66 The Government of the United States has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; its safe and capacious harbours; its rich productions, the exchange of which, for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures, constitutes one of the most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter. Other considerations, connected with a certain class of our population, make it the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, the result of which could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States. "On the other hand, the wisdom which induced the Spanish Government to relax in its colonial system, and to adopt with regard to those islands a more liberal policy, which opened their ports to general commerce, has been so far satisfactory in the view of the United States, as, in addition to other considerations, to induce this Government to desire that their possession should not be transferred from the Spanish Crown to any other power." Mr. Van Buren, Sec. of State, to Mr. Van Ness, min. to Spain, No. 2, Oct. 2, 1829; MS. Inst. U. States Ministers, XIII. 19; 26 Br. & For. State Papers, 1149. See publications in 26 Br. & For. State Papers (1837-'38), 1124–1159, including: Mr. Forsyth (Madrid) to Mr. Adams (Sec.), Nov. 20, 1822; Mr. Forsyth (Madrid) to Mr. Adams (Sec.), Dec. 13, 1822; Mr. Adams to Mr. Forsyth, Dec. 17, 1822; Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Adams, Feb. 10, 1823; Mr. Adams to Mr. Nelson, Apr. 28, 1823 (suggesting purchase of Cuba); Mr. Appleton (Cadiz) to Mr. Adams, July 10, 1823; Mr. Nelson to Mr. Clay (Sec.), July 10, 1825; Mr. Clay to Mr. Everett, Apr. 27, 1825; Mr. Nelson to Mr. Bermudez, June 22, 1825; Mr. Bermudez to Mr. Nelson, July 12, 1825 (stating that Spain would not part with Cuba); Mr. Everett to Mr. Clay, Sept. 25, 1825; Mr. Everett to Mr. Clay, Aug. 17, 1827; the Spanish minister at London to the minister of state, June 1, 1827; Mr. Everett to Mr. Clay, Dec. 12, 1827; confidential memorandum of Mr. Everett for the Spanish secretary of state, Dec. 10, 1827, stating, among other things, that the Government of "His Catholic Majesty can not of course be ignorant, of the movements commenced a few months ago by the British Ministry, in conjunction with the Spanish refugees in London, and now in a course of execution, for the purpose of revolutionizing the Island of Cuba and the Canaries," saying that the United States would not consent to Cuba passing to any third power, and complaining of discrimination against the United States; Mr. Van Ness (Mad rid) to Mr. Forsyth (Sec.), Aug. 10, 1836, speaking of rumors of disquiet in Cuba; Mr. Van Ness to Mr. Forsyth, Dec. 10, 1836, as to the effect of Sqanish political changes on Cuba; Mr. Stevenson (London) to Mr. Forsyth, June 16, 1839, as to conversation with Lord Palmerston, Mr. S. protesting against foreign interference in Cuba; Mr. Eaton (Madrid) to Mr. Forsyth, Aug. 10, 1837, stating that Mr. Villiers, British minister in Spain, disclaimed the idea of Great Britain taking Cuba. "This Government has been given to understand that if Spain should persevere in the assertion of a hopeless claim to dominion over her former colonies, they will feel it to be their duty as well as their interest to attack her colonial possessions in our vicinity-Cuba and Porto Rico. Your general instructions are full upon the subject of the interest which the United States take in the fate of those islands, and particularly of the latter [former]. They inform you that we are content that Cuba should remain as it now is, but could not consent to its transfer to any European power. Motives of reasonable state policy render it more desirable to us that it should remain subject to Spain rather than to either of the South American States. Those motives will readily present themselves to your mind. They are principally founded upon an apprehension that, if possessed by the latter, it would, in the present state of things, be in greater danger of becoming subject to some European power than in its present condition. Although such are our own wishes and true interests, the President does not see on what ground he would be justified in interfering with any attempts which the South American States might think it for their interest, in the prosecution of a defensive war, to make upon the islands in question. If indeed an attempt should be made to disturb them by putting arms in the hands of one portion of their population to destroy another, and which, in its influence, would endanger the peace of a portion of the United States, the case might be different. Against such an attempt the United States (being informed that it was in contemplation) have already protested, and warmly remonstrated in their communications, last summer, with the Government of Mexico. But the information lately communicated to us, in this regard, was accompanied by a solemn assurance that no such measures will, in any event, be resorted to, and that the contest, if forced upon them, will be carried on, on their part, with strict reference to the established rules of civilized warfare." Mr. Van Buren, Sec. of State, to Mr. Van Ness, min. to Spain, Oct. 13, 1830, MS. Inst. U. States Ministers, XIII. 184; 26 Br. & For. State Papers, 1152. H. Doc. 551-vol 6- -29 "Should you have reason to suspect any design on the part of Spain to transfer voluntarily her title to the island [Cuba], whether of ownership or possession, and whether permanent or temporary, to Great Britain, or any other power, you will distinctly state that the United States will prevent it, at all hazards, as they will any foreign military occupation for any pretext whatsoever; and you are authorized to assure the Spanish Government that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it." Mr. Forsyth, Sec. of State, to Mr. Vail, min. to Spain, No. 2, July 15, To the same effect, Mr. Upshur, Sec. of State, to Mr. Irving, min to Spain, Early in 1843 a special messenger was sent to Havana to deliver in person to Mr. Campbell, the United States consul, a letter from a person of high standing in Cuba in relation to conditions there. The name of the writer of the letter was not disclosed, and he maintained an air of great secrecy, representing that he was in honor bound not to reveal to the local authorities in Cuba what he had made known to his correspondent in the United States. He declared that the situation in Cuba was dangerous and critical, and that the authorities of the island were incompetent to meet the crisis; that, in spite of the treaty of 1817 between Great Britain and Spain, the slave trade had been carried on in full vigor up to 1841; and that the British ministry and