to the same subject. In reply I beg to say that your several communications have been submitted to an impartial officer of this Department, who has given the subject careful and equitable consideration. His report and conclusions are substantially as follows: "It appears from a consideration of all the evidence in the case that there was at least probable cause for the arrest of Mr. Reis, and that there was no reasonable doubt on the part of the officer causing the arrest that Mr. Reis was engaged in the conspiracy against the Provisional Government of Hawaii because of reliable information from different sources of the use of seditious language on the part of Mr. Reis, while he was in the constant employment, as a hack driver, of those known to be 'Royalists.' "Furthermore it appears that several claims against the Hawaiian Government by citizens of the United States who were arrested and imprisoned at the same time as Mr. Reis and under similar circumstances were presented to this Department before the annexation of Hawaii by the United States, and this Government was asked to collect indemnities from the Hawaiian Government. Upon investigation and consideration, the Government of the United States decided that those claimants, although citizens of the United States, were not entitled to diplomatic intervention. "There was no evidence in those cases of maltreatment of the claimants during the imprisonment, nor is there in the case in question, nor that the arrest was due to any cause other than the desire of the existing government to investigate thoroughly every case of suspected complicity in the uprising, nor was there any evidence of direct or indirect participation by those claimants in the uprising. Yet an investigation showed that the imprisonments were not made without some ground of suspicion, and this Government decided that the alleged illegal treatment complained of was justified by the circumstances which were unusual. "In view therefore, of its adverse action as to claims of its own citizens based on similar grounds to those in the case in question, the Government of the United States would not feel justified in taking favorable action on the claim of Mr. Reis. "In relation to the case you mention in your personal note to the Secretary of State, of the Portuguese subject who had obtained naturalization papers in the United States, and had returned to Portugal and becoming implicated in an attempt at revolution, found himself in trouble and applied to the American minister for protection, who insisted on the man being tried in the civil instead of the military courts, it is respectfully submitted that in that case the civil courts in Portugal were then open, while in Hawaii at the time of the arrest of Reis, that country was under martial law, and there could be no resort to the civil courts." Mr. Hill, Act. Sec. of State, to Viscount de Santo-Thyrso, Portuguese min. The claim above referred to grew out of the attempted revolt in Hawaii 8. PROTOCOL WITH SPAIN, 1877. § 1017. As to this protocol, see supra, § 196. When, in 1893, in the case of an American named Howard, who was brought before a court-martial in Havana for trial for an offense committed in a sailors' row, the consul-general of the United States applied for the prisoner's transfer to the civil jurisdiction in conformity with the protocol of 1877, the deputy prosecuting attorney denied the existence of such an agreement and remanded the prisoner into the hands of the court-martial. The consul-general then called upon the prosecuting attorney, who, although he was aware that the agreement existed, explained the error of the deputy by stating that the agreement had never been published by the Spanish Government. The deputy then withdrew his opposition, and Howard was transferred to the civil jurisdiction. Mr. Williams, consul-general at Havana, to Mr. Uhl, Assist. Sec. of State, Mr. Julio Sanguily, a naturalized citizen of the United States, registered as such in the United States consulate-general at Havana, was arrested at his home in that city, Feb. 24, 1895, by order of the governor-general of the island, on suspicion of conspiring against the Spanish Government, and was lodged in the Cabana fortress, subject to the military jurisdiction. As he was not captured with arms in hand, the consul-general asked that he be transferred to the ordinary jurisdiction, with the right to appoint such advocates, solicitors, or notaries as he might choose for his defense, in accordance with the protocol of 1877 and art. 7 of the treaty of 1795. Although Sanguily had been a general in the insurgent army in the Cuban insurrection of 1868-1878, his American citizenship, which was acquired August 6, 1878, was afterwards recognized by the governor-general of Cuba, who issued to him in 1878 and again in 1886 a personal pass (çedula personal) in that character; and on March 16, 1895, the governor-general issued a decree directing that the provisions of the treaty and the protocol be strictly complied with. Nevertheless, Sanguily was soon afterwards committed again to the military jurisdiction on another charge, founded on an alleged kidnapping, and was remanded into solitary confinement and deprived of all intercourse with his counsel by order of the court-martial. The consul general repeated the protest and request which he had made in the previous instance. The governor-general affirmed his adherence to the decision previously made, but took the ground that the preliminary investigation of the charge, as distinguished from the formal trial, did not fall within the stipulations of the treaty and the protocol. The United States denied this contention, maintaining that the treaty of 1795 excluded the military jurisdiction altogether; that the protocol merely recognized and explained the treaty right; that even the arrest, when made by the military authority, was to be construed as a civil act, but that by no fiction could a preliminary military examination be deemed a civil examination of first instance. The consul-general was therefore directed to file a formal protest "declining to recognize validity of military jurisdiction in preliminary stage." A month later, the promised transfer to civil jurisdiction not having been reported, the