"You will therefore, if still in Austria, immediately on the receipt of this letter, repair to Spezzia, which is the rendezvous of the United States squadron in the Mediterranean. Commodore Stringham will be instructed to convey you to Athens, where you will forthwith put yourself in communication with the proper department of the Greek government. You will state, in general terms, the opinion entertained by the President of Dr. King's trial and condemnation as above intimated, and his expectation that a formal remission of the sentence of banishment should be granted by the proper department; and you will state in a general way the reasons why the President forbears in any other respect to make a national question of the treatment of Dr. King on this occasion. You will then represent the affair of Dr. King's land in the light in which it is placed in your report.

"State strongly and briefly the results of your inquiry, taking care, as far as possible, not to be drawn into a lengthened discussion for the purposes of delay. Avoid the tone or language of menace, but let the government of Greece perceive that the President is quite in earnest. In the meantime, you will be pleased, in any way you may deem expedient on the spot, by taking the opinion of intelligent and impartial foreigners, by recent sales of land in the vicinity, by a private arbitration of disinterested persons, or by any other sources of information, to ascertain what amount of loss Dr. King has really suffered; by which is meant not speculative and consequential losses, but such as would probably be adjudged by candid and practical men.

"Having in this way ascertained, as far as practicable, what sum of money would be a reasonable compensation to Dr. King, propose at once to the Greek government to allow it, and urge upon it the expediency of at once putting an end to this long delayed and vexatious affair. If the Greek government is discreet, they will immediately close with this offer, and you will use all your address to induce them to do so. If they decline, you will then make them this proposition, viz: to refer the whole question to the arbitration of a friendly power.

Should this proposal also be refused, in other words, should the government of Greece persist in denying justice in any form to Dr. King, you will immediately report the facts to this department and return to your post. It will be for the government of the United States to adopt such a course as may be deemed expedient under the circumstances of the case. Considering the great disparity of the parties, you will, in all your conferences with the Greek minister, avoid the language of menace, and be especially careful to leave your government entirely uncommitted as to ulterior measures.”

Mr. Everett, Sec. of State, to Mr. Marsh, min. to Turkey, No. 24, Feb.
5, 1853, S. Ex. Doc. 9, 33 Cong. 2 sess. 5, 8, 9. See, as to the case of
Dr. King, Baird's Modern Greece, 355–367.
Mr. Marsh repaired to Athens and presented the demands which he was
directed to make. The Greek government evaded the one with
reference to the sentence of banishment, on the allegation that Mr.
Marsh had demanded that the government "revoke" the sentence of
a judicial tribunal. It appears, however, that the Greek government
permitted the sentence of banishment against Mr. King to remain
unexecuted. (S. Ex. Doc. 9, 33 Cong. 2 sess. 186.)

"The efforts of Mr. Marsh to have the sentence of banishment

revoked were unavailing during his stay in Greece, but it is presumed that his arguments upon the subject were appreciated, for Mr. King himself, with a letter to the Department of the 3rd of March, 1854, communicates a copy of another decree of the government, revoking the sentence of banishment against him." (Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Roger A. Pryor, special agent, July 18, 1855, MS. Inst. Turkey, I. 388.)

It appears that the Greek government offered to pay an indemnity for the land, but there was a discussion as to the amount that should be paid. (S. Ex. Doc. 9, 33 Cong. 2 sess. 166–172.)

In July, 1855, the Hon. Roger A. Pryor was sent, as a special agent of the United States, to Greece, in order to effect, if possible, a settlement of the question of indemnity. (Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pryor, July 18, 1855, MS. Inst. Turkey, I. 388.)

In this mission Mr. Pryor was successful. He settled the claim, to Dr. King's satisfaction, for $25,000. (Mr. Pryor, special agent, to Sec. of State, Oct. 1/20, 1855, MS.) The President in his annual message of 1855 said: "A question, also, which has been pending for several years between the United States and the Kingdom of Greece, growing out of the sequestration by public authorities of that country of property belonging to the present American consul at Athens, and which had been the subject of very earnest discussion heretofore, has recently been settled to the satisfaction of the party interested and of both governments." (President Pierce, annual message, Dec. 31, 1855.)

Irregularities in the prosecution of a citizen of the United States in Chile, not amounting to a denial of justice or an undue discrimination against him as an alien, will not be ground for the interference of the government of the United States.

Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Starkweather, Aug. 24, 1855, MS. Inst.
Chile, XV. 124.

"The Constitution of the United States limits and defines the powers of the several branches of the government, and it is not within the province of the executive to interfere by its action with cases pending in the courts. Such matters are within the cognizance and under the control of the judicial branch of the government, subject to the rules established by law for the administration of justice."

Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Polo de Bernabé, Span. min., May 31, 1873,
MS. Notes to Spain, IX. 178.

When there is a denial of justice in Canada in a particular case of wrong inflicted in Canada on citizens of the United States, the case is one for diplomatic intervention.

Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Sir E. Thornton, Sept. 4, 1873, MS. Notes to
Gr. Brit. XVI. 192.

"It may, in general, be true that when foreigners take up their abode in a country they must expect to share the fortune of the other inhabitants, and can not expect a preference over them. While, however, a government may construe according to its pleasure its obligation to protect its own citizens from injury, foreign governments have a right, and it is their duty, to judge whether their citizens have received the protection due to them pursuant to public law and treaties. It may be the abstract right of a government to exclude foreigners entirely from its territories. This right, however, has rarely been exercised in modern times. Whenever it is waived, this step imparts to the government to whom the foreigners may owe their allegiance the right of seeing that the duty of the other government toward them is fulfilled. An acknowledgment of this right is not, under the circumstances, as Mr. Lafragua seems to suppose, tantamount to making unjust and invidious discriminations in favor of foreigners and against citizens. It can not be acknowledged, as Mr. Lafragua maintains, that diplomatic interference in such cases necessarily annihilates or trenches upon the peculiar functions of the judiciary of a country. In cases of a denial of justice the right of intervention through the diplomatic channel is allowed, and justice may as much be denied when, as in this case, it would be absurd to attempt to seek it by judicial process, as if it were denied after having been so sought."

Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Foster, Dec. 16, 1873, MS. Inst. Mex.
XIX, 48.

By a joint resolution of Congress, approved June 15, 1878, the President was requested to cause an investigation to be made of the case of Edward O'M. Condon, imprisoned in Ireland, and, if deemed expedient, to take such action as might secure the prisoner an opportunity for exoneration or a speedy, fair, and impartial trial. A special agent was sent abroad to investigate the case, and pending this investigation the American minister in London was directed to take no further official action, but was authorized informally to say to the British secretary for foreign affairs that, if the result of the investigation should tend to exonerate the prisoner from the crime. of which he had been convicted, or should develop facts in his favor not known or presented at his former trial, the exculpatory proof would be laid before Her Majesty's government, in the confident

hope that a new trial, with adequate means of defense, would be accorded as an act of justice and equity. The minister was subsequently instructed that, if the investigation should satisfactorily show that there was no failure of justice in the conviction, and that there were no new facts to establish the prisoner's innocence, he might use his good offices in a renewed appeal to clemency; and that it was "particularly advisable" that nothing should be done which might give the British government "even colorable grounds for regarding" the investigation "as in any sense an interference in the domestic judicial administration of another state, the sole object being to discover, if possible, whether any presumption of innocence exists in favor of the prisoner, which, if he were a British subject, and the evidence in his behalf came through the usual channels of British law, might reasonably operate to secure him the relief contemplated."

Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Welsh, min. to England, No. 100, July 1, 1878, For. Rel. 1878, 278; same to same, No. 116, July 24, 1878, id. 280.

"That the state to which a foreigner belongs may intervene for his protection when he has been denied ordinary justice in the foreign country, and also in case of a plain violation of the substance of natural justice, is a proposition universally recognized.

"One of the highest authorities on international law, Valin, says: "To render legitimate the use of reprisals, it is not at all necessary that the ruler against whom this remedy is to be employed, nor his subjects, should have used violence, nor made a seizure, nor used any other irregular attempt upon the property of the other nation or its subject; it is enough that he has denied justice.'

"If the government of a foreign country refuses to execute its own laws as interpreted by its own courts, and to give effect to the decisions of its own courts, in respect of a foreigner, it denies justice.

"If the tribunals of a foreign state are unable or unwilling to entertain and adjudicate upon the grievances of a foreigner, the ground for interference is fairly laid.' (Phill., Int. Law, pp. 4, 5.) In his recent work on the 'Law of Nations,' Sir Travers Twiss, who holds a distinguished position as a writer on public law, says:

"International justice may be denied in several ways: (1) By the refusal of a nation either to entertain the complaint at all, or to allow the right to be established before its tribunals; (2) or by studied delays and impediments, for which no good reason can be given, and which are in effect equivalent to a refusal; or (3) by an evidently unjust and partial decision.' (Law of Nations, by Sir Travers Twiss, part 1, p. 36.)"

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. McLane, min. to France, No. 134, June 23, 1886, MS. Inst. France, XXI. 330.

While the settlement of claims of citizens of the United States against the goverment of Peru by impartial international tribunals "is deemed most expedient and desirable, this government could not entertain a proposition to submit such claims on the basis defined by the minister for foreign affairs-that is to say, on the basis of the exclusion from such submission of all claims upon which judgment may have been pronounced by Peruvian tribunals. Such judgments are not recognized by international law as internationally binding, and can not be so regarded by this government. This question has been discussed at length by the Department in several recent instructions to you, and it is not deemed necessary now to do more than to reaffirm the position therein taken.

"This government is also unable to admit the broad contention of the government of Peru that the diplomatic intervention of a government in behalf of its citizens is inadmissible where the laws of the country against which the claim is made afford a remedy until that remedy has been attempted and the courts of the nation have retarded or refused justice. This proposition is acceptable only with the qualification that, at the time of the injury complained of, there were duly established courts to which resort was open and practically available."

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Buck, min. to Peru, No. 104, Nov. 1, 1886, MS. Inst. Peru, XVII. 252.

A law of Salvador, promulgated September 27, 1886, contained Chapter IV.) the following provisions:

ARTICLE 39. Only in the event of a denial, or of a voluntary retardation in the administration of justice, and after having resorted in vain to all the ordinary means established by the laws of the Republic, may foreigners appeal to the diplomatic recourse.

ARTICLE 40. It is to be understood that there is a denial of justice only when the judicial authority refuses to make a formal declaration upon the principal subject or upon any incident of the suit in which he may have cognizance or which is submitted to his cognizance; consequently the fact alone that the judge may have pronounced a decision or sentence, in whatever sense it may be, although it may be said that the decision is iniquitous or given in express violation of law, cannot be alleged as a denial of justice.

ARTICLE 41. Retardation in the administration of justice is not to be considered voluntary when the judge alleges any legal motive of physical impediment therefor which he is unable to prevent.

With reference to these provisions the United States took the following position:

"I regret that the Department is unable to accept the principle of any of these articles without important qualifications. The denial to the foreigner of the right of appeal to his government necessarily implies the denial in the particular case of his government's right to intervene; and as this denial is based upon the decisions of