all the captures of British vessels made under cover of that military fiction. She had also secured from Spain the promise to pay many long-standing claims of British subjects upon the Spanish Government. In satisfaction of all these demands the island of Cuba might be the only indemnity in the power of Spain to grant, as it would undoubtedly be to Great Britain the most satisfactory indemnity which she could receive. Continuing, Mr. Adams said: "The war between France and Spain changes so totally the circumstances under which the declaration above mentioned of Mr. Canning was made, that it may, at its very outset, produce events, under which the possession of Cuba may be obtained by Great Britain, without even raising a reproach of intended deception against the British Government for making it. An alliance between Great Britain and Spain may be one of the first fruits of this war. A guaranty of the island to Spain may be among the stipulations of that alliance; and, in the event either of a threatened attack upon the island by France, or of attempts on the part of the islanders to assume their independence, a resort to the temporary occupation of the Havana by British forces may be among the probable expedients through which it may be obtained, by concert, between Great Britain and Spain herself. It is not necessary to point out the numerous contingencies by which the transition from a temporary and fiduciary occupation to a permanent and proprietary possession may be effected. "The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of this Union. This opinion is so generally entertained, that even the groundless rumors that it was about to be accomplished, which have spread abroad, and are still teeming, may be traced to the deep and almost universal feeling of aversion to it, and to the alarm which the mere probability of its occurrence has stimulated. The question both of our right and of our power to prevent it, if necessary by force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils, and the Administration is called upon, in the performance of its duties to the nation, at least to use all the means within its competency to guard against and forefend it. "It will be among the primary objects requiring your most earnest and unremitting attention, to ascertain and report to us every movement of negotiation between Spain and Great Britain upon this subject. We can not, indeed, prescribe any special instructions in relation to it. We scarcely know where you will find the Government of Spain upon your arrival in the country, nor can we foresee, with certainty, by whom it will be administered. Your credentials are addressed to Ferdinand, the King of Spain, under the constitution. You may find him under the guardianship of a Cortes, in the custody of an army of faith, or under the protection of the invaders. of his country. So long as the constitutional government may con tinue to be administered in his name, your official intercourse will be with his ministers, and to them you will repeat, what Mr. Forsyth has been instructed to say, that the wishes of your Government are that Cuba and Porto Rico may continue in connection with independent and constitutional Spain. "You will add that no countenance has been given by us to any projected plan of separation from Spain, which may have been formed in the island. This assurance becomes proper, as by a late despatch received from Mr. Forsyth, he intimates that the Spanish Government have been informed that a revolution in Cuba was secretly preparing, fomented by communications between a society of Freemasons there and another of the same fraternity in Philadelphia. Of this we have no other knowledge; and the societies of Freemasons in this country are so little in the practice of using agency of a political nature on any occasion, that we think it most probable the information of the Spanish Government, in that respect, is unfounded. It is true that the Freemasons at the Havana have taken part of late in the politics of Cuba, and, so far as it is known to us, it has been an earnest and active part in favor of the continuance of their connexion with Spain. While disclaiming all disposition on our part either to obtain possession of Cuba or Porto Rico ourselves, you will declare that the American Government had no knowledge of the lawless expedition undertaken against the latter of those islands last summer." Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Nelson, min. to Spain, Apr. 28, 1823, Ser, also, Moore Int. Arbitrations, V. 4534 et seq. "During your residence in the island of Cuba, you will from time to time, as safe opportunities may occur, communicate to this Department, in private and confidential letters, all such information as you may be able to obtain, relating to the political condition of the island; the views of its government and the sentiments of its inhabitants. You will attentively observe all occurrences having relation to their connection with Spain, and to the events which may result from the war between France and Spain, probably now commenced. Should there be French or British agents residing at the Havanna, you will endeavour to ascertain, without direct enquiries, or apparent curiosity, on the subject, their objects and pursuits; and you will notice whatever maritime force of either of those powers may be stationed in the West Indies, or present themselves in the vicinity of the island. "You will be mindful of any apparent popular agitation; particularly of such as may have reference either to a transfer of the island from Spain to any other power, or to the assumption by the inhabi tants of an independent government. If, in your intercourse with society, inquiries should be made of you with regard to the views of the Government of the United States concerning the political state of Cuba, you will say that, so far as they were known to you from having resided at the seat of government, the first wish of the Government was for the continuance of Cuba in its political connection with Spain, and that it would be altogether averse to the transfer of the island to any other power. You will cautiously avoid committing yourself upon any proposals which may be suggested to you, of cooperation in any measure proposing a change of the political condition of its people; but will report as above mentioned to me whatever may in any manner become known to you in this respect, and the communication of which may be useful to the public service. Exercise a discriminating judgment upon all evidence of what you shall report as information, so that we may distinguish the degree of credit due to every statement of fact. You will duly distrust mere popular rumours, but neglect no probable source of useful information. "Should any uneasiness be manifested by the governor, at the duration of your residence at the Havanna, you will take such occasion as may be presented for removing it. During the sickly season at the Havanna, you may take the opportunity of making an excursion to any place in its neighborhood exempt from the danger." Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Randall, special agent, April 29. 1823, Mr. Jefferson, in a letter to President Monroe, June 11, 1823, suggested that, as Cuba seemed to "hold up a speck of war to us" and as the possession of the island by Great Britain "would indeed be a great calamity to us," it might be advisable to induce Great Britain to join the United States "in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except Spain." Writing again to President Monroe, June 23, 1823, he said that his suggestion was based on the supposition that there was an English interest in Cuba as strong as that of the United States; but that, if there was no danger of the islands falling into the possession of England," he must "retract an opinion founded on an error of fact." It would be better "to lie still in readiness to receive that interesting incorporation when solicited by herself. For, certainly, her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanting to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest." 66 Jefferson's Works, VII. 288, 299. "I did not leave Mr. de Chateaubriand (French minister for foreign affairs) without adverting to the affairs of Spain. That our sympathies were entirely on her side, and that we considered the war made H. Doc. 551-vol 6-25 on her by France unjust, I did not pretend to conceal; but I added 3. CANNING-RUSH NEGOTIATIONS. § 932. "When my interview with Mr. Canning, on Saturday, was about to close, I transiently asked him whether, notwithstanding the late news from Spain, we might not still hope that the Spaniards would get the better of all their difficulties. I had allusion to the defection of Ballasteros in Andalusia, an event seeming to threaten with new dangers the constitutional cause. His reply was general, importing nothing more than his opinion of the increased difficulties and dangers with which, undoubtedly, this event was calculated to surround the Spanish cause. "Pursuing the topic of Spanish affairs, I remarked that should France ultimately effect her purposes in Spain, there was at least the consolation left that Great Britain would not allow her to go further and lay her hands upon the Spanish colonies, bringing them, too, under her grasp. I here had in my mind the sentiments promulgated upon this subject in Mr. Canning's note to the British ambassador at Paris of the 31st of March, during the negotiations that preceded the invasion of Spain. It will be recollected that the British Government say in this note that time and the course of events appeared to have substantially decided the question of the separation of these colonies from the mother country, although their formal recognization as independent states by Great Britain might be hastened or retarded by external circumstances, as well as by the internal condition of those new states themselves; and that as His Britannic Majesty disclaimed all intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, he was also satisfied that no attempt would be made by France to bring any of them under her dominion, either by conquest or by cession from Spain. "By this we are to understand, in terms sufficiently distinct, that Great Britain would not be passive under such an attempt by France, and Mr. Canning, on my having referred to this note, asked me what I thought my Government would say to going hand in hand with this, in the same sentiment; not, as he added, that any concert in action under it could become necessary between the two countries, but that the simple fact of our being known to hold the same sentiment would, he had no doubt, by its moral effect, put down the intention on the part of France, admitting that she should ever entertain it. This belief was founded, he said, upon the large share of the maritime power of the world which Great Britain and the United States shared between them, and the consequent influence which the knowledge that they held a common opinion upon a question on which such large maritime interests, present and future, hung, could not fail to produce upon the rest of the world. "I replied that in what manner my Government would look upon such a suggestion I was unable to say, but that I would communicate it in the same informal manner in which he threw it out. I said, however, that I did not think I should do so with full advantage, unless he would at the same time enlighten me as to the precise situation in which His Majesty's Government stood at this moment in relation to those new states, and especially on the material point of their own independence. "He replied that Great Britain certainly never again intended to lend her instrumentality or aid, whether by mediation or otherwise, towards making up the dispute between Spain and her colonies, but that if this result could still be brought about she would not inter-. fere to prevent it. Upon my intimating that I had supposed that all idea of Spain ever recovering her authority over the colonies had long since gone by, he explained by saying that he did not mean to controvert that opinion, for he, too, believed that the day had arrived when all America might be considered as lost to Europe so far as the tie of political dependence was concerned. All that he meant was, that if Spain and the colonies should still be able to bring the dispute, not yet totally extinct between them, to a close upon terms satisfactory to both sides, and which should at the same time secure to Spain commercial or other advantages not extended to other nations, that Great Britain would not object to a compromise in this spirit of preference to Spain. All that she would ask would be to stand upon as favored a footing as any other nation after Spain. Upon my again alluding to the improbability of the dispute ever settling down now even upon this basis, he said that it was not his intention to maintain such a position, and that he had expressed himself as above rather for the purpose of indicating the feeling which this cabinet still had towards Spain in relation to the controversy than of predicting results. "Wishing, however, to be still more specifically informed, I asked whether Great Britain was at this moment taking any step, or contemplating any, which had reference to the recognition of these States, this being the point in which we felt the chief interest. |