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"Your able and very interesting despatch of June 10th, No. 36, has been submitted to the President.

Seward.

"I think that in the main you have rightly apprehended the sentiments of the government and people of this country in regard to the Spanish-American states, as well as the instructions of their history, their present political condition, their resources, their wants, the benefits they offer and the claims they have upon other nations.

"But it would be disingenuous on the part of the United States and injurious to the Spanish-American republics to encourage an expectation on their part that at the present conjuncture treaties guaranteeing their sovereignty can be contracted with this Government. Even if the traditional policy of this country derived from the teachings and practice of Washington could be proved to be erroneous its hold upon the mind of the American people would nevertheless prove to be too strong to be broken at this moment when the distractions of civil war are encouraging foreign intrigues and even inviting foreign aggression.

"The country, however, has tried and proved that policy and has hitherto found its ways to be ways of wisdom and all its paths to be the paths of peace.

"It may well be said that Washington did not enjoin it upon us as a perpetual policy. On the contrary, he inculcated it as the policy to be pursued until the union of the States, which is only another form of expressing the idea of the integrity of the nation, shouldbe established, its resources should be developed and its strength, adequate to the chances of national life, should be matured and perfected. Whatever pleasant dreams upon that subject we have heretofore indulged are now broken by a conclusive shock, and we are trying through a civil war of unexampled severity the great question whether the Union of the States is indeed impregnable, and whether we are to remain, as we hitherto have been, one strong and enduring nation. It is not at such a time that the policy of the fathers which forbids entangling alliances is likely to be reviewed or discussed. "Nor indeed ought it to be. Assuming the condition of the Spanish-American states to be one urgently demanding our national protection, the question whether we shall accord it is at least a practical one. We can not enter into covenants to render physical aid which we are not able and do not intend to keep. The people of the United States have a sensibility concerning engagements as just as it is peculiar. They never have contracted an obligation which they did not mean to fulfill and did not with all diligence fulfill in its letter and spirit. While we are engaged in a fearful and exhausting civil war at home, it could be only surplus treasure and surplus force that we could send abroad to protect and defend other states. Thus far

we had no such surplus force. True we shall have it when our domestic troubles shall have been ended. But we may well postpone the question how it shall be employed until the superfluous force itself shall be found in our hands. You appeal to us to heal the SpanishAmerican states. We are ourselves at this moment even more disordered than they, and the national conscience and national heart cry out to us Physician, heal thyself.' This is indeed just what we are doing.

"Again, our own difficulties and dangers are present, actual, engaging, absorbing. Those of the Spanish-American states are at most but probable and future.

“Moreover, the most effective aid which we can at any time render them is to be afforded hereafter as heretofore by the moral influences resulting from the stability and strength of our republican institutions. So far as the improvement of society and the increase of national strength are concerned, each of the Spanish-American republics must of course work out the case for itself. It is only foreign intervention, to occur while they are working it out, that they have to fear. No foreign nation disturbed them, all foreign nations grew forbearing towards them, while we remained undivided and impregnable.

"Their exposure and their apprehensions result from our own embarrassments. When we shall have surmounted them, the Spanish-American states will regain their accustomed safety.

"In giving you this view of the President's policy, I am not for a moment to be thought wanting in just apprehension of the importance of the commercial, moral and political advantages of fraternal and affectionate relations with the states in whose behalf your appeal is made. Americanism is one interest and ought to be one sentiment throughout this continent. Republicanism is one interest and has one destiny for the weal or woe of mankind throughout not only this continent, but throughout the world. But the policy which diffuses these two sentiments and advances these two interests is a time, prudence, and peace, not of war and conquest."

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Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Riotte, min. to Costa Rica, No. 20,
July 7, 1862, MS. Inst. Am. States, XVI. 225.

"Your despatch of Aug. 27th, No. 44, together with the papers enclosed and marked IV., have been submitted to the President.

"These papers contain a letter written by the minister for foreign affairs of Costa Rica to a representative of the revolutionary government in New Granada, concerning a proposed congress of the American States to be held at Panama with a view of effecting arrangements for their mutual stability and safety. In this correspondence, his excellency the minister for foreign affairs of Costa Rica,

Mr. Iglesias, discusses the question whether the United States ought to be invited to attend such congress and become a party to the proposed arrangement. You inform me that the publication of this letter has produced some uneasiness in Costa Rica, on the ground that the remarks of Mr. Iglesias on that subject might be disagreeable to the United States.

"My despatch of July 7th, 1862, No. 20, has already informed you that the United States could not at present depart from their traditional policy so far as to enter into such a congress. You have already communicated to Mr. Iglesias in a general way the effect of that despatch. The President perceives no reason why you should not read to him the despatch itself if, for any reason, you deem it expedient to do so. At the same time you are authorized to assure Mr. Iglesias that so far from experiencing any sensibility concerning the views he has expressed in relation to the character of this Government, its past policy in regard to Spanish-American States, its present views, and its possible change of those views hereafter, the President sees nothing in the letter of Mr. Iglesias but the exercise of a rightful freedom of debate upon a legitimate question in a manner perfectly respectful to the government and people of the United States. The United States are conscious that jealousy of foreign states is an essential element in the political constitution of every nation which intends and hopes to preserve and maintain its own real sovereignty and independence. They would therefore rather encourage than complain of the expression of such jealousies in the republics of Spanish America, even although the watchfulness thus manifested bear upon the United States themselves."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Riotte, min. to Costa Rica, No. 25, Sept. 17, 1862, MS. Inst. Am. States, XVI. 243.

