this international duty will be performed by us within our own sphere, in the interest not merely of ourselves, but of all other nations, and with strict justice toward all. If this is done a general acceptance of the Monroe doctrine will in the end surely follow; and this will mean an increase of the sphere in which peaceful measures for the settlement of international difficulties gradually displace those of a warlike character. "We can point with just pride to what we have done in Cuba as a guaranty of our good faith. We stayed in Cuba only so long as to start her aright on the road to self-government, which she has since trod with such marked and distinguished success; and upon leaving the island we exacted no conditions save such as would prevent her from ever becoming the prey of the stranger. Our purpose in Santo Domingo is as beneficent. The good that this country got from its action in Cuba was indirect rather than direct. So it is as regards Santo Domingo. The chief material advantage that will come from the action proposed to be taken will be to Santo Domingo itself and to Santo Domingo's creditors. The advantages that will come to the United States will be indirect, but nevertheless great, for it is supremely to our interest that all the communities immediately south of us should be or become prosperous and stable, and therefore not merely in name but in fact independent and self-governing. "I call attention to the urgent need of prompt action on this matter. We now have a great opportunity to secure peace and stability in the island, without friction or bloodshed, by acting in accordance with the cordial invitation of the governmental authorities themselves. It will be unfortunate from every standpoint if we fail to grasp this opportunity; for such failure will probably mean increasing revolutionary violence in Santo Domingo, and very possibly embarrassing foreign complications in addition. This protocol affords a practical test of the efficiency of the United States Government in maintaining the Monroe doctrine." Message of President Roosevelt to the Senate, Feb. 15, 1905, Confid, Exec. gets hold of a piece of land far away in South America, in payment of debts or to ensure the safety of misused colonists. . If the Monroe doctrine were to-day to be applied no farther than Central America, and South America were to be exempted, the possibilities of a conflict with European powers would be considerably decreased. . . . It was never doubted that the exclusion of the Old World countries from the new American continents was only the conclusion of a premise, to the effect that the Americans themselves proposed to confine their political interests to their own continent. That was a wise policy in the times of Washington and Monroe; and whether or not it would have been wise in the time of McKinley, it was in any case at that time thrown over. The Americans have united with the European forces to do battle in China; they have extended their own dominion toward Asia; they have sent men-of-war to Europe on political missions; in short, the Americans have for years been extending their political influence around the world, and Secretary Hay has for a long time played an influential part in the European concert of powers. . The real interest of the United States with regard to South America is solely that that land shall develop as far as possible, that its enormous treasures shall be exploited, and that out of a prosperous commercial continent important trade advantages shall accrue to the United States. This is possible only by the establishment of order there-the instant termination of anarchy. . . . It would be somewhat different if the United States were to admit, as a consequence of the Monroe doctrine, its own responsibility for the public administration of these countries, for their debts and for whatever crimes they commit; in other words, if the United States were virtually to annex South America." (The Americans, 221-224.) "It is, nevertheless, indispensable for us to continue to uphold the Monroe doctrine. First, from motives of common humanity; and secondly, from the viewpoint of our own national interests. Can Professor Münsterberg deliberately advocate a reversion to the state of things which existed in the eighteenth century, when the Caribbean was the cockpit of the British, French and Spanish? . . . As for our actual and prospective traffic with Latin America, experience should have taught us that from all that part of it which should fall into German, French or Italian hands our manufacturers and merchants would be barred. Then again, for strategic reasons too obvious to need emphasis, we, as owners of the Panama Canal, could not permit a European power to occupy any part of the coasts of Central America, or of Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador. The Monroe doctrine was formulated not for a day, but for all time. The American people never will renounce it. Never will they suffer the New World to be made the victim of partition." (Editorial, New York Sun, Thursday, April 28, 1904.) Professor Münsterberg's objection, based on the argument that the position of the United States has tended to confirm and perpetuate disorders in Spanish-American states, appears to be met by the position of President Roosevelt in his foregoing message on Santo Domingo. H. Doc. 551-vol 634 13. REPUBLIC OF TEXAS. $ 963. "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 2, dated July 31st, and to express my gratification at the result of your conversation with Mr. Guizot, especially that part of it which refers to the rumored protest of the French Government, conjointly with that of Great Britain, against the proposed annexation of Texas to the United States. Such a step, had it been taken by France, must have excited unkind feelings, and given to the United States just cause of complaint. The Government of the United States will confidently rely on the åssurances of Mr. Guizot, and it is hoped that, neither separately nor jointly with any other power, will France adopt a course which would seem so little in accordance with her true interests, or the friendly relations which have so long subsisted between the two countries. In regard to Mr. Guizot's inquiry respecting a proposed guaranty of the independence