which may menace the peace and prosperity of its neighbors. It is, above all," continued Mr. Blaine, "anxious to do any and everything which will tend to make stronger the natural union of the republics of the continent, in the face of the tendencies of other and distant forms of government to influence the internal affairs of Spanish America. It is especially anxious, in pursuance of this great policy, to see the Central American republics more securely united than they have been in the past in protection of their common interests, which interests are, in their outward relations, identical in principle with those of Mexico and the United States." Mr. Blaine added that the President, without prejudice to the merits of the controversy, deemed it his duty, as the unbiased counselor of both Mexico and Guatemala, "to set before the government of Mexico his conviction of the danger to the principles which Mexico has so signally and successfully defended in the past, which would ensue should disrespect be shown to the boundaries which separate her from her weaker neighbors, or should the authority of force be resorted to in establishment of rights over territory which they claim, without the conceded justification of her just title thereto, and especially would the President regard as an unfriendly act toward the cherished plan of upbuilding strong republican governments in Spanish America, if Mexico, whose power and generosity should be alike signal in such a case, shall seek or permit any misunderstanding with Guatemala, when the path toward a pacific avoidance of trouble is at once so easy and so imperative an international duty." Mr. Morgan was directed to seek an interview with Señor Mariscal, Mexican minister of foreign affairs, and to acquaint him with the purport of these instructions, and even to read them to him if he should. so desire.

On June 21, 1881, Mr. Blaine addressed a further instruction to Mr. Morgan, on the strength of information received from the American minister at Guatemala City, which was said to indicate that Mexico intended not merely to obtain possession of the disputed territory, but to precipitate hostilities with Guatemala with the ultimate view of extending her borders by actual conquest. Mr. Blaine said that he could not believe it possible that these designs could seriously enter into the policy of the Mexican government. Of late years, said Mr. Blaine, the American movement toward fixity of boundaries and abstention from territorial enlargement had been so marked and so necessary a part of the continental policy of the American republics that any departure therefrom became "necessarily a menace to the interests of all." The "now established policy" of the United States to refrain from territorial acquisition gave that government the right, declared Mr. Blaine, to use its friendly offices in discouragement of any movement on the part of neighboring states which might "tend

to disturb the balance of power between them," and rendered it morally obligatory on the United States, as the strong but disinterested friend of all its sister states, to exert its influence " for the preservation of the national life and integrity of any one of them against aggression, whether this may come from abroad or from another American republic." The "peaceful maintenance of the status quo of the American commonwealths" was, said Mr. Blaine, "of the very essence of their policy of harmonious alliance for self-preservation, and is of even more importance to Mexico than to the United States." It was the desire and intention of the United States, by moral influence and the interposition of good offices," " to hold up the republics of Central America in their old strength and to do all that may be done toward insuring the tranquillity of their relations among themselves and their collective security as an association of allied interests, possessing in their common relationship to the outer world all of the elements of national existence." In this "enlarged policy," said Mr. Blaine, the United States confidently asked the cooperation of Mexico, while any contrary movement on her part directly leading to the absorption in whole or in part of her weaker neighbors would be deemed "an act unfriendly to the best interests of America." Mr. Morgan was instructed to bring these views to the attention of Mr. Mariscal, and to intimate that the good feeling between Mexico and the United States would be fortified by a frank avowal that the Mexican policy towards the neighboring states was not one of conquest or aggrandizement, but of conciliation, peace, and friendship. Mr. Morgan had an interview with Mr. Mariscal on July 9, 1881, and acquainted the latter with the purport of his instructions. Mr. Mariscal insisted that it was Mexico that had cause to complain against Guatemala and not Guatemala against Mexico. Further interviews were held, with the result that Mr. Morgan, in a dispatch of September 22, 1881, suggested that unless the United States was prepared to announce to Mexico that it would, if necessary, actively preserve the peace, it would be the part of wisdom to let the matter remain where it was. "Negotiations on the subject," said Mr. Morgan, “will not benefit Guatemala, and you may depend upon it that what we have already done in this direction has not tended to the increasing of the cordial relations which I know it is so much your desire to cultivate with this nation."

In an instruction to Mr. Morgan of November 28, 1881, Mr. Blaine declared that to leave the matter where it was was simply impossible, since it would not remain there. The United States had sought to compose the differences between the two countries, which differences would become more aggravated if they were not ended. Information, said Mr. Blaine, has been received that Mexican troops had been ordered to the disputed boundary line. The United States did

not pretend to direct the policy of Mexico, and the Mexican government was of course free to decline the counsel of the United States, no matter how friendly. But it was necessary that the United States should know distinctly what, the Mexican government had decided. It was useless, and apparently would be irritating, declared Mr. Blaine, "to keep before the government of Mexico the offer of friendly intervention, while, on the other hand, it would not be just to Guatemala to hold that government in suspense as to whether there was a possibility of the acceptance of the amicable mediation which we have offered." Mr. Morgan was therefore to seek an interview with Mr. Mariscal and urge upon him the peaceful solution of existing differences, and, if he should find it to be practicable, to suggest a limited arbitration. Should the Mexican government decline this "friendly intervention," Mr. Morgan was to state that he accepted this decision as one undoubtedly within the right of Mexico to make; but he was to express the regret of the United States if it should be found that the powerful Republic of Mexico was unwilling to join in maintaining and establishing the principle of friendly arbitration of international differences on the continent. of America. Mexico and the United States, acting in cordial harmony, could, said Mr. Blaine, induce all the other independent governments of North and South America to aid in fixing this policy of peace for all the future disputes between the nations of the Western Hemisphere. In concluding the instruction, Mr. Blaine adverted to an intimation made by Mr. Mariscal that President Barrios, of Guatemala, was endeavoring to obtain the influence of the United States towards furthering his ambition of forming a consolidation of the Central American republics. With reference to this intimation, Mr. Blaine declared that the union of the Central American states appealed to the sympathy and judgment of the United States; that this was no new policy, but one which the United States had for many years urged upon those republics. If, said Mr. Blaine, an inference was to be drawn from Mr. Mariscal's language that the prospect of a Central American union was not agreeable to the policy of Mexico, and that the friendly attitude of the United States towards such union rendered unwelcome the "friendly intervention which had been offered, this fact would only deepen the regret at Mexico's decision, and compelled him (Mr. Blaine) "to declare that the government of the United States will consider a hostile demonstration against Guatemala for the avowed purpose, or with the certain result of weakening her power in such an effort, as an act not in consonance with the position and character of Mexico, not in harmony with the friendly relations existing between us, and injurious to the best interests of all the republics of this continent." The United States, added Mr. Blaine, "will continue its policy of peace

