blockaded place would largely be that of a means of communication with the outside world. Transportation of goods and persons would not commonly be by this method until aerial craft are further developed.

The case of the Atalanta.-The attitude of the learned English judge, Sir William Scott, later Lord Stowell, on the carriage of dispatches and maintenance of a means of communication with those who would be most served has

justly formed a basis for much of the later reasoning upon regulation of communication in the time of war. In the case of the Atalanta, in 1808, the communication involved was between a mother country and colony. The principles might apply equally well to any area with which communication is prohibited. A somewhat extended quotation from Lord Stowell's opinion shows the course of reasoning which has been approved:

That the simple carrying of dispatches between the colonies and the mother country of the enemy is a service highly injurious to the other belligerent is most obvious. In the present state of the world, in the hostilities of European powers, it is an object of great importance to preserve the connection between the mother country and her colonies; and to interrupt that connection, on the part of the other belligerent, is one of the most energetic operations of war. The importance of keeping up that connection, for the concentration of troops, and for various military purposes, is manifest; and I may add, for the supply of civil assistance, also, and support, because the infliction of civil distress for the purpose of compelling a surrender forms no inconsiderable part of the operations of war. It is not to be argued, therefore, that the importance of these dispatches might relate only to the civil wants of the colony, and that it is necessary to show a military tendency; because the object of compelling a surrender being a measure of war, whatever is conducive to that event must also be considered in the contemplation of law as an object of hostility, although not produced by operations strictly military. How is this intercourse with the mother country kept up in time of peace by ships of war or by packets in the service of the State? If a war intervenes and the other belligerent prevails to interrupt that communication, any person stepping in to lend himself to effect the same purpose, under the privilege of an ostensible neutral character, does, in fact, place himself in the service of the enemy State, and is justly to be considered in that character; nor let it be supposed that it is an act of light and casual importance. The consequence of such a service is indefinite, infinitely beyond the effect of any contraband that can be conveyed. The carrying of two or three cargoes of stores is necessarily an assistance of a limited nature; but in the transmission of dispatches may be conveyed the entire plan of a campaign that may defeat all the projects of the other belligerent in that quarter of the world. It is true, as it has been said, that onc ball might take off a Charles the XIIth, and might produce the most disastrous effects in a campaign; but that is a consequence so remote and accidental that, in the contemplation of human

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