ABBREVIATIONS-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (21).
ACCEPTANCE-See MASTER AND SERVANT (26); PRINCIPAL AND
AGENT (2).
ACCIDENT-See MASTER AND SERVANT (2, 4).
Where plaintiff complained of defendant in a plea of tres-
pass on the case upon promises, his declaration containing
four special counts and also all the common counts in
assumpsit, he could not be required to elect upon which
counts he sought a verdict because in the special counts
he used the words fraud and deceit, as, under section
10421, 3 Comp. Laws, an action of assumpsit may be
brought to recover damages caused by fraud or deceit.
Mahder v. Wax, 480.
See CARRIERS (4, 5); DEATH; INSURANCE (8); INTOXICATING
LIQUORS (3); LIBEL AND SLANDER (1, 2); MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS (17); PLEADING (3); TAXATION (3).
ACT OF GOD-See CARRIERS (3, 6-8); CONTRACTS (3).
ADJOINING PROPERTY-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1).
ADJOURNMENT-See INFANTS (3).
ADJUSTER-See INSURANCE (7, 11, 12).
ADMINISTERING ESTATES-See BANKS AND BANKING (8).
ADMISSIONS-See EVIDENCE (1, 14).
ADOPTION OF CONTRACT-See CARRIERS (13).
ADVANCEMENT-See TRUSTS (4).
ADVERTISING-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5).
AFFIDAVITS-See ARREST (1); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (22).
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF-See TAXATION (13).
AGENCY-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
AGREEMENT FOR COMPENSATION-See MASTER AND SERVANT
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-See HUSBAND AND WIFE (2-5).
ALIMONY-See DIVORCE (3, 4, 6, 7).
ALTERATIONS-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (24, 25).
AMBIGUOUS MEANING-See LIBEL AND SLANDER (2).
AMENDMENT OF DECLARATION-See JUDGMENT (4).
AMOTION-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8).
AMOUNT DUE-See MECHANIC'S LIENS (1).
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT-See HUSBAND AND WIFE (1).
1. A correct result reached by the trial court will be af-
firmed on error, even if a wrong reason therefor be given.
Eames v. Barber, 1.
2. Where a question was raised by plaintiff's counsel in his
opening statement, and the court, before any evidence was
submitted, declined to instruct the jury on the question,
saying it was dependent upon the proof that might be
put in, and later, when evidence was offered, no objection
was made by defendant, the latter was not prejudiced by
the ruling of the court. Jolman v. Alberts, 25.
3. In such action, where the court ruled out questions per-
mitting defendant to explain why he did not have his
"big lights" on, and later withdrew from the jury the
question as to lights entirely, instructing them that de-
fendant's car was lighted in conformity with law, the
rulings were either favorable to defendant or were cor-
rectly made. Id. 26.
4. A ruling of the court to which no exception was taken
could not be reviewed on error. People v. Breen, 39.
5. Want of a final judgment in a personal injury action is
fatal to the review of the case on error and, in the absence
of any showing that judgment had been later entered, the
writ must be dismissed. Bancroft v. Board of Regents, 168.
6. In an action against a railroad company for flooding plain-
tiff's lands, she alleged, and gave evidence tending to
prove, that the natural flow of the surface water was from
her lands over and across defendant's right of way; that
in 1871 defendant graded its right of way so as to obstruct
the natural flow; that until about 1902 an open ditch had
taken the water off plaintiff's land, but in that year de-
fendant widened its grade and destroyed the ditch; that
by reason of said obstruction the water has backed up on
plaintiff's land during certain specified years to her in-
jury. The defense was confined mostly to a denial that
such ditch ever existed, and the only questions submitted
to the jury were whether there had ever been such a ditch
and whether it had been filled up; held, that the other
APPEAL AND ERROR-Continued.
issues will be treated as if they had been decided in plain-
tiff's favor, and that the natural flow of the surface water
is from plaintiff's land over and across defendant's right
of way, that the water has been held back to her injury
during the time alleged, and that defendant has been
guilty of actionable wrong unless the verdict of the jury
for defendant is equivalent to finding a prescriptive right
in its favor. Hume v. Railway Co., 225.
7. Where plaintiff's claim was based on two theories, one
that an application for a new policy was made and ac-
cepted, and the other that an assignment of an old policy
was made to plaintiff, and both theories were submitted to
the jury, and it is conceded, on appeal, that no valid as-
signment was made, a judgment for plaintiff will be re-
versed, as the appellate court is unable to determine that
the verdict was based upon the question properly sub-
mitted. Leonard v. Insurance Co., 231.
8. Where, in such prosecution, the court permitted the jury
to return into court and have the stenographer read all
the testimony of the prosecuting witness, without having
submitted also the testimony of the respondent, who made
no request to have his testimony read, and where no ex-
ception was taken to the action of the court, no question
is presented to this court for review. People v. Smith, 355.
9. An exception is necessary to review on error the denial
of defendant's motion for a new trial in a negligence
action. Greenleaf v. Lambert, 411.