even if it can not have the great aid which the cooperation of Mexico would assure; and it will hope, at no distant day, to see such concord and cooperation between all the nations of America as will render war impossible." Mr. Morgan was directed to leave a copy of this instruction with Mr. Mariscal.

Señor Ubico, Guatemalan min. to Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, June 15, 1881, For. Rel. 1881, 598; Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Morgan, min. to Mexico, No. 138, June 16, 1881, For. Rel. 1881, 766; same to same, No. 142, June 21, 1881, id. 768; Mr. Morgan to Mr. Blaine, No. 232, July 12, 1881, id. 773; same to same, No. 273, Sept. 22, 1881, id. 806, 809; Mr. Blaine to Mr. Morgan, No. 198, Nov. 28, 1881, id. 814.

See, also, a pamphlet entitled, Difficulties between Mexico and Guatemala. Proposed mediation of the United States. Some official documents. New York, 1882."

While the United States would not look with favor on any "schemes of aggrandizement" by which "the individuality of any of the states of Central America would disappear in civil turmoil or conquest," yet it would view with approbation "such an intimacy of union between the states of Central America as would not only secure their domestic interests but render them outwardly strong against the rest of the world." (Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Logan, min. to Cent. Am., No. 53, confld., March 4, 1880, MS. Inst. Cent. Am. XVIII. 73.)

It appeared upon investigation that the particular point that prevented a friendly arrangement between Guatemala and Mexico was the calling into question by the former of Mexico's title to the State of Chiapas, including the territory of Soconusco. On December 31, 1881, Mr. Morgan, under further instructions of the Department of State, made a formal tender to the Mexican government of the "good offices" of the President of the United States and of his services as arbitrator. Mr. Mariscal, on March 20, 1882, replied that the Mexican government found it impossible to discuss or submit to arbitration the question of her rights to this portion of her territory, but would agree to arbitration if the Guatemalan government would expressly exclude Chiapas and Soconusco. On this basis the preliminaries of a treaty of settlement were signed at New Nork on August 12, 1882.

Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Montúfar, Guatemalan min., June 5, 1882, For. Rel. 1882, 326; Mr. Montúfar to Mr. Frelinghuysen, June 15, 1882, id. 328; Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Montúfar, June 27, 1882, id. 330; Mr. Montúfar to Mr. Frelinghuysen, July 21, 1882, id 330; Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Montúfar, July 24, 1882, id. 331; Mr. Romero, Mex. min., to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Aug. 14, 1882, id. 437; Mr. Cruz, Guatemalan min., to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Oct. 14, 1882, id. 332.

"ART. XXII. The United States will aid by their good offices, if desired, in securing the union of the five Central American republics under one representative government, and the reorganization of the

said republics in one nationality being accomplished, the Central American republics shall have the same rights and bear the same obligations as Nicaragua has and bears by virtue of this treaty."

Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty, Dec. 1, 1884, between the United States
and Nicaragua, unratified; Sen. Doc. 291, 55 Cong. 2 sess. 10.

The treaty was signed by Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, and
General Joaquin Zavala, ex-President of Nicaragua.

The consular agent of the United States at Johannesburg was directed to render to John Hays Hammond and other American citizens arrested by the Boers on charges of rebellion in connection with the Jameson raid "all possible aid and protection." Simultaneously, the American ambassador in London was instructed to apply to the foreign office, with a view to obtain the good offices of the British representatives in South Africa. In compliance with this request the British high commissioner was instructed to see that the persons in question received all proper protection and assistance.

Mr. Olney, Sec. of State, to Mr. Catchings, M. C., Jan. 25, 1896, 207 MS.
Dom. Let. 349.

"By way of friendly good offices, you will inform British minister for foreign affairs that I am to-day in receipt of a telegram from the United States consul at Pretoria reporting that the government of the two African republics request the President's intervention with a view to cessation of hostilities, and that a similar request is made to the representatives of European powers. In communicating this request I am directed by the President to express his earnest hope that a way to bring about peace may be found and to say that he would be glad to aid in any friendly manner to promote so happy a result."

Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. White, chargé, tel., March 10, 1900, MS.
Inst. Gr. Br. XXXIII, 364.

66

The British government replied that it could not accept the intervention" of any power in the contest. It is obvious that the Boer request was not happily phrased, the use of the word "intervention " affording a ready ground of declination.

See, as to this incident, S. Doc. 222, 36 Cong. 1 sess.

II. NONPOLITICAL INTERVENTION.

1. PROTECTION OF CITIZENS.

§ 912.

The most usual, indeed it may be said that the ordinary, ground of intervention is that of the protection of the citizens of a country against wrong or injustice in another land. Such wrong or injustice