abolition societies, finding themselves foiled or eluded by the Spanish authorities, had resolved upon the total and immediate ruin of the island, and were through their agents offering independence to the creoles on condition that they would unite with the colored people in effecting a general emancipation of the slaves and in converting the government into a black military republic under British protection. With 600,000 blacks in Cuba and 800,000 in her own West India islands, Great Britain, it was said, would strike a death blow at the existence of slavery in the United States, and, intrenched at Havana and San Antonio, would be able to close the two entrances to the Gulf of Mexico and even to prevent free passage of the commerce of the United States over the Bahama bank and through the Florida channel. Upon the strength of the last census in Cuba, the writer of the letter inferred that the white creoles would be able to preserve their rights in the future Ethiopico-Cuban republic, and that the Spaniards would leave the island at once; but he expressed the opinion that the mass of the white population in Cuba in easy circumstances, including Spaniards, would always prefer the flag of the United States to that of England. In commu nicating these statements to Mr. Campbell, the Department of State declared that the Government of the United States neither adopted nor rejected the speculations contained in the letter. Mr. Campbell was directed to examine and report on the allegations with scrupulous care and with as much promptness as strict secrecy and discretion would permit. It was obvious, said Mr. Webster, who was then Secretary of State, that any attempt on the part of England to employ force in Cuba, for any purpose, would bring on a war, involving, possibly, all Europe as well as the United States, and, as she could hardly fail to see this, and probably did not desire it, there might be reason to doubt the accuracy of the information given by the writer of the letter. The Spanish Government, said Mr. Webster, had repeatedly been told that the United States "never would permit the occupation of that island [Cuba] by British agents or forces upon any pretext whatsoever; and that in the event of any attempt to wrest it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval and military resources of this country to aid her in preserving or recovering it." Mr. Webster, Sec. of State, to Mr. Campbell, consul at Havana, Jan. 14, 1843, 44 Br. & For. State Papers, 174; H. Ex. Doc. 121, 32 Cong. 1 sess. See, also, Mr. Upshur, Sec. of State, to Mr. Irving, min. to Spain, No. 21, Jan. 9, 1844, MS. Inst. Spain, XIV. 167; 32 Br. & For. State Papers, 867. "By direction of the President, I now call your attention to the present condition and future prospects of Cuba. The fate of this island must ever be deeply interesting to the people of the United States. We are content that it shall continue to be a colony of Spain. Whilst in her possession we have nothing to apprehend. Besides, we are bound to her by the ties of ancient friendship, and we sincerely desire to render these perpetual. But we can never consent that this island shall become a colony of any other European power. In the possession of Great Britain. or any strong naval power it might prove ruinous both to our domestic and foreign commerce, and even endanger the Union of the States. The highest and first duty of every independent nation is to provide for its own safety; and acting upon this principle, we should be compelled to resist the acquisition of Cuba by any powerful maritime State, with all the means which Providence has placed at our command. "Cuba is almost within sight of the coast of Florida, situated between that State and the peninsula of Yucatan, and possessing the deep, capacious and impregnably fortified harbor of the Havana. If this island were under the dominion of Great Britain she could command both the inlets to the Gulf of Mexico. She would thus be enabled, in time of war, effectively to blockade the mouth of the Mississippi, and to deprive all the Western States of this Union, as well as those within the Gulf, teeming as they are with an industrious and enterprising population, of a foreign market for their immense productions. But this is not the worst. She could also destroy the commerce by sea between our ports on the Gulf and our Atlantic ports, a commerce of nearly as great a value as the whole of our foreign trade. "Is there any reason to believe that Great Britain desires to acquire the island of Cuba? "We know that it has been her uniform policy, throughout her past history, to seize upon every valuable commercial point throughout the world, whenever circumstances have placed this in her power. And what point so valuable as the island of Cuba? The United States are the chief commercial rival of Great Britain; our tonnage at the present moment is nearly equal to hers, and it will be greater, within a brief period, if nothing should occur to arrest our progress. Of what vast importance would it, then, be to her to obtain the possession of an island from which she could at any time destroy a very large portion both of our foreign and coasting trade? Besides, she well knows that if Cuba were in our possession, her West India Islands would be rendered comparatively valueless. From the extent and fertility of this island, and from the energy and industry of our people, we should soon be able to supply the markets of the world. with tropical productions, at a cheaper rate than these could be raised in any of her possessions." Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to Mr. Saunders, min. to Spain, June 17, 1848, MS. Inst. Spain, XIV. 256; H. Ex. Doc. 121, 32 Cong. 1 sess. 12. Mr. Saunders was informed that the United States would pay $100,000,000 for the island, if it could not be obtained for less. See supra, § 118, I. 584-587. "Whilst this Government is resolutely determined that the island of Cuba shall never be ceded by Spain to any other power than the United States, it does not desire, in future, to utter any threats, or enter into any guaranties with Spain, on that subject. Without either guaranties or threats, we shall be ready, when the time comes, to act. The news of the cession of Cuba to any foreign power would, in the United States, be the instant signal for war. No foreign power would attempt to take it, that did not expect a hostile collision with us as an inevitable consequence." Mr. Clayton, Sec. of State, to Mr. Barringer, min. to Spain, No. 2, Aug. 2, 1849, MS. Inst. Spain, XIV. 295. On October 8, 1851, M. de Sartiges, French minister at Washington, informed Mr. Crittenden, Acting Secretary of State, that the |