consulate-general was instructed to demand that Sanguily's "military imprisonment cease forthwith and that he be speedily given civil trial on charges preferred by civil process, or else released." It turned out, however, that he had already been transferred and that he was then under prosecution before a civil tribunal. In the following September a request was made for his speedy trial or release, it appearing that a Spanish subject, jointly accused with him, had been tried by military process and acquitted. The receipt of further information, however, materially modified this aspect of the case. The civil trial began November 28, 1895, on charges of sedition and rebellion, and ended in Sanguily's sentence, Dec. 2, 1895, to imprisonment for life. The charge of kidnapping was afterwards quashed. A judicial appeal was taken to the supreme court at Madrid from the sentence on the charge of rebellion, and the case was remanded for a new trial. This trial took place in December, 1896, and resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. From this sentence an appeal was taken again to the supreme court at Madrid. In February, 1897, Sanguilly withdrew his appeal, and his sentence was commuted by the Queen Regent from "perpetual imprisonment and civil interdiction" to "perpetual exile and its accessories." This was done upon his voluntary written pledge to leave and remain away from Cuba and to abstain not only from giving aid to the insurrection, but also from claiming the protection of the United States if he should do so. On his release he went to the United States. For. Rel. 1896, 750-753; S. Doc. 104, 54 Cong. 2 sess.; For. Rel. 1896, 757, 760, 765, 766, 767, 768, 776, 779, 788, 789-817, 833, 820, 836, 839, 843, 844. H. Doc. 551-vol 6-50 See other discussions of arrests in Cuba, as follows: Eugene S. Pelletier, For. Rel. 1896, 631, 633; Glean brothers, id. 632, 634, 640, 641, 650; George Calvar and Peter Duarte, id. 633, 634; Bert S. Skiller, id 637, 638, 647; Francis J. Larrieu, id. 639, 641; Samuel T. Tolon, id. 641-645, 647, 652-655; Suarez del Villar, id. 645-647, 649, 662; For. Rel. 1897, 483; Manuel Fernandez Chaqueilo, For. Rel. 1896, 645, 648, 649; Oscar Cespedes, id. 662-670; Adolphus Torres, Charles Scott, Jorge W. Aguirre, José L. Cepero, and Luis Someillau, For. Rel. 1897, 483-487. Toward the end of April, 1896, the American schooner Competitor was captured by the Spanish authorities while landing arms and ammunition for the insurgents near San Cayetano, in Cuba. Several persons were taken on board, and in behalf of some of them a right to the protection of the United States was asserted. In behalf of these the consul-general of the United States at Havana claimed a trial under art. 7 of the treaty of 1795 and the protocol of 1877. The Spanish authorities denied the claim, and alleged that they were not entitled to the benefits of the protocol because they were not "residing" in Spanish territory; and they were tried and sentenced by a summary court-martial. On appeal this sentence was annulled, and the case was then proceeded with by an ordinary court-martial, with the rights of counsel and defense guaranteed by the treaty of 1795, the proceeding being in the nature of a preliminary examination. The consulate-general, in reporting this proceeding, observed that the United States, in the case of Sanguily, "declined to recognize the validity of the military jurisdiction in preliminary or at any stage of the proceedings." The Department of State, however, replied that it was not believed that a protest "at this preliminary stage of proceedings" could “be of any avail," and directed that the proceedings be watched and that the "conclusions" of the "preliminary inquest" be reported as soon as they were reached. For. Rel. 1896, 744, 745; S. Doc. 79, 54 Cong. 2 sess. VII. EXPULSION. § 1018. The subject of expulsion is fully discussed elsewhere. See supra, §§ 550-559. For claims on account of expulsion decided by mixed commissions, see For the settlement by Great Britain of claims for deportation from South VIII. ACTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS. 1. GOVERNMENTS, AS A RULE, NOT LIABLE. § 1019. "The act of the subject can never be the act of the sovereign; unless the subject has been commissioned by the sovereign to do it." Case of the Resolution, Federal Court of Appeals, 1781, 2 Dallas, 1. "By the law of nations, if the citizens of one state do an injury to the citizens of another, the government of the offending subject ought to take every reasonable measure to cause reparation to be made by the offended. But if the offender is subject to the ordinary processes of law, it is believed this principle does not generally extend to oblige the government to make satisfaction in case of the inability of the offender." Lincoln, At. Gen., 1802, 1 Op. 106, 107. An alleged Danish vessel was seized by an American vessel as French property, on the south side of the island of St. Domingo, and, whilst awaiting examination, under the American flag, was seized by a British ship and taken to Jamaica and there condemned. It was ruled that as the first captors were not liable for capturing and detaining the vessel long enough for examination, nor for the second capture, and as the Government of the United States is not liable even for the unlawful captures of its subjects, the United States were not bound to indemnify the Danish owner. Lincoln, At. Gen., 1802, 1 Op. 106. The Government of the United States is not liable to foreign governments for misconduct of its private citizens within their jurisdiction. such citizens not being in any sense its representatives. Mr. Forsyth, Sec. of State, to Mr. Calderon de la Barea, Sept. 17, 1839, Governments do not undertake to reimburse persons for the criminal acts Case of Mexican January 30, 1875, Mr. Mariscal, Mexican minister at Washington, in a note to Mr. Fish, who was then Secretary of State, made representations concerning the lynchshepherds. ing (by hanging) of seven Mexican shepherds on November 28, 1873, on a ranch owned by a Mexican near Nueces, Texas. No coroner's inquest, said Mr. Mariscal, was held until the 5th of December, the delay being due, as was alleged, to an Indian invasion; no blame was by the inquest fixed upon anyone, |