10. Held, on reviewing the testimony in a case arising out of
the collision of plaintiff's motorcycle with defendant's
truck, conflicting contentions of the plaintiff and defendant
were properly submitted to the jury, that the question
of contributory negligence was one of fact for their con-
sideration.
11. One assignment of error is insufficient for the review of
a number of exceptions to the admission of evidence re-
lating to distinct subjects. Id.
12. Failure to challenge remarks of counsel so as to secure a
ruling or correction of the objectionable language pre-
vents a review of the point and the judgment cannot be
reversed for such reason. Id.
13. Where the trial court denied the motion for a new trial
without filing his reasons therefor, and no exceptions were
taken, the question is not open for review in this court.
3 comp. Laws 1915, § 12635. Mahder v. Wax, 479.
14. A question tacitly agreed upon by the parties, and not
raised in the argument, will not be considered by this
court. Kennedy v. Stimming, 600.
APPEAL AND ERROR-Continued.
15. The finding of the court, sitting without a jury, cannot
be disturbed, on appeal, if there is any evidence to sus-
tain it. In re Fox's Estate, 699.
See CRIMINAL LAW (6); EVIDENCE (9); EXECUTORS AND AD-
MINISTRATORS (1, 2); JUDGMENT (1); MASTER AND SERVANT
(1, 3); NEW TRIAL (1); PLEADING (2, 4); RES JUDICATA;
TRIAL (2).
APPEAL FROM INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD-See CER-
TIORARI.
APPEAL PENDING-See DIVORCE (7).
APPLICATION FOR POLICY-See INSURANCE (5, 15).
ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL-See APPEAL AND ERROR (12).
ARREST.
1. An affidavit, in an action for conversion, that the deponent
rented to the defendant a horse for the purpose of driving
to a place named and back, and the bailee did not return
the animal as agreed, and failed to deliver it to the affiant
when requested so to do, sufficiently stated a prima facie
case in trover. Timm v. Circuit Judge, 508.
2. While a demand and refusal are not in themselves a con-
version, they are evidence of one and usually make a
prima facie case, and on making proof thereof, the writ
of capias will lie. Id. 509.
3. It was not a sufficient jurisdictional objection that the
judge was not present in the county in which the writ
issued when he fixed the bail and indorsed it on the writ,
being in another county of the circuit to which he was
officially assigned. Id.
See FALSE IMPRISONMENT (1).
ASSESSMENT-See TAXATION (11).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR-See APPEAL AND ERROR (11).
ASSIGNMENTS-See CARRIERS (4); INSURANCE (6).
ASSUMPSIT-See ACTION; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (17).
ASSUMPTION OF RISK-See MASTER AND SERVANT (5, 7, 14,
15, 40).
ASSUMPTION OF RISK OF FREEZING-See CARRIERS (1).
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-See NOTARY PUBLIC.
AUDITOR GENERAL-See TAXATION (7).
AUTHORITY TO CONTRACT-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (16).
AUTOMOBILES-See EVIDENCE (1); MASTER AND SERVANT (31,
32, 35-37); NEGLIGENCE (1).
1. Defendant bank had no lien on its stock as against the
assignee of a stockholder, where the bank took a note and
mortgage from the stockholder, due in one year, which
included the amount of an unsecured note, and, after an
investigation, repudiated the mortgage as worthless and
so notified the stockholder, but marked the unsecured note
"Paid," and continued to carry the loan in its mortgage
loan account and so reported it to the banking commis-
sioner on several occasions in its sworn statements; by
its acts, it relied on the new note and mortgage rather
than the unsecured note, and had no past due indebtedness
from the stockholder as the basis for a lien on the stock.
Murray W. Sales & Co. v. Savings Bank, 540.
2. The courts of Michigan have jurisdiction to inquire by
quo warranto whether a corporation organized under the
banking laws of the United States is lawfully engaged in
exercising any or all of its franchises within the borders
of the State or to enjoin the enjoyment of such franchises,
if they are not legally exercised. Attorney General, ex rel.
Union Trust Co. v. First National Bank of Bay City, 640.
3. While the final determination as to the constitutionality
of acts of Congress rests with the United States Supreme
Court, the assumption by a national bank of the franchise
to do business as trustee, executor, or other fiduciary
agent under the authority of the Federal reserve act (38
U. S. Stat. 262, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1913, § 9794 [k]) may
be questioned in proceedings by the attorney general on
relation of a party in interest. Id. 641.
4. The legislature having power to create corporations with
authority to manage and execute trusts, estates of dece-
dents, etc., and having provided for domestic corporations
to transact such business, foreign corporations with powers
of a like character may be admitted to do such business
in Michigan. In acting in the capacity of trustee, executor,
or administrator, the laws of the State in which it is
engaged in business control. Id.
5. National banks, which are not foreign corporations, are
agencies of the Federal government domesticated in the
State and may sue and be sued in the courts of the State,
but their powers, management and control are not within
the State authority, except that a national bank is limited
to the powers and authority made lawful by the statutes
of the State in which it is doing business and cannot act
in contravention of the same. Id.
6. There is no State policy opposed to corporate trustees,
executors or administrators. Id.
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