of Texas, your reply was well timed and judicious. The settled policy of the United States has been to avoid entering into such guaranties, except in cases of strong necessity. The present case offers no reasons to warrant a deviation from that policy. On the contrary it presents a strong additional reason why it should be adhered to, as such a guaranty would permanently defeat the proposed measure of annexation which both countries seem anxious to advance. A suggestion of the same purport was made to me, by the British minister here, Mr. Pakenham, during a casual conversation soon after I came into office; and he was promptly informed that the Government of the United States could not accede to such a proposition.' Mr. Calhoun, Sec. of State, to Mr. W. R. King, min. to France, No. 6, 14. VENEZUELA. (1) USE OF GOOD OFFICES. § 964. With reference to an intimation of the Venezuelan Government that it desired the interposition of the United States in a controversy which had arisen with Spain, Mr. Cass stated that it was the established policy of the United States "not to interfere with the relations of foreign nations to each other, and that it would be both improper and impossible for the United States to decide upon the course of conduct towards Venezuela which Spain may think required by her honor and her interests; " but that, if the United States could "by any informal action serve as a means of bringing about the reconciliation so much to be desired," it would be "a subject of great satisfaction to the President to be instrumental for such a purpose." The note of the Venezuelan minister was therefore transmitted to the American minister at Madrid, with instructions to tender his good offices to the Governments of Spain and Venezuela, if in his discretion he thought the opportunity favorable to an effort for a more friendly understanding between them, and if such offer could be made" without offence to the Spanish Government." Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Gen. Paez, Venezuelan min., Nov. 5, 1860, MS. See, also, Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Preston, min. to Spain, No. 34, (2) AVOIDANCE OF JOINT ACTION. "Baron Gerolt (the German envoy and minister plenipotentiary) yesterday enquired how the Government of the United States would receive the proposal contained in what he said was a circular addressed by his Government to their Representatives at London, Madrid, Florence, and Copenhagen, proposing a joint and concerted movement to urge on Venezuela a more orderly government, better observance of her engagements, &c., &c. I failed to obtain from the baron any definition of the precise nature of the proposed movement, or of the precise objects to be attained, or of the extent to which it was in contemplation either to advise or to coerce Venezuela, nor whether coercion was really in contemplation, although he made once an allusion to a combined fleet' and 'guns.' "The United States is among the creditors of Venezuela, so are France, Holland, Great Britain, Italy, Denmark, and Spain. "We are not aware that Germany is among the creditors of Venezuela, or that she has any special cause of complaint against that Government for any injuries to her people or commerce. 66 "Her movement, therefore, in this direction excites some surprise. Baron Gerolt stated that he was directed to make the inquiry confidentially,' and that he was not to make the proposal to the United States unless it would be favorably received. "He was told that we had a vivid recollection of a combined European movement against Mexico a few years since, and that we would wish to know the causes of Germany's complaint, and the precise object and means which they proposed and the limits which they intended to prescribe to their operations. That the United States could not look with indifference upon any combination of European powers against an American state; that if Germany or any other, power had just cause of war against Venezuela, this Government could interpose no objection to her resorting thereto. "If the object of Germany be a united remonstrance to Venezuela against the anarchy and chronic revolutionary condition of that state, or an appeal to honesty in the observance of her engagements, this Government would not object, but would, of itself, make a similar remonstrance and appeal. If, however, the object be a forcible demonstration of coercion by a combination of European states, the United States could not regard it with indifference. "You will inquire confidentially of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any proposal has been made in behalf of the German Government to that of Great Britain on this subject, and ask whether the Government of Her Majesty has it in contemplation to unite therein. You will at the same time, delicately but decidedly, express the anxiety which the suggestion of the proposition has excited in this Government, and may say that the President hopes that the suggested proposal may not be carried to the extent of disturbing the sensibilities which would be aroused by a combination of European powers against one of the Republics of this Continent." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Gen. Schenck, min. to England, No. 5 (confid.), "With reference to General Sickles' despatch of the 20th ultimo, No. 360, As to Venezuelan complaints concerning political plots hatched by Venezuelans at the Dutch island of Curaçao, and the desire of Venezuela to annex the island, see Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Russell, min. to Venezuela, Nos. 127 and 128, Jan. 13, 1877, MS. Inst. Venezuela, III. 9, 10. The minister of the United States at Caracas having, in conversations with the British minister at that capital, reached the conclusion that "great and good results would accrue to both American and English claimants" if the two Governments would make “a joint representation" and employ their "joint cooperation" in securing from Venezuela a settlement of claims, Mr. Bayard replied that the policy of the United States was "distinctly opposed to joint action with other powers in the presentation of claims, even when they may arise from an act equally invading the common rights of American citizens and the subjects of another state residing in the country to |