"This government acts directly and sincerely in its intercourse with foreign nations, and no less directly and sincerely with New Granada than with all others. It regards the government of each state as its head until that government is effectually displaced by the substitution of another. It abstains from any interference with its domestic affairs in foreign countries, and it holds no unnecessary communication, secret or otherwise, with revolutionary parties or factions therein. It neither seeks to prevent social or political reforms in such countries nor lends its aid to reforms of them rightfully of which it has neither the authority nor the means to judge."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Burton, Oct. 25, 1862, MS. Inst. Colombia, XVI. 47.

"The first duty of a foreign minister is to maintain and practice in behalf of his government good faith and friendship towards the govern ment to which he is accredited. It is not easy to conceive any case in which a minister could rightfully intervene and give aid or coun

tenance to an insurrectionary movement in derogation of the sovereign to which he is accredited. Doubtlessly there are revolutions which deserve the sympathies and favor of all civilized states, but even in such cases the representatives of foreign governments should act by their direction and make their protests direct and explicit, taking the responsibilities of the termination of diplomatic intercourse. No such circumstances are known to us as existing in regard to the revolution in New Granada." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Burton, July 18, 1861, MS. Inst. Colombia, XVI. 7.)

"This government has not now, it seldom has had, any special transaction, either commercial or political, to engage the attention of a minister at Rome. Indeed, until a very late period the United States were without any representation at that ancient and interesting capital. The first colonists in this country were chiefly Protestants, who not merely recognized no ecclesiastical authority of the Pope, but were very jealous lest he might exert some ecclesiastical influence here which would be followed by an assumption of political power unfavorable to freedom and self-government on this continent. It was not seen that the political power of the Catholic Church was purely a foreign affair, constituting an important part of the political system of the European continent. It is be

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lieved that ever since the tide of emigration set in upon this continent the head of the Roman Church and states has freely recognized and favored the development of this principle of political freedom on the part of the Catholics in this country, while he has never lost an opportunity to express his satisfaction with the growth, prosperity and progress of the American people. It was under these circumstances that this government, in 1848, wisely determined that while it maintained representatives in the capitals of every other civilized state, and even at the capitals of many semicivilized states which reject the whole Christian religion, it was neither wise nor necessary to exclude Rome from the circle of our diplomatic intercourse. Thus far the new relation then established has proved pleasant and benificent.

"Just now Rome is the seat of profound ecclesiastical and political anxieties, which, more or less, affect all the nations of Europe. The Holy Father claims immunity for the temporal power he exercises, as a right incident to an ecclesiastical authority which is generally respected by the European states.

"On the other hand, some of those states, with large masses in other states, assert that this temporal power is without any religious sanction, is unnecessary and pernicious. I have stated the question merely for the purpose of enabling myself to give you the President's views of what will be your duty with regard to it. That duty is to forbear altogether from taking any part in the controversy. The reasons for this forbearance are three: First, that so far as spiritual

or ecclesiastical matters enter into the question they are beyond your province, for you are a political representative only. Second, so far as it is a question affecting the Roman States, it is a domestic one, and we are a foreign nation. Third, so far as it is a political question merely, it is at the same time purely an European one, and you are an American minister, bound to avoid all entangling connection with the politics of that continent.

"This line of conduct will nevertheless allow you to express, and you are therefore instructed to express, to His Holiness the assurances of the best wishes of the government and of the people of the United States for his health and happiness, and for the safety and prosperity and happiness of the Roman people.”

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Blatchford, Sept. 25, 1862, Dip. Cor. 1862, 851.

With reference to an invitation from France to cooperate with the governments of Paris, London, and Vienna in the exercise of a moral influence with the Emperor of Russia with reference to affairs in Poland, Mr. Seward said:

"This government is profoundly and agreeably impressed with the consideration which the Emperor has manifested towards the United States by inviting their concurrence in a proceeding having for its object the double interests of public order and humanity. Nor is it less favorably impressed with the sentiments and the prudential considerations which the Emperor has in so becoming a manner expressed to the court of St. Petersburg.

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"Notwithstanding, however, the favor with which we thus regard the suggestion of the Emperor of the French, this government finds an insurmountable difficulty in the way of any active cooperation with the governments of France, Austria, and Great Britain, to which it is thus invited.

"Founding our institutions upon the basis of the rights of man, the builders of our Republic came all at once to be regarded as political reformers, and it soon became manifest that revolutionists in every country hailed them in that character, and looked to the United States for effective sympathy, if not for active support and patronage. Our invaluable Constitution had hardly been established when it became necessary for the government of the United States to consider to what extent we could, with propriety, safety, and beneficence, intervene, either by alliance or concerted action with friendly powers or otherwise, in the political affairs of foreign states. An urgent appeal for such aid and sympathy was made in behalf of France, and the appeal was sanctioned and enforced by the treaty then existing of mutual alliance and defense, a treaty without which it may even now be confessed, to the honor of France, our own sovereignty